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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 The beginning of the post-Cold War era ─ specifically, the 
first half of the 1990s ─ saw a huge increase in the number and 
size of UN peace-keeping missions deployed around the world,1 
including, in several cases, to environments for which tradi-
tional peace-keeping principles of consent, the non-use of force 
and impartiality proved ill-suited. 
 
 This led to a vigorous debate among international relations 
scholars, national defence establishments and the UN Secretariat 
on such questions as the extent to which these peace-keeping 
principles, in particular that limiting the use of force to 
self-defence, could be relaxed. New types of "peace-keeping" 
were envisaged for those situations where party cooperation was 
problematic and the need to use force beyond that for self-
defence in fulfilment of mission objectives apparent.2
 
 Yet, other commentators argued that such environments 
required an entirely new type of peace operation3 ─ conceptually 
distinct, both from traditional peace-keeping and from the kind 
of large-scale enforcement action mounted in cases of trans-
                                                                
      1  See: Supplement to an Agenda for Peace, A/50/60 & S/1995/1, 3 Jan. 1995 
[hereinafter, Agenda Supplement], sec. II, table; The Blue Helmets ─ A 
Review of United Nations Peace-keeping (New York, UNDPI, 3rd ed., 1996), 
pp. v-vii and 4. 
      2  With respect to "aggravated peacekeeping", see: Terry MAYS, Historical 
Dictionary of Multinational Peacekeeping (Lanham, Md., Scarecrow Press, 
1996), pp. xv-xvi; Richard CONNAUGHTON, "Command, Control and Coalition 
Operations" (IN Military Implications of United Nations Peacekeeping 
Operations (McNair Paper no. 17), ed. by William Lewis, Washington, D.C., 
National Defense U. Press, June 1993), p. 13. On the subject of "muscular 
peacekeeping", see Alan JAMES, "Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era", 
International Journal, vol. L, no. 2, spring 1995, pp. 250-58 (especially 
250-51). The concept of "wider peacekeeping", introduced by the British 
Army in 1995, will be discussed in chapter 6 (text accompanying notes , 
infra). 
      3  This term has been used by the UN, the US government and many 
international relations scholars to describe the full range of operations 
mandated by the UN for the maintenance of international peace and security. 
The exact scope of the term will be explored in some depth in chapter 6, 
infra. 
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boundary aggression, as in the Korean Peninsula (1950-53) and 
the Persian Gulf (1990-91).4 This thesis of a "middle ground" in 
peace operations was, however, rejected by other writers who saw 
no room for anything between peace-keeping and enforcement.5 In 
short, confusion reigned at mid-decade with perhaps the only 
point of consensus being the need for greater conceptual clarity 
in respect of peace operations.6
 
 The question of a possible middle ground in the peace 
operations spectrum has largely dropped out of public discussion 
over the last half of the 1990s. Yet, it is submitted that the 
question has now been resolved. The purpose of this 
dissertation, then, is to demonstrate that such a middle ground 
 
      4  Brian URQUHART, "Who Can Stop Civil Wars?", The New York Times, 29 Dec. 
1991, sec. E, p. 9. John MACKINLAY and Jarat CHOPRA, "Second Generation 
Multinational Operations", The Washington Quarterly, vol. 15(3), summer 
1992, pp. 116-20 (especially 118). And see: An Agenda for Peace: Preventive 
Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping, A/47/277 & S/24111, 17 June 1992 
[hereinafter, "An Agenda for Peace"], para. 44; Marrack GOULDING, "The Use 
of Force by the United Nations", International Peacekeeping (London), vol. 
3(1), spring 1996, pp. 16-17. 
      5  Mats BERDAL, "Military Aspects of UN Peacekeeping" (IN New Dimensions of 
Peacekeeping, ed. by Daniel Warner, Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff, 1995), pp. 
132-34. James, supra, note 2, pp. 252-58 (especially 252). 
      6  See: Georges ABI-SAAB, "United Nations Peacekeeping Old and New: An 
Overview of the Issues" (IN New Dimensions of Peacekeeping, ibid.), p. 9; 
John MACKINLAY, "Improving Multifunctional Forces", Survival, vol. 36(3), 
autumn 1994, pp. 151-57; Olara OTUNNU, "An Afterword" (IN Peacemaking and 
Peacekeeping for the Next Century (Report of the 25th Vienna Seminar, March 
1995), New York, International Peace Academy, 1995), pp. 70-72; Adam 
ROBERTS, "The Crisis in UN Peacekeeping", Survival, vol. 36(3), autumn 
1994, pp. 110-11; idem, "From San Francisco to Sarajevo: the UN and the Use 
of Force", Survival, vol. 37(4), winter 1995-96, p. 26; John Gerard RUGGIE, 
"Wandering in the Void: Charting the U.N.'s New Strategic Role", Foreign 
Affairs, vol. 72(5), Nov.-Dec. 1993; Seminar on Peacekeeping and its 
Relationship to Crisis Management ─ Chairman's Summary (Progress Report to 
Ministers by the PMSC/AHG on Cooperation in Peacekeeping, Brussels, 2 Dec. 
1994, Annex II; IN NATO Communiqués 1994, NATO Office of Information and 
Press), paras. 5 and 8-9; Shashi THAROOR, "United Nations Peacekeeping in 
Europe", Survival, vol. 37(2), summer 1995, pp. 125-27; The United Nations 
in its Second Half-Century ─ A Report of the Independent Working Group on 
the Future of the United Nations (New York, Ford Foundation, 1995), pp. 14 
and 19; Thomas WEISS, "Overcoming the Somalia Syndrome ─ 'Operation 
Rekindle Hope?'", Global Governance, vol. 1(2), May-Aug. 1995, pp. 174-76. 
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has indeed been recognized, in both theory and practice, and to 
describe its features in detail. 
 
 Before proceeding, it is worth pondering the merits of the 
subject of study. Why is it so important to resolve this 
question of a middle ground in peace operations? First, because 
the lack of a guiding operational concept for the middle ground 
was undoubtedly a major factor in the failure of several peace 
operations with enforcement or quasi-enforcement mandates 
conducted during the first half of the 1990s ─ in particular, 
the hunt for General Aideed in Somalia and the defence of the 
"safe areas" in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Thus, the first reason for 
mapping out the middle ground is to improve our ability to plan 
and implement operations of this kind. While one source of the 
aforementioned failures undoubtedly lay in a simple failure of 
political will, leading to half-measures and/or frequent shifts 
of strategy, confusion as to the nature of the middle ground and 
its relationship to peace-keeping and other types of enforcement 
action almost certainly played a major role as well. 
 
 Second, conceptual clarity facilitates collective action in 
respect of peace operations. As the ends and means of middle 
ground operations are spelled out with some precision, 
individual governments, accountable to their electorates and, in 
some cases, facing hostile legislatures, will find it easier to 
commit themselves to participate in them.7
 
 A third reason for conducting the present study relates to 
the question of UN reform. It seems obvious that a clear 
understanding of the different strategies developed by the UN 
for the maintenance of international peace and security is a 
prerequisite to any consideration of future reforms in this 
area. Only once we know exactly what instruments the UN has at 
its disposal, can we decide whether and how these might be 
improved or extended. 
 
 
      7  See Oscar SCHACHTER, International Law in Theory and Practice (Dordrecht, 
The Netherlands, Martinus Nijhoff, 1991), p. 413. 
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 Finally, it remains to be proven that the UN, in particular 
the UN Security Council, has the legal authority to establish 
and conduct ─ and, crucially, authorize member states to 
establish and conduct ─ middle-ground-type operations. Although 
the question of the legality of Security Council action is 
important in its own right, it has taken on added importance in 
the post-Cold War era with the sharp increase in Security 
Council activity, especially in the enforcement area, and 
accompanying accusations of double standards and pursuit of 
self-interest.8
 
 When, in recent years, the Council has acted under chapter 
VII of the UN Charter for the purpose of taking, or authorizing 
others to take, enforcement action, it has invariably done so 
without indicating the specific Charter provision or provisions 
upon which its action rests, providing at most a simple 
reference to chapter VII in its entirety. Yet, a failure to 
underpin UN-sanctioned enforcement action, including middle 
ground operations, with a clear legal basis fuels the perception 
that the members of the Security Council ─ in particular its 
permanent members and, among these, the US and its European 
allies ─ are basically unresponsive to legal considerations, 
preferring instead to further individual interests which may or 
may not coincide with those of the international community. The 
end result is that the Council's legitimacy is seriously under-
mined.9
 
 It is important, then, to confirm that the Security Council 
does, in fact, have the legal authority it assumes it has to 
conduct, and authorize others to conduct, middle ground oper-
ations, further to clarify the precise legal basis of this 
authority. Although the Security Council's powers under chapter 
 
      8  See: Rosalyn HIGGINS, The New United Nations: Appearance and Reality 
(University of Hull Press, 1993), pp. 5-9; David CARON, "The Legitimacy of 
the Collective Authority of the Security Council", The American Journal of 
International Law, vol. 87(4), October 1993, pp. 562-66. 
      9  See Frederic KIRGIS, JR., "The Security Council's First Fifty Years", The 
American Journal of International Law, vol. 89(3), July 1995, pp. 537-39. 
On the question of Security Council legitimacy in general, see Caron, ibid. 
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VII of the Charter are broad, they are not unlimited. Council 
legitimacy obviously depends on a wide range of factors; yet it 
also depends, in part, on the perception that the enforcement 
action it conducts or authorizes has a firm legal basis in the 
Charter. 
 
 The outlines of the middle ground are sketched, most 
famously, in paragraph 44 of the former UN Secretary-General's 
An Agenda for Peace.10 The first chapter of the dissertation is 
devoted to an in-depth analysis of the 1992 Agenda and 
subsequent UN documentation, both in respect of the middle 
ground, which the Agenda calls "peace-enforcement", and the 
related question of the use of force in peace-keeping. 
 
 In chapters 2-5, we examine a series of enforcement 
operations, conducted or authorized by the UN, which tend to 
resemble "peace-enforcement", as the concept is presented in the 
1992 Agenda. This practice is briefly reviewed and analyzed in 
the first section of chapter 7. Yet, this is preceded, in 
chapter 6, by a study of American, British and French military 
doctrine in respect of peace operations, focusing on the 
question of the middle ground and the latter's relationship to 
other types of peace operation. 
 
 Chapters 7 and 8 are devoted to the task of definition, 
first from a political perspective (the operational characteris-
tics of peace enforcement), then from a legal one (its legal 
basis). In the last section of the dissertation, we consider the 
question of peace enforcement's specificity in the context of 
the broader spectrum of UN peace operations. At issue ─ the role 
of peace enforcement in relation to peace-keeping and other 
types of enforcement action. 
 
      10  Supra, note 4. 
1  THE CONCEPT OF PEACE ENFORCEMENT 
AS DEVELOPED BY THE UN 
 
 
 
AN AGENDA FOR PEACE1
 
 On 31 January 1992, meeting for the first time at the level 
of heads of state and government, the Security Council asked the 
Secretary-General to prepare 
 
his analysis and recommendations on ways of strengthening and 
making more efficient within the framework and provisions of the 
Charter the capacity of the United Nations for preventive 
diplomacy, for peacemaking and for peace-keeping.2
 
Over the following months, the Secretary-General, with the 
assistance of a Task Force set up especially for this purpose, 
prepared the report requested by the Council. Several states or 
groups of states submitted formal briefs to the Secretary-
General within the terms of reference specified by the Security 
Council at the January summit. A broad range of proposals from 
the academic and NGO communities also formed part of the pool of 
recommendations examined in the initial stages of the report's 
preparation. 
 
 In defining the parameters of the project, the Secretary-
General opted for a "bold and comprehensive" approach,3 covering 
a wide range of issues relating to the UN's maintenance of 
international peace and security and staking out his own 
position in areas where no consensus existed in order to 
stimulate debate. Although then new to the UN, having taken up 
                                                                
      1  The account of the report's preparation included in this section is based 
on David COX, Exploring An Agenda for Peace: Issues Arising from the Report 
of the Secretary-General (Aurora Paper no. 20, Ottawa, Canadian Centre for 
Global Security, October 1993), pp. 3-6 and 41, and on a letter from Tapio 
KANNINEN, Political Affairs Officer (UN Secretariat, New York) to the 
author, 9 October 1996. Mr. Kanninen acted as Secretary of the Agenda Task 
Force. 
      2  S/23500, 31 Jan. 1992. 
      3  Cox, supra, note 11, p. 3. 
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his functions as Secretary-General on 1 January 1992, Boutros 
Boutros-Ghali guided the work of the Task Force and determined 
the content of the final report. An Agenda for Peace is thus 
very much his own work.4
 
 Pursuant to the Security Council's terms of reference, the 
1992 Agenda focused on "preventive diplomacy", "peacemaking" and 
"peace-keeping". Boutros-Ghali, on his own initiative, also 
discussed "the critically related concept of post-conflict 
peace-building".5 Similarly falling outside the Council's terms 
of reference was "peace-enforcement"6 which, somewhat problem-
atically, as will be explained shortly, was dealt with under the 
rubric of peacemaking. 
 
 None of the definitions offered by the 1992 Agenda for the 
aforementioned instruments was particularly satisfying. We will, 
however, restrict our attention to the definitions offered for 
peacemaking and peace-keeping given their relevance to peace 
enforcement, before embarking upon a detailed examination of the 
latter concept.7
 
 
 
 
      4  See Cox, supra, note 11, p. 3. 
      5  An Agenda for Peace, supra, note 4, para. 21. 
      6  Note that the hyphen included in the UN's initial spelling of the term ─ 
"peace-enforcement" ─ was later dropped. The more recent, hyphen-less 
spelling is retained throughout the dissertation, except, obviously, where 
a quoted passage dictates otherwise. 
      7  Concerning the problems inherent in the 1992 Agenda's definitions of 
preventive diplomacy and post-conflict peace-building, see Trevor FINDLAY, 
"Multilateral Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution", SIPRI 
Yearbook 1994, pp. 16-18. Note also that in his 50th Anniversary Annual 
Report on the Work of the Organization, Boutros-Ghali stated his preference 
for the term "preventive action" as opposed to that of "preventive 
diplomacy" (A/51/1, 20 Aug. 1996, para. 652). For Findlay, the likely 
source of these definitional problems lies in "the woolly thinking of the 
Security Council, which tasked the Secretary-General with preparing a 
report on the rather selective menu of 'preventive diplomacy, peacemaking 
and peacekeeping' rather than the comprehensive agenda of conflict 
prevention, management and resolution" (ibid., p. 18). 
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PEACEMAKING 
 
 An Agenda for Peace defines "peacemaking" as: 
 
action to bring hostile parties to agreement, essentially through 
such peaceful means as those foreseen in Chapter VI of the Charter 
of the United Nations.8
 
The word "essentially", coupled with the report's discussion of 
economic sanctions and the use of military force, including 
peace enforcement, under the "peacemaking" rubric constituted 
something of an innovation or, as some observers argued, a 
source of unnecessary confusion,9 since the traditional, pre-
Agenda meaning of "peacemaking" restricted the concept to non-
coercive ─ basically diplomatic ─ means.10 The recent, post-
Agenda literature includes authors who stick to the non-coercive 
formulation11 and others whose understanding of the concept 
incorporates a markedly coercive slant.12
 
 This confusion may have been the price the Secretary-
General felt he had to pay in order to include the subject of 
enforcement action in An Agenda for Peace since, in contrast to 
peacemaking, the Security Council made no mention of enforcement 
action in its terms of reference for the report. In any case, 
since the 1992 Agenda, peacemaking has been restored by the UN 
to its original, non-coercive formulation. Tentative steps 
                                                                
      8  An Agenda for Peace, supra, note 4, para. 20. See also para. 21. 
      9  See: A/47/386, 31 Aug. 1992, para. 41; Findlay, supra, note 17, p. 17; T. 
WEISS, D. FORSYTHE and R. COATE, The United Nations and Changing World 
Politics (Boulder, Co., Westview Press, 1994), p. 86. 
      10  See: The Blue Helmets ─ A Review of United Nations Peace-keeping (New 
York, UNDPI, 2nd ed., 1990), pp. 7-8; Peacekeeper's Handbook (New York, 
International Peace Academy, 1978), pp. I-1 and I-6. 
      11  See Gareth EVANS, Cooperating for Peace (St. Leonards, Australia, Allen & 
Unwin, 1993), p. 11. 
      12  See: W. Michael REISMAN, "Peacemaking", Yale Journal of International 
Law, vol. 18(1), winter 1993; Richard HAASS, Intervention (Washington, 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1994), pp. 59-60. 
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towards this reformulation were made in 1993,13 but only in 1994 
was the shift clearly reflected in UN documentation.14 The 
distinction between peacemaking and enforcement action was 
emphasized in the 1995 Agenda Supplement15 and, even more 
strongly, in the Secretary-General's 1996 Report on the Work of 
the Organization: 
 
'Peacemaking' is also a term that requires definition. As employed 
by the United Nations, it refers to the use of diplomatic means to 
persuade parties in conflict to cease hostilities and to negotiate 
a peaceful settlement of their dispute. As with preventive action, 
the United Nations can play a role only if the parties to the 
dispute agree that it should do so. Peacemaking thus excludes the 
use of force against one of the parties to enforce an end to 
hostilities, an activity that in United Nations parlance is 
referred to as 'peace enforcement'.16
 
 
 
PEACE-KEEPING 
 
 An Agenda for Peace defines "peace-keeping" as: 
 
the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto 
with the consent of all the parties concerned, normally involving 
United Nations military and/or police personnel and frequently 
civilians as well.17
 
As innocuous as this definition might appear at first glance, 
the word "hitherto" actually suggested a radical departure from 
                                                                
      13  See Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI, "An Agenda for Peace: One Year Later", Orbis, 
vol. 37(3), summer 1993, p. 325. Compare A/48/1, 10 Sept. 1993, paras. 278 
and 294. 
      14  See: A/48/403, 14 March 1994, para. 4(b); A/50/1, 22 Aug. 1995, para. 
593. 
      15  Supra, note 1, para. 23. 
      16  A/51/1, 20 Aug. 1996, para. 653. 
      17  An Agenda for Peace, supra, note 4, para. 20. 
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the traditional practice of peace-keeping, developed during the 
Cold War. 
 
 While UN attempts to codify general principles governing 
the establishment and conduct of UN peace-keeping operations 
have not succeeded,18 a basic consensus did evolve during the 
Cold War on the nature of the activity. Specifically, three 
characteristics were seen to define the activity of peace-
keeping. First, peace-keeping was to be conducted only with the 
consent of the parties concerned, in particular the state upon 
whose territory the force was to be deployed (the "host state"), 
together with the other parties to the specific conflict.19 The 
principle of consent also governed the process of putting the 
peace-keeping force together. Military personnel and equipment 
were made available by participating states on a purely 
voluntary basis.20
 
      18  This task formed a central part of the mandate of the Special Committee 
on Peace-keeping Operations, established under General Assembly Resolution 
2006(XIX) of 18 February 1965. Its codification efforts during the Cold War 
foundered, in particular, on the question of the distribution of authority 
over peace-keeping operations between the Security Council and the 
Secretary-General. See Robert SIEKMANN, "The Codification of General 
Principles for United Nations Peace-keeping Operations", Netherlands 
International Law Review, vol. XXXV, 1988/3. The Special Committee has not 
resumed its codification attempts since the end of the Cold War. Note, 
however, that the most recent version of the Special Committee's draft 
articles for peace-keeping operations, dating back to 1977, lists, in draft 
article 9, "the full co-operation of the parties" and the "complete 
objectivity" (i.e. impartiality) of peace-keeping forces as essential 
features of peace-keeping. "Draft Formulae for Articles of Agreed 
Guidelines for United Nations Peace-keeping Operations" (A/32/394, 2 Dec. 
1977, Annex II, Appendix I) [hereinafter, "1977 Draft Articles"]. While 
many of the 1977 draft articles contain alternative provisions, reflecting 
the disagreement just described, a single version of draft article 9 was 
agreed by all Special Committee members, at least as a basis for further 
discussion. In this regard, see paragraphs 7 and 8 of the Eleventh Report 
of the Working Group (A/32/394, 2 Dec. 1977, Annex II). 
      19  The basic enunciations of the principle are found in: A/3943, 9 Oct. 
1958, para. 155; Blue Helmets, supra, note 20, pp. 5-6. And see: Brian 
URQUHART, "Beyond the 'Sheriff's Posse'", Survival, vol. 32(3), May-June 
1990, p. 198; Marrack GOULDING, "The Evolution of United Nations 
Peacekeeping", International Affairs, vol. 69(3), July 1993, p. 454; Abi-
Saab, supra, note 6, p. 3. 
      20  A/3943, 9 Oct. 1958, para. 155. 
  
12
                                                               
 
 The principle of consent presupposed not merely the absence 
of opposition to the force, but, further, the full cooperation 
of the belligerent parties in the implementation of the peace-
keeping force's mandate.21 This meant, for example, allowing the 
force the freedom of movement and communication and other 
facilities which were necessary for the performance of its 
tasks.22
 
 The second defining characteristic of peace-keeping was the 
non-use of force except in self-defence. In formulating the 
basic rules and principles of peace-keeping on the basis of the 
experience of the First United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I), 
UN Secretary-General Hammarskjöld defined the principle thus: 
 
men engaged in the operation may never take the initiative in the 
use of armed force, but are entitled to respond with force to an 
attack with arms, including attempts to use force to make them 
withdraw from positions which they occupy under orders from the 
Commander, acting under the authority of the Assembly and within 
the scope of its resolutions.23
 
This formulation of the principle was, as we shall see, also 
used for the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC). Yet, 
the principle was subsequently extended to encompass the 
"defence" of the peace-keeping mission as well as the defence of 
 
      21  S/11052/Rev. 1, 27 Oct. 1973, para. 3. And see: Fou-Tchin LIU, United 
Nations Peacekeeping and the Non-use of Force (International Peace Academy 
Occasional Paper, Boulder, Co., Lynne Rienner, 1992) p. 11; note 28, supra. 
      22  A/3943, 9 Oct. 1958, para. 164. S/11052/Rev.1, 27 Oct. 1973, para. 4(b). 
Blue Helmets, supra, note 20, p. 6. And see note 28, supra. This principle, 
together with details of the facilities to be accorded, has been 
incorporated into the status of forces agreements that the UN has concluded 
with host states in respect of several peace-keeping operations. Note also 
that a peace-keeping force's right of freedom of movement is often analyzed 
in the literature as a corollary of its right of self-defence. On this 
point, see the discussion concerning the United Nations Operation in the 
Congo ─ text accompanying notes 136-42, infra. 
      23  A/3943, 9 Oct. 1958, para. 179. UNEF I, exceptionally, was established by 
the General Assembly. 
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the peace-keeping force and its positions. We will later examine 
more closely this evolution in the principle restricting the use 
of force in peace-keeping.24 Yet, we can note here that since the 
extended definition of self-defence was almost never applied 
during the Cold War, the concept of peace-keeping continued to 
be based on the self-defence principle's original, narrow 
formulation. 
 
 Impartiality was the third defining characteristic of 
peace-keeping. A peace-keeping operation was expected to act 
with complete impartiality vis-à-vis the parties to the conflict 
in performing its functions under the UN mandate.25 This derived 
from the fact that peace-keeping was, in principle, a temporary, 
emergency measure, designed to consolidate a fragile peace 
between belligerent parties without prejudice to the claims or 
positions forming the subject matter of the particular dispute.26
 
 The principle of force autonomy derived from that of 
impartiality. Pursuant to the former, the peace-keeping force 
could not act at the behest of the host state or any other party 
to the conflict. Its function was to implement the mandate 
conferred upon it by the Security Council or other international 
organ, to whom alone it was accountable.27
 
 The principle of impartiality also had implications for the 
composition of the peace-keeping force. Shortly after the 
establishment of UNEF I, Secretary-General Hammarskjöld 
asserted, as a matter of principle, that neither the permanent 
members of the Security Council nor any states having a special 
interest in the particular situation giving rise to a peace-
keeping operation should participate in it.28
 
      24  See text accompanying notes 158-65, 169-73, and 311-15, infra. 
      25  A/3943, 9 Oct. 1958, paras. 149 and 167. S/11052/Rev. 1, 27 Oct. 1973, 
para. 4(e). S/12611, 19 March 1978, para. 4(e). And see note 28, supra. 
      26  Abi-Saab, supra, note 6, pp. 2 and 4. Goulding, supra, note 29, p. 454. 
      27  Abi-Saab, supra, note 6, p. 4. And see A/3943, 9 Oct. 1958, para. 165. 
      28  A/3943, 9 Oct. 1958, para. 160. And see Abi-Saab, supra, note 6, p. 2. 
Note that the participation of the United Kingdom in the United Nations 
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 ──── 
 
 While they were not its only characteristics,29 the three 
core principles of consent, the non-use of force except in self-
defence, and impartiality were widely seen, at an early stage, 
to define the activity of peace-keeping. It is for this reason 
that the definition proposed in An Agenda for Peace, rejecting 
consent as a basic characteristic of peace-keeping, was nothing 
short of revolutionary. To reject the principle of consent is 
also to reject the principle of the non-use of force since, in 
the absence of consent, a UN force would have little alternative 
but to employ some measure of force in order to implement its 
mandate. This implication of the infamous "hitherto" was in fact 
made explicit in writings and addresses given by Secretary-
General Boutros-Ghali in the year following the release of An 
Agenda for Peace.30
 
 Yet, it is only on the basis of the non-use of force that 
peace-keeping can be distinguished from enforcement action. The 
ultimate implication of the "hitherto", in other words, was to 
erase the distinction between peace-keeping and enforcement 
action. This too emerged quite clearly from Boutros-Ghali's 
writings: 
 
Between Chapter VI and Chapter VII lie cases which are sui generis 
and where earlier certainties about actions with or without the 
parties' agreement may need to be re-examined with each new 
 
Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) and that of France in the United 
Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) were Cold War exceptions to the 
first rule. Since the end of the Cold War, the latter has effectively been 
abandoned. The second rule, while probably not abandoned, has been 
undermined in the post-Cold War period by several, significant departures 
from it, beginning with Russian and Turkish participation in the United 
Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in the former Yugoslavia. 
      29  For others, see: A/3943, 9 Oct. 1958; S/11052/Rev.1, 27 Oct. 1973; Blue 
Helmets, supra, note 20, pp. 5-8; Goulding, supra, note 29, pp. 453-55; 
Urquhart, supra, note 29, p. 198. 
      30  See: Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI, "Beyond Peacekeeping", New York University 
Journal of International Law and Politics, vol. 25(1), fall 1992, p. 120; 
Boutros-Ghali, supra, note 23, p. 328. 
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approach.31
 
On le voit, les catégories juridiques traditionnelles à partir 
desquelles nous avions identifié jusqu'alors l'action des Nations 
Unies dans le domaine de la paix et de la sécurité sont largement 
remises en cause. La frontière même entre l'action coercitive et 
l'action non coercitive devient moins apparente.32
 
 
Yet, the "middle ground", if it does exist, cannot be defined in 
such terms. A particular operation is either authorized to use 
force for the purpose of implementing its mandate (not merely 
for the incidental purpose of protecting itself while implement-
ing its mandate by peaceful means) or it is not. There is 
nothing between enforcement and non-enforcement. Whatever the 
operational specificity of post-Agenda peace-keeping, it cannot 
lie here. In fact, the principal criticism that post-Agenda 
peace-keeping inspires, from a theoretical point of view, is 
that it has no specificity at all. 
 
 In his Report on the Work of the Organization for 1993, 
Boutros-Ghali retained, word for word, the definition of peace-
keeping found in the 1992 Agenda, including the "hitherto".33 He 
offered, however, a new definition for "the concept of peace 
enforcement": 
 
It involves peace-keeping activities which do not necessarily 
involve the consent of all the parties concerned.34
 
Which was to say that "peace-keeping" and "peace enforcement" 
were the same thing or, at least, that "peace-keeping" 
overlapped with "peace enforcement". In fact, the boundaries of 
 
      31  Boutros-Ghali, "Beyond Peacekeeping", ibid., p. 120. 
      32  Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI, "Message du Secrétaire Général de l'Organisation 
des Nations Unies" (DANS Le chapitre VII de la Charte des Nations Unies, 
Paris, Pedone, 1995). 
      33  A/48/1, 10 Sept. 1993, para. 278. 
      34  Ibid., para. 278. 
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post-Agenda peace-keeping appeared to know no limits. 
 
Just as preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution, familiar 
responsibilities of the United Nations, have taken on new dimen-
sions, so the term peace-keeping now stretches across a heretofore 
unimagined range of United Nations activities and 
responsibilities. 
 Peace-keeping is a United Nations invention. The concept is, 
however, not a static one, but is ever changing; in order to 
succeed, and to reflect the changing needs of the community of 
States, peace-keeping has to be reinvented every day. Each case in 
which United Nations peace-keepers are involved draws upon the 
fund of experience, imagination and professionalism of the 
Organization. It is not an exaggeration to state that today there 
are as many types of peace-keeping operations as there are types 
of conflict.35
 
On theoretical grounds, then, the Secretary-General's proposed 
reconceptualization of peace-keeping raised serious concern.36
 
 Yet, the real test of the new definition of peace-keeping 
would come, not on paper, but on the ground. The new definition 
was driven, not by theoretical considerations, but by the 
practical problems then facing UN peace-keeping operations. A 
series of proposals for the use of force by peace-keepers, 
circulating in the early 1990s,37 were largely prompted by the 
UN's increasing, post-Cold War involvement in internal conflicts 
and the relative scarcity, in that context, of party consent and 
cooperation. In fact, the problem was quite vividly illustrated 
during the period, in the spring of 1992, that An Agenda for 
Peace was being drafted. 
 
      35  Ibid., paras. 292-93. 
      36  Concerning the problems raised by the Secretary-General's "hitherto", 
see: Weiss, supra, note 6, p. 176; Findlay, supra, note 17, pp. 17-18; 
Roberts, supra, note 6, pp. 100-01. 
      37  See: John MACKINLAY, "Powerful Peace-keepers", Survival, vol. 32(3), May-
June 1990, especially pp. 248-50; William DURCH and Barry BLECHMAN, Keeping 
the Peace: The United Nations in the Emerging World Order (Washington, 
Henry L. Stimson Center, March 1992), pp. i-ii, 16-17 and 47. For other 
views and commentary on the issue of the use of force by peace-keepers, see 
Urquhart, supra, note 29, pp. 201-04; Liu, supra, note 31, pp. 41-43; 
Schachter, supra, note 7, pp. 409-10. 
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 As the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) deployed 
to Serb-held areas of Croatia pursuant to the UN peace-keeping 
plan for the newly independent republic, the Secretary-General 
reported that the Serb-controlled Yugoslav Army, as it withdrew 
from these areas, as required under the plan, was transferring 
arms, equipment and personnel to local Croatian Serb 
paramilitary units.38 In this way, the plan's demilitarization 
and demobilization provisions were thwarted and UNPROFOR's 
mission in Croatia effectively subverted.39 During the same 
period, as the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia 
(UNTAC) deployed to that country, the Khmer Rouge were moving to 
derail the military component of the Paris Accords, signed in 
October 1991 for the purpose of ending the Cambodian civil war.40
 
 Yet, it remained to be seen whether such problems could be 
overcome by allowing peace-keepers to use force. Calls for UNTAC 
to use force to bring the Khmer Rouge to heel were not heeded.41 
The former Yugoslavia was to offer more fertile terrain for 
experimentation, though the combination of peace-keeping and 
enforcement action mounted by the UN and NATO in Bosnia-Herzego-
vina in 1993-9542 was soon discredited. Writing in early 1995, 
even before the catastrophic fall of the Srebrenica and Zepa 
safe areas in Bosnia, the Secretary-General drew very different 
 
      38  S/23844, 24 April 1992, para. 16. 
      39  Failure to demilitarize the "United Nations Protected Areas" prevented 
the return of displaced persons to their homes as originally intended. For 
a good account of the subversion of UNPROFOR's mandate in Croatia, see Alan 
JAMES, "The UN in Croatia: An Exercise in Futility?", The World Today, vol. 
49(5), May 1993, especially pp. 94-95. 
      40  S/24090, 12 June 1992. The Khmer Rouge were refusing to comply with 
measures which would permit the entry into force of Phase II of the cease-
fire, involving the regroupment, cantonment, disarmament and partial 
demobilization of the four rival armies. 
      41  Concerning the decision not to use force, see: Steven RATNER, The New UN 
Peacekeeping (New York, St. Martin's Press, 1995) pp. 154 and 170-71; Lt.-
Gen. J.M. SANDERSON, "UNTAC: Debriefing and Lessons ─ The Military 
Component View", International Peacekeeping (The Hague), vol. 2(2-3), Feb.-
May 1995, p. 32. 
      42  See chapter 4, "The Safe Areas" section, infra. 
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conclusions concerning the distinctions between peace-keeping 
and enforcement from those he had offered, at least implicitly, 
in An Agenda for Peace. 
 
In both [Somalia and Bosnia-Herzegovina], existing peace-keeping 
operations were given additional mandates that required the use of 
force and therefore could not be combined with existing mandates  
requiring the consent of the parties, impartiality and the non-use 
of force. It was also not possible for them to be executed without 
much stronger military capabilities than had been made available, 
as is the case in the former Yugoslavia. In reality, nothing is 
more dangerous for a peace-keeping operation than to ask it to use 
force when its existing composition, armament, logistic support 
and deployment deny it the capacity to so. The logic of peace-
keeping flows from political and military premises that are quite 
distinct from those of enforcement; and the dynamics of the latter 
are incompatible with the political process that peace-keeping is 
intended to facilitate. To blur the distinction between the two 
can undermine the viability of the peace-keeping operation and 
endanger its personnel.43
 
 Thus, it has become clear: first, that "a mix of peace-
keeping and enforcement is not the answer to a lack of consent 
and cooperation by the parties to the conflict";44 second, that 
peace-keeping remains peace-keeping, founded upon the three core 
principles of consent, the non-use of force except in self-
 
      43  Agenda Supplement, supra, note 1, para. 35. It will be seen in chapter 3 
of the dissertation that the second United Nations Operation in Somalia 
(UNOSOM II), in contrast to the safe areas initiative in Bosnia, did not in 
fact mix peace-keeping and enforcement action. Compare paragraph 35 of the 
Agenda Supplement, just quoted, with paragraphs 599-600 of the Secretary-
General's 1995 Report on the Work of the Organization (A/50/1, 22 Aug. 
1995) where, in a similar discussion of the dangers of mixing peace-keeping 
and enforcement, the example of Bosnia, alone, is retained. 
      44  A/50/1, 22 Aug. 1995, para. 600. And see: Agenda Supplement, supra, note 
1, paras. 34-36; Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI, "Mes nouvelles propositions pour la 
paix", Le Trimestre du monde, no. 29, 1995/1, pp. 11-12; Idem, "Friedmann 
Award Address", Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, vol. 33(2), 1995, p. 
255; Idem, "Le maintien de la paix: pause ou sursaut?",  Le Trimestre du 
monde, no. 32, 1995/4, pp. 15-16; Idem, "L'ONU et les nouveaux conflits 
internationaux", Relations internationales et stratégiques, no. 20, hiver 
1995, pp. 19-20. 
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defence, and impartiality. 
 
 In fact, the UN's shift back to the standard definition of 
peace-keeping was evident even before the release of the Agenda 
Supplement. The Secretary-General's March 1994 report on 
Improving the Capacity of the United Nations for Peace-Keeping 
quietly dropped the "hitherto" in its new definition of peace-
keeping: "a United Nations presence in the field ... with the 
consent of the parties".45 The point is emphasized in the Agenda 
Supplement: 
 
the last few years have confirmed that respect for certain basic 
principles of peace-keeping are essential to its success. Three 
particularly important principles are the consent of the parties, 
impartiality and the non-use of force except in self-defence.46
 
Virtually everyone, inside and outside of the UN now agrees. The 
three core principles are seen as fundamental to peace-keeping.47 
This is as true of so-called "second generation peace-keeping" 
as it is of its Cold War predecessor. While second generation 
operations are typically called upon to perform a much wider 
variety of functions than the traditional missions for the 
supervision of cease-fire arrangements and the separation of 
rival military forces,48 they remain peace-keeping, founded on 
 
      45  A/48/403, 14 March 1994, para. 4(c). 
      46  Agenda Supplement, supra, note 1, para. 33. And see Boutros BOUTROS-
GHALI, "Preface: The Evolution of Peacekeeping Policy" (IN Soldiers for 
Peace, ed. by B. Benton, New York, Facts on File, 1996), p. 2. 
      47  See: A/50/230, 22 June 1995, paras. 40 and 43; A/51/130, 7 May 1996, 
para. 37; A/52/209, 28 June, 1997, para. 41; GAR 50/30, 6 Dec. 1995, para. 
2; GAR 51/136, 13 Dec. 1996, para. 2; S/PRST/1995/9, 22 Feb. 1995, p. 2. 
Compare S/25859, 28 May 1993. And see the following authors: Roberts, 
supra, note 6, p. 94; Trevor FINDLAY, "Reflections on the Use of Force in 
Peace Operations" (unpublished paper derived from the Workshop on the Use 
of Force in Peace Operations, SIPRI and the Austral. Dept. of Foreign 
Affairs & Trade, Stockholm, April 1995), p. 2; Olara OTUNNU, "Peacekeeping: 
From a Crossroads to the Future", April 1995 (text of address to the UN 
Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations; source 
<www.afnews.org/ans>); Marie-Claude SMOUTS, "Pour qui sont ces soldats?" 
(DANS L'ONU et la guerre ─ la diplomatie en kaki, sous la direction de M.-
C. Smouts, Bruxelles, Éditions Complexe, 1994), pp. 12-14. 
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the three criteria just described.49
 
 Thus, attempts to stretch peace-keeping beyond established 
limits have been definitively rejected. Yet, this is not to 
reject the need for something more than peace-keeping when 
faced, in a particular conflict, with a lack of party consent 
and cooperation. Since An Agenda for Peace was released in June 
1992, the traditional concept of peace-keeping, which it called 
into question, has been reaffirmed. The use of force to overcome 
a lack of consent and cooperation is a separate question. 
 
PEACE ENFORCEMENT 
 
 Several commentators, writing in the early 1990s, were 
sceptical that a lack of consent and cooperation could be 
remedied by allowing peace-keepers to use force.50 They advo-
cated, instead, a "third option", specifically a "third category 
of international military operation ... somewhere between 
peacekeeping and large-scale enforcement."51 In fact, Boutros-
Ghali's proposal, in An Agenda for Peace, for "peace-enforcement 
units" appears to stake out such a middle ground. 
                                                                
      48  The new operations, unlike their Cold War predecessors, often follow a 
peace settlement between the parties and may have as their primary mission 
the implementation of that settlement. A second factor encouraging an 
expansion of tasks is the shift in the locus of activity from the inter-
state to intra-state realm. See: Abi-Saab, supra, note 6; Georges ABI-SAAB, 
"La deuxième génération des opérations de maintien de la paix: quelques 
réflexions préliminaires", Le Trimestre du monde, no. 20, 1992/4; Victor-
Yves GHEBALI, "Le développement des opérations de maintien de la paix de 
l'ONU depuis la fin de la guerre froide", Le Trimestre du monde, no. 20, 
1992/4; Ratner, supra, note 51, p. 17. 
      49  See: Ratner, supra, note 51, p. 17; Shashi THAROOR, "Should UN 
Peacekeeping Go 'Back to Basics'?" Survival, vol. 37(4), winter 1995-96, p. 
54. Both authors emphasize the continued importance of consent to second 
generation peace-keeping. 
      50  Mackinlay, supra, note 47, reviews the various arguments made by those 
sceptical of the use of force in this context. And see Urquhart, supra, 
note 29, especially pp. 201-03. 
      51  Urquhart, supra, note 4. Urquhart's proposal was echoed by Mackinlay and 
Chopra, supra, note 4 (p. 118). And see Jarat CHOPRA, Age EKNES, and Toralv 
NORDBO, Fighting for Hope in Somalia (Oslo, Norwegian Institute of Interna-
tional Affairs (NUPI), 1995), pp. 15-16. 
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 Paragraph 44 of the 1992 Agenda reads as follows: 
 
Peace-enforcement units 
   44  The mission of forces under Article 43 would be to respond 
to outright aggression, imminent or actual. Such forces are not 
likely to be available for some time to come. Cease-fires have 
often been agreed to but not complied with, and the United Nations 
has sometimes been called upon to send forces to restore and 
maintain the cease-fire. This task can on occasion exceed the 
mission of peace-keeping forces and the expectations of peace-
keeping force contributors. I recommend that the Council consider 
the utilization of peace-enforcement units in clearly defined 
circumstances and with their terms of reference specified in 
advance. Such units from Member States would be available on call 
and would consist of troops that have volunteered for such 
service. They would have to be more heavily armed than peace-
keeping forces and would need to undergo extensive preparatory 
training within their national forces. Deployment and operation of 
such forces would be under the authorization of the Security 
Council and would, as in the case of peace-keeping forces, be 
under the command of the Secretary-General. I consider such peace-
enforcement units to be warranted as a provisional measure under 
Article 40 of the Charter. Such peace-enforcement units should not 
be confused with the forces that may eventually be constituted 
under Article 43 to deal with acts of aggression or with the 
military personnel which Governments may agree to keep on stand-by 
for possible contribution to peace-keeping operations.52
 
 On its face, this proposal is "more a mechanism than a 
concept",53 yet it also seems part concept and, as such, of 
broader scope than the specific contingency it envisages of 
cease-fire enforcement.54 Taken together with an article written 
 
      52  An Agenda for Peace, supra, note 4. Note the resemblance to Urquhart's 
proposal for "armed police actions" designed "to put an end to random 
violence and to provide a reasonable degree of peace and order so that 
humanitarian relief work could go forward and a conciliation process could 
commence." Urquhart, supra, note 4. 
      53  Chopra et al, supra, note 61, p. 14. 
      54  This interpretation finds strong support in paragraph 44 where the Secre-
tary-General "recommend[s] that the Council consider the utilization of 
peace-enforcement units in clearly defined circumstances and with their 
terms of reference specified in advance." (emphasis added) The suggestion, 
clearly, is that the cease-fire enforcement function is merely one of a 
possible range of assigned functions. Also in support of this 
interpretation, see Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI, "L'ONU en première ligne", 
Politique internationale, no. 57, automne 1992, p. 146. But see Boutros 
BOUTROS-GHALI, "Empowering the United Nations", Foreign Affairs, vol. 
71(5), winter 1992-93, pp. 93-94. 
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by Boutros-Ghali for the winter 1992-93 edition of Foreign 
Affairs,55 paragraph 44 can be seen to define an intermediate 
category of peace operation, possessing three principal charac-
teristics. 
 
Enforcement The peace enforcement units proposed in the 1992 
Agenda would be mandated "to restore and maintain [a] cease-
fire" in situations where such a cease-fire has "been agreed to 
but not complied with".56 Put differently, their task would be 
"to enforce a ceasefire by taking coercive action against either 
party, or both, if they violate it."57 As such, these units 
"would have to be more heavily armed than peace-keeping 
forces".58 Clearly, peace enforcement, as the name would suggest, 
involves the use of force beyond self-defence. It constitutes a 
species of enforcement action. 
 
Imperfect Consent As we are dealing with enforcement action, 
one would assume, in direct contrast to peace-keeping, that 
consent is entirely dispensed with. In fact, under the scenario 
envisaged in both paragraph 44 and the Foreign Affairs article, 
the peace enforcement operation is deployed to enforce 
compliance with a previously agreed cease-fire. While there may 
not have been express consent to the deployment of the peace 
enforcement operation,59 the belligerents have at least agreed on 
the objective which the operation is mandated to secure. 
Consent, of a kind, existed, but has failed. 
 
Impartiality While this is not expressly stated in An Agenda 
for Peace, the Secretary-General's affirmation that the legal 
basis of peace enforcement would be UN Charter article 40 is a 
                                                                
      55  Boutros-Ghali, "Empowering the United Nations", ibid. 
      56  An Agenda for Peace, supra, note 4, paragraph 44, 3rd sentence. 
      57  Boutros-Ghali, "Empowering the United Nations", supra, note 64, p. 94. 
      58  An Agenda for Peace, supra, note 4, middle of paragraph 44. And see 
Boutros-Ghali, "Empowering the United Nations", supra, note 64, p. 94. 
      59  Boutros-Ghali, "Empowering the United Nations", supra, note 64, p. 94. 
  
23
                                                               
strong indication of its impartial nature.60 In fact, the point 
is made explicitly in the Secretary-General's Foreign Affairs 
article ─ peace enforcement troops "would be impartial between 
the two sides, taking action only if one or other of them 
violated the agreed ceasefire."61
 
 Peace enforcement's intermediate nature, standing somewhere 
between peace-keeping, on the one hand, and large-scale enforce-
ment action, on the other, is highlighted in paragraph 44 of the 
1992 Agenda: 
 
Such peace-enforcement units should not be confused with the 
forces that may eventually be constituted under Article 43 to deal 
with acts of aggression or with the military personnel which 
Governments may agree to keep on stand-by for possible 
contribution to peace-keeping operations.62
 
 Peace-keeping, as previously stated, is defined by the 
principles of consent, the non-use of force except in self-
defence, and impartiality. Boutros-Ghali's reference to hypo-
thetical article 43 forces designed "to deal with acts of 
aggression" suggests the kind of large-scale enforcement action 
mounted to stop or roll back transborder attacks by standing 
armies, as in Korea (1950-53) and the Persian Gulf (1990-91). 
Enforcement action of this type obviously involves no consent 
whatsoever and, since directed against a predetermined 
 
      60  The second-to-last sentence of article 40 reads: "Such provisional 
measures shall be without prejudice to the rights, claims or position of 
the parties concerned." The aim then is to freeze a given situation without 
consideration of relative blame or fault and without making any judgement 
on the specific claims advanced. For a detailed discussion of article 40, 
see chapter 8, infra. 
      61  Boutros-Ghali, "Empowering the United Nations", supra, note 64, p. 94. 
      62  An Agenda for Peace, supra, note 4, para. 44, last sentence. And see the 
first two sentences of the paragraph. Peace enforcement's intermediate 
nature is also suggested in the Secretary-General's 1993 Report on the Work 
of the Organization wherein he states that "the concept of peace 
enforcement ... involves peace-keeping activities which do not necessarily 
involve the consent of all the parties concerned." A/48/1, 10 Sept. 1993, 
para. 278. 
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aggressor, is wholly partial. 
 
 Peace enforcement, as defined above, combines features of 
both peace-keeping and large-scale enforcement action. Like 
peace-keeping, peace enforcement is impartial. Like large-scale 
enforcement action, it involves the use of force beyond that for 
self-defence; it constitutes a species of enforcement action. It 
is distinct from both when it comes to consent, occupying an 
intermediate point between the "full and continuous consent" 
needed in peace-keeping63 and the total absence of consent found 
in large-scale enforcement action. 
  
 In the course of the dissertation, we will explore these 
characteristics of peace enforcement more thoroughly. An Agenda 
for Peace only reveals the approximate contours of the middle 
ground. To capture the latter with greater analytical precision 
─ indeed, to confirm its existence ─ we will have to look 
outside the framework of the UN, as the latter, since the 
release of An Agenda for Peace in June 1992, has not merely 
failed to develop the concept, it has, arguably, rejected it 
altogether. At the very least, the term "peace enforcement" has 
been stripped of all meaning. 
 
 The ties in UN language between "peace enforcement" and the 
middle ground are severed in the Secretary-General's March 1994 
report on Improving the Capacity of the United Nations for 
Peace-keeping which offered mostly new64 definitions for the 
various instruments for peace and security initially presented 
in An Agenda for Peace, including "peace-enforcement": 
 
It consists of action under Chapter VII of the Charter, including 
 
      63  "The Special Committee stresses that full and continuous consent is 
crucial to the success of peace-keeping operations." A/50/230, 22 June 
1995, para. 43. This conclusion was endorsed by the General Assembly in 
paragraph 2 of its Resolution 50/30 of 6 December 1995. 
      64  Although the Secretary-General claims, in paragraph 4 of the report 
(A/48/403, 14 March 1994) that "the international community has become 
increasingly familiar" with these instruments, the definitions given for 
peacemaking and peace-keeping, as well as that for peace enforcement, 
differ in key respects from those offered in the 1992 Agenda. 
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the use of armed force, to maintain or restore international peace 
and security in situations where the Security Council has 
determined the existence of a threat to the peace, breach of the 
peace or act of aggression;65
 
On this definition, peace enforcement simply means enforcement 
action of any kind consistent with chapter VII of the UN 
Charter, including, but not restricted to, the use of armed 
force. 
 
 In the Supplement to An Agenda for Peace, issued in January 
1995, the term "peace enforcement" is eclipsed by the generic 
term "enforcement" or "enforcement action". Although, in 
paragraph 23 of the report, "peace enforcement" is listed as one 
of "a range of instruments for controlling and resolving 
conflicts between and within States",66 the term is dropped two 
sentences later in the paragraph in favour of "enforcement" 
alone. There is no hint of the middle ground in the brief 
definition of "enforcement" offered there which suggests a sharp 
division between coercive and non-coercive measures on the basis 
of the presence or absence of consent.67
 
 The term "peace enforcement" is not used at all in the 
section of the Supplement dealing with "Enforcement action".68 
The focus there is solely on enforcement operations authorized 
by the Security Council but conducted by ad hoc coalitions of 
member states or regional arrangements. A very wide spectrum of 
military activity is envisaged, ranging from the massive oper-
ations mounted to end North Korean (1950-53) and Iraqi 
aggression (1990-91) to NATO's use of air power for relatively 
 
      65  A/48/403, 14 March 1994, para. 4(d). 
      66  Agenda Supplement, supra, note 1. 
      67  The relevant sentence in paragraph 23 reads: "Sanctions and enforcement, 
on the other hand, are coercive measures and thus, by definition, do not 
require the consent of the party concerned." Agenda Supplement, supra, note 
1. 
      68  ─ section "F" of the report, i.e. paras. 77-80. Agenda Supplement, supra, 
note 1. 
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narrow purposes in Bosnia-Herzegovina (1994-95).69
 
 A fact sheet on peace-keeping, put out by the UN's Depart-
ment of Public Information in September 1996, assigns the term 
"peace-enforcement" to the broad range of UN-authorized enforce-
ment action described in the Agenda Supplement.70 Issued around 
the same time as the fact sheet, the Secretary-General's Annual 
Report on the Work of the Organization describes "peace enforce-
ment" as "the use of force against one of the parties to enforce 
an end to hostilities".71
 
 Thus, the term "peace enforcement", as used by the UN, no 
longer means anything in particular. One could argue that the UN 
has, in fact, entirely rejected the concept of a middle ground 
in peace operations, whether called "peace enforcement" or 
something else. The admonition, contained in the Agenda Supple-
ment, against "blur[ring] the distinction between" peace-keeping 
and enforcement lends strong support to such a claim.72 Yet, the 
presentation, in a preceding section of the report, of "a new 
kind of United Nations operation" involving the impartial and 
limited use of force by UN troops for humanitarian purposes 
seems predicated on the existence of a middle ground.73 Unless 
 
      69  And see the transcript of Boutros-Ghali's press conference of 5 January 
1995, held in conjunction with the release of the Agenda Supplement ─ 
SG/SM/95/1, 5 Jan. 1995 (UN Information Service, Geneva), p. 7. 
      70  UN Peace-keeping: Some Questions and Answers, UNDPI, DPI/1851, Sept. 
1996. The discussion of "peace-enforcement" contained in DPI/1851 has been 
used in a more recent UNDPI publication, though with some changes, in 
particular the partial replacement of the term "peace-enforcement" with 
"enforcement action". See Peace-keeping at a Glance, UNDPI, DPI/1903, May 
1997. 
      71   A/51/1, 20 Aug. 1996, para. 653. 
      72  Agenda Supplement, supra, note 1, para. 35. And see para. 34. 
      73  Agenda Supplement, supra, note 1, paras. 18-19. The specific examples 
mentioned are the protection of humanitarian relief operations and the 
protection of safe areas. Paragraph 19 reads: 
"This has led, in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Somalia, to a new kind of 
United Nations operation. Even though the use of force is authorized 
under Chapter VII of the Charter, the United Nations remains neutral 
and impartial between the warring parties, without a mandate to stop 
the aggressor (if one can be identified) or impose a cessation of 
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the report's subsequent admonition against mixing peace-keeping 
and enforcement, cited above, constitutes an implicit74 rejection 
of these activities, the middle ground would, then, retain some 
relevance for the UN, although its contours are even hazier in 
the Agenda Supplement than in the 1992 Agenda. 
 
 However one interprets the Agenda Supplement on this point, 
it is clear that in order to map the middle ground with any 
precision, indeed in order to confirm its existence, we need to 
look outside the UN ─ to operations in the field and national 
military doctrine. Our earlier efforts to sketch out the salient 
features of peace enforcement on the basis of An Agenda for 
Peace and the related Foreign Affairs article will serve as the 
foundation of that analysis. 
 
 
AGENDA FOLLOW-UP 
 
 The initial reaction of UN member states to Boutros-Ghali's 
proposal for peace enforcement units was cool.75 Over the 1992-93 
period, neither the Security Council nor the General Assembly 
formally approved either the mechanism or concept in their 
review of the proposals contained in An Agenda for Peace. The 
closest either body came to an endorsement of the concept of 
peace enforcement (the middle ground) can be found in the last 
of a series of nine statements made by the President of the 
                                                                
hostilities. Nor is this peace-keeping as practised hitherto, because 
the hostilities continue and there is often no agreement between the 
warring parties on which a peace-keeping mandate can be based. The 
"safe areas" concept in Bosnia and Herzegovina is a similar case. It 
too gives the United Nations a humanitarian mandate under which the 
use of force is authorized, but for limited and local purposes and 
not to bring the war to an end." 
      74  Note that paragraphs 18 and 19 of the Agenda Supplement (supra, note 1), 
describing the new activities, contain no hint of the criticism found in 
the subsequent passage of the report (paragraphs 34-35). On the contrary, 
the presentation of these activities as "a new kind of United Nations 
operation" suggests a desire to institutionalize such practice. 
      75  For more on this subject, see: Cox, supra, note 11, pp. 10-11, 21, 27-28 
and 41-42; Findlay, supra, note 17, pp. 15-16; A/48/173, 25 May 1993, 
paras. 39-44; A/47/386, 31 Aug. 1992, paras. 39-43. 
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Security Council on the 1992 Agenda. Therein, the Council 
enunciated a series of "operational principles" for "peace-
keeping operations", including the following: 
 
the consent of the government and, where appropriate, the parties 
concerned, save in exceptional cases; ... readiness of the 
Security Council to take appropriate measures against parties 
which do not observe its decisions; the right of the Security 
Council to authorize all means necessary for United Nations forces 
to carry out their mandate and the inherent right of United 
Nations forces to take appropriate measures for self-defence.76
 
While this statement, adopted at the height of Security Council 
activism, in May 1993,77 shows some inclination on the part of 
Council members to use force in peace-keeping-type situations, 
it falls decisively short of an endorsement of the concept of 
peace enforcement which the statement neither mentions by name 
nor captures in its essential features. 
 
 While peace enforcement did not fare well on paper during 
this period, events on the ground were to force a trial of the 
concept, first in Somalia, subsequently in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
We will examine the series of operations deployed to these two 
conflict zones in detail. Yet, we will first direct our 
attention to ONUC, the only military operation the UN conducted 
during the Cold War which appeared to involve, in certain 
instances, the use of force beyond that for self-defence. 
 
      76  S/25859, 28 May 1993. 
      77  In late March 1993, the Security Council decided to establish a UN peace 
enforcement operation for Somalia. UNOSOM II took over from the US-led 
multinational force in early May. See chapter 3, infra. The spring-summer 
of 1993 also saw the Security Council move to take a more muscular approach 
in respect of the Bosnian conflict. See chapter 4, infra. 
2  THE CONGO (1960-64)1
 
 
 The largest peace-keeping operation undertaken by the UN 
during the Cold War period2 was that deployed to the Belgian 
Congo3 immediately following the latter's independence on 30 
June 1960. Though initially cast in a strict peace-keeping 
mould, over the course of its four-year deployment in the 
country, the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC)4 would 
be given additional powers and functions which were to force it 
to and, it will be argued, even over the line dividing peace-
keeping and enforcement action. 
 
 
 
THE CONGO CRISIS: AN OVERVIEW 
 
 A brief overview of the major developments in the 1960-64 
Congo Crisis, especially as they concerned ONUC, is in order 
before we examine the latter's functions in detail. 
 
 Congolese independence, inadequately prepared, was almost 
immediately followed by the mutiny of Congolese soldiers and the 
breakdown of law and order in many areas of the country. The 
authorities in Katanga seized the opportunity to declare the 
province's secession from the rest of the Congo. Beginning on 10 
July 1960, Belgian troops deployed in various areas of the Congo 
                                                                
      1  Acknowledgement: two works served as points of access to much of the 
source material (UN documentation) used in this chapter: Georges ABI-SAAB, 
The United Nations Operation in the Congo 1960-1964 (Oxford, Oxford U. 
Press, 1978); Rosalyn HIGGINS, United Nations Peacekeeping 1946-1967: 
Documents and Commentary (Oxford, Oxford U. Press, vol. III, 1980). 
      2  At its peak, ONUC's military component comprised nearly 20,000 officers 
and men. The Blue Helmets, supra, note 1, p. 175. 
      3  The overthrow of the Mobutu regime, in May 1997, was accompanied by the 
renaming of the country, from "Zaire" to "Democratic Republic of Congo", 
which is close to the name used in the early 1960s ─ "Republic of the 
Congo" (emphasis added). For the sake of uniformity between dissertation 
text and quoted materials, usage in this chapter will reflect that of the 
early 1960s, with the country being referred to as "the Congo", instead of 
the current "Congo". 
      4  The French acronym, "ONUC" ("l'Opération des Nations Unies au Congo"), is 
used by the UN in both its French and English language documentation. 
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in order to protect Belgian nationals. The Belgian intervention, 
launched without the approval of the Congolese authorities, led 
the Congolese Prime Minister, Patrice Lumumba, and President, 
Joseph Kasavubu, to request military assistance from the UN. 
 
 The UN Security Council authorized the establishment of 
ONUC on 14 July. The first units of the Force were deployed only 
days later for the purpose of restoring and maintaining law and 
order, thus allowing the Belgian troops to withdraw. The 
deployment of UN troops to Katanga, initially opposed by the 
secessionist authorities, was agreed to once the latter had been 
assured that the UN would not act on behalf of the Central 
Government to end the secession. 
 
 As of September 1960, Central Government authority itself 
became fragmented in a struggle for power between Lumumba, 
Kasavubu and other claimants. The murder of Lumumba in February 
1961 pushed the country to the brink of full-scale civil war, 
prompting the Security Council, for the first time, to authorize 
ONUC to use force in order to prevent civil war clashes (SCR 
161). 
 
 The constitutional crisis was finally resolved with the 
establishment, in August 1961, of a new Central Government led 
by Prime Minister Cyrille Adoula. At the latter's insistence, 
ONUC then turned its attention to the problem of the foreign 
military and paramilitary personnel who were lending crucial 
support to the Katangese secessionists. Two operations launched 
by the UN in August and September of 1961, ostensibly for the 
purpose of securing the expulsion of these foreigners from the 
Congo pursuant to Security Council Resolution 161, failed in 
this aim. 
 
 The UN mandate was further strengthened in November 1961 
(SCR 169), but it was not until January 1963 that ONUC, through 
the vigorous assertion of its right of freedom of movement and 
self-defence, disabled the Katangese military machine and put an 
end to the secession. ONUC withdrew from the country at the end 
of June 1964, having largely fulfilled its mandate,5 though at 
 
      5  See S/5784, 29 June 1964, para. 125. 
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considerable cost.6
 
 
 
ONUC'S BASIC MISSION IN THE CONGO 
 
 The rest of the chapter will be devoted to a detailed 
consideration of those of ONUC's functions which, on paper 
and/or in practice, led it very near or over the line separating 
peace-keeping from enforcement action. In its Resolution 169 of 
24 November 1961, the Security Council: 
 
Reaffirm[ed] the policies and purposes of the United Nations with 
respect to the Congo (Leopoldville) ... namely: 
 
  (a) To maintain the territorial integrity and the political 
independence of the Republic of the Congo, 
  (b) To assist the Central Government of the Congo in the 
restoration and maintenance of law and order, 
  (c) To prevent the occurrence of civil war in the Congo, 
  (d) To secure the immediate withdrawal and evacuation from the 
Congo of all foreign military, paramilitary and advisory personnel 
not under the United Nations Command, and all mercenaries, 
  (e) To render technical assistance7
 
 Underpinning these objectives was the concept of 
"preventive diplomacy", as formulated by UN Secretary-General 
Dag Hammarskjöld. From this perspective, the UN's intervention 
in the Congo served, above all, to prevent the extension of the 
Cold War to the country by "filling the vacuum" which would 
otherwise be filled by the superpowers in the context of the 
prevailing crisis.8 Preventive diplomacy, as applied to the 
                                                                
      6  The cost was not limited to the 250 fatalities suffered by ONUC (United 
Nations Peace-keeping, UNDPI, DPI/1827, August 1996, p. 19) or the loss of 
Secretary-General Hammarskjöld, killed in a plane crash in September 1961 
while en route to discuss cease-fire terms with Katangese leaders. The many 
controversies generated by the operation had wide, often negative, effects 
on the UN as a whole. See Alan JAMES, "The Congo Controversies", 
International Peacekeeping (London), vol. 1(1), spring 1994. 
      7  SCR 169, S/5002, 24 Nov. 1961, pream. para. 3. 
      8  Hammarskjöld's concept of preventive diplomacy is enunciated in the 
introduction to his annual report on the work of the UN covering the year 
1959-60 (GAOR, 15th sess., supp. no. 1A (A/4390/Add.1, 1960), sec. III), 
which is also the source of the quotation. The concept's relevance to the 
Congo operation is underlined by Abi-Saab, supra, note 88, pp. 1-2 and 5. 
Note that while the term "preventive diplomacy" was revived in An Agenda 
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Congo, basically required the fulfilment of two fundamental 
objectives: (1) the stabilization of the Congo's internal 
situation and (2) the prevention or elimination of foreign 
intervention. Realization of the first aim would promote the 
realization of the second, although measures specifically 
targeted at the elimination of the foreign intervention would 
also be needed in pursuit of that aim. 
 
 
 
ONUC'S INITIAL MANDATE 
 
 In the Congo, in July 1960, stabilization meant the 
restoration and maintenance of law and order. Although, in their 
telegrams of 12 and 13 July, the Congolese President and Prime 
Minister requested UN military assistance in order "to protect 
the national territory of the Congo against the present external 
aggression",9 ONUC was to advance this aim only indirectly. 
Hammarskjöld proposed the creation of a force which would not 
concern itself with the Belgian intervention as such, but 
attend, rather, to the restoration and maintenance of law and 
order.10 The plan would, nevertheless, indirectly meet the needs 
of the Congolese authorities as "[it] would be understood that 
were the United Nations to act as proposed, the Belgian 
                                                                
for Peace, it carried a substantially different meaning from the 
Hammarskjöld concept. Preventive diplomacy now means crisis prevention. 
See: An Agenda for Peace, supra, note 4, paras. 23-33; note 17, supra. 
      9  The 12 July telegram (English translation). The 13 July telegram 
reiterated the point, stressing that the requested assistance was not for 
the purpose of restoring the internal situation in the Congo. The two 
telegrams are reproduced in S/4382, 13 July 1960. 
      10  While the mandate is not spelled out in these exact terms in Hammar-
skjöld's initial statement to the Security Council on the Congo crisis, it 
emerges from the statement read as a whole. See SCOR, 15th yr., 873rd mtg., 
13-14 July 1960, paras. 24-27. While paragraph 2 of Security Council 
Resolution 143, authorizing the establishment of ONUC, retains the somewhat 
open-ended wording of the initial statement, subsequent UN documents 
enunciate the law and order mandate clearly. See: S/4389, 18 July 1960, 
paras. 5-7; GAR 1474 (ES-IV), 20 Sept. 1960, para. 2; SCR 169, S/5002, 24 
Nov. 1961, preambular para. 3 (reproduced supra ─ text accompanying note 
94) and operative para. 9; SCOR, 15th yr., 913th mtg., 7 Dec. 1960, paras. 
24-25. 
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Government would see its way to a withdrawal."11 This was the 
desire of the members of the Security Council who, though they 
disagreed on the legitimacy of the Belgian intervention, agreed 
that Belgium should withdraw its troops.12
 
 The logic underlying the Secretary-General's plan was quite 
straightforward: 
 
[The Belgian] intervention ... occurred purportedly because of the 
widespread internal disorders in the country. Consequently, to 
bring about the withdrawal of the Belgian troops, it was 
considered necessary, in response to the request of the Government 
of the Republic of the Congo, to introduce United Nations troops 
to assist the restoration of internal order and security.13
 
The same kind of reasoning also underlay the mission of the 
First United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I), deployed to the 
Sinai in 1956, and was, in fact, central to Hammarskjöld's 
doctrine of preventive diplomacy.14
 
 ONUC, as initially conceived, was a peace-keeping force.15 
Thus, the operation was deployed and conducted with the consent 
of the parties concerned ─ i.e., the Central Government of the 
 
      11  SCOR, 15th yr., 873rd mtg., 13-14 July 1960, para. 27 (statement of 
Secretary-General Hammarskjöld). 
      12  Thus, the first Security Council resolution on the crisis, which 
authorizes the establishment of ONUC, also "Calls upon the Government of 
Belgium to withdraw its troops from the territory of the Republic of the 
Congo". SCR 143, S/4387, 14 July 1960, para. 1. See: Higgins, supra, note 
88, pp. 15-16; Abi-Saab, supra, note 88, pp. 11-12. 
      13  SCOR, 15th yr., 913th mtg., 7 Dec. 1960, para. 25 (statement of 
Secretary-General Hammarskjöld). 
      14  See Abi-Saab, supra, note 88, pp. 12-13. 
      15  Note that, in setting out the basic principles governing ONUC's 
establishment and operation, Hammarskjöld relied heavily on his Summary 
Study of UNEF I (A/3943, 9 Oct. 1958) which, as we saw earlier (text 
accompanying notes 29-39, supra), basically defined UN peace-keeping. Thus, 
many of the principles he enunciated in his first report on the 
implementation of SCR 143 (S/4389, 18 July 1960), relating to ONUC, simply 
restated the earlier report ─ as reflected in the text and notes 
immediately below. 
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Congo and also the secessionist leaders of the province of 
Katanga.16 The entry of ONUC into Katanga was agreed to by the 
latter authorities only after certain assurances were supplied 
by the UN as to the functions of the Force.17
 
 Second, ONUC could only use force in self-defence. This 
included forcible attempts to make UN troops withdraw from 
positions they occupied under orders. "The basic element 
involved [was] clearly the prohibition against any initiative in 
the use of armed force."18
 
 Finally, ONUC was to remain strictly impartial. It could 
not "be permitted to become a party to any internal conflict."19 
This meant, in keeping with the related principle of force 
 
      16  For the formal request for UN military assistance (the two telegrams of 
12 and 13 July 1960), see S/4382, 13 July 1960. Note that ONUC's consensual 
basis was affirmed in S/4389, 18 July 1960, paras. 6 and 7. It was also 
reflected in SCR 143 of 14 July 1960 (para. 2), authorizing the establish-
ment of ONUC. While ONUC's consensual basis was one of its defining 
features, throughout its four-year history, the principle, as it applied to 
ONUC, was not absolute. When faced with a lack of cooperation, as in the 
case of the Katangese authorities in August 1960 (the problem of ONUC's 
deployment to the province) or the Kasavubu Government in March 1961 (the 
Matadi incident), Hammarskjöld portrayed UN action in the Congo as based on 
mandatory Security Council decisions taken in order to counteract a threat 
to international peace and security. From this he concluded: first, that 
the Congolese were legally bound to cooperate with ONUC and comply with 
Security Council decisions concerning the Congo; second, that any decision 
to withdraw ONUC rested solely with the Security Council. S/4775, 30 March 
1961, sec. I. And see: E.M. MILLER, "Legal Aspects of the United Nations 
Action in the Congo", The American Journal of International Law, vol. 
55(1), January 1961, pp. 13-15; Higgins, supra, note 88, pp. 190-91. On the 
question of the mandatory nature of the Security Council decisions, see: 
S/4417, 6 Aug. 1960, para. 6; SCOR, 15th yr., 884th mtg., 8 Aug. 1960, 
paras. 22-23; SCR 146, S/4426, 9 Aug. 1960, para. 5. Concerning the power 
of decision over ONUC's withdrawal, see: S/4389/Add.5, 29 July 1960, 
especially para. 2; S/4775, 30 March 1961, sec. I, 6th para.; Miller, 
ibid., p. 15. On the same question, compare A/3943, 9 Oct. 1958, paras. 
156-59. 
      17  See text accompanying notes 106-09, infra. 
      18  A/3943, 9 Oct. 1958, para. 179 (emphasis in the original). This passage 
and the point concerning the use of force which precedes it, both contained 
in the UNEF I Summary Study, are reproduced, in relation to ONUC, in 
S/4389, 18 July 1960, para. 15. 
      19  S/4389, 18 July 1960, para. 7. 
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autonomy, that it could not act at the request of the Central 
Government to end the secession in Katanga.20 Doubts on this 
point led to the adoption of Security Council Resolution 146 (9 
August 1960), paragraph 4 of which: 
 
Reaffirms that the United Nations Force in the Congo will not be a 
party to or in any way intervene in or be used to influence the 
outcome of any internal conflict, constitutional or otherwise 
 
Secretary-General Hammarskjöld followed this, on 12 August, with 
a Memorandum on Implementation of the Security Council 
Resolution of 9 August 1960, Operative Paragraph 4 which 
explicitly stated that "the United Nations Force cannot be used 
on behalf of the Central Government to subdue or to force the 
provincial government to a specific line of action."21 It was on 
this basis that the Katangese authorities consented to ONUC's 
deployment in the province.22
 
 
 
 Restoration and Maintenance of Law and Order 
 
 ONUC's mandate for the restoration and maintenance of law 
and order involved the performance of a wide variety of tasks, 
such as patrolling troubled areas, guarding political leaders 
and government buildings, facilitating the evacuation of 
civilians from insecure zones, and establishing and guarding 
protected areas for refugees and others at risk of harm.23 As 
 
      20  See S/4389, 18 July 1960, paras. 7, 12 and 13. 
      21  S/4417/Add.6, 12 Aug. 1960, para. 8. 
      22  See Catherine HOSKYNS, The Congo Since Independence: January 1960 -
December 1961 (London, Oxford U. Press, 1965), pp. 170-73. Despite ONUC's 
claim to impartiality, it would often be accused of siding with one party 
or another. This became a major issue in September 1960 when a simmering 
conflict between the Congolese President and Prime Minister developed into 
a full-blown constitutional crisis. For a good overview of the crisis and 
its ramifications for the UN, see James, supra, note 93, pp. 46-47. 
      23  For a more comprehensive list of tasks, together with references to 
relevant UN documents, see Finn SEYERSTED, United Nations Forces in the Law 
of Peace and War (Leyden, A. W. Sijthoff, 1966), pp. 67-68 and R. SIMMONDS, 
Legal Problems Arising from the United Nations Military Operations in the 
Congo (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1968), pp. 80-81. 
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reflected in this list, a key component of the law and order 
mandate was the protection of life and property24 ─ which was 
problematic since ONUC, at no stage, was given enforcement 
powers for this purpose. 
 
 The power to arrest, detain or disarm could be seen as 
consistent with peace-keeping principles where exercised in 
cooperation with the Central Government or other, de facto 
authorities against "uncontrolled groups of armed men who defied 
national or local authority".25 Yet, ONUC was instructed by 
Hammarskjöld "to protect the civilian population against attacks 
from armed units, whatever the authority under which they are 
acting."26 To the extent such action was directed against 
recognized Congolese authorities,27 it would entail a violation 
of the peace-keeping principle of consent. It could, however, be 
reconciled, barely, with the principle limiting the use of force 
to self-defence where peace-keepers, by defending themselves 
and/or their positions,28 effectively shielded others from armed 
attacks, as in the case of a United Nations protected area.29
 
      24  See: S/4389, 18 July 1960, para. 7; S/4389/Add.1, 19 July 1960, para. 2; 
SCOR, 15th yr., 913th mtg., 7 Dec. 1960, para. 26; SCOR, 15th yr., 917th 
mtg., 10 Dec. 1960, para. 61. 
      25  See: Oscar SCHACHTER, "Preventing the Internationalization of Internal 
Conflict: A Legal Analysis of the U.N. Congo Experience", American Society 
of International Law ─ Proceedings of the 57th Annual Meeting (Washington, 
D.C., 25-27 April 1963), p. 221; Abi-Saab, supra, note 88, p. 178; Michael 
BOTHE, "Peace-keeping" (IN The Charter of the United Nations, ed. by B. 
Simma, Oxford, Oxford U. Press, 1994), p. 589. The quotation is from 
Schachter. 
      26  SCOR, 16th yr., 935th mtg., 15 Feb. 1961, para. 27. 
      27  This would mean, in the first place, the recognized representatives of 
the Central Government. It would also mean the Katangese authorities, whose 
consent, as described earlier, was considered a necessary prerequisite to 
ONUC's deployment in that province. 
      28  See text accompanying note 105, supra. 
      29  Over the course of its mission in the Congo, ONUC set up several zones 
where it undertook to ensure the security of all civilians who took refuge 
there. See: S/4757, 2 March 1961; S/4940/Add.18, 20 Dec. 1961, para. 6. 
Brady Lee's study of the "Rikhye Zone" in Katanga illustrates, however, 
that this task could not always be reconciled with the constraints imposed 
on the use of force in peace-keeping. "Since the U.N. had no authority for 
enforcement action in the zone, it could only act in self-defense, and 
local leaders rather than U.N. peacekeepers were the ones usually under at-
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 Hammarskjöld was also of the view that ONUC could not use 
force to liberate individuals ─ in particular Prime Minister 
Lumumba after his detention by the Central Government. Two 
considerations appear paramount in his thinking on this point: 
first, his assessment that such action "would, in fact, mean 
overriding by force the authority of the Chief of State"30 (thus 
violating the consent principle); second, the fact that it would 
involve taking the initiative in the use of force31 (thus 
violating the principle of the non-use of force except in self-
defence, as formulated by Hammarskjöld). 
 
 One would have to conclude, at a minimum, that ONUC's 
mandate for the restoration and maintenance of law and order, at 
least as it related to the protection of life, took it very 
close to the line separating peace-keeping from enforcement 
action. Hammarskjöld himself acknowledged as much when he 
situated it "on the outer margin of the mandate of the United 
Nations".32
 
 
 
  
 
ONUC'S SUBSEQUENT MANDATES 
 
 Developments which followed the initial establishment and 
deployment of ONUC in July-August 1960, including the breakdown 
of central authority, Lumumba's assassination, and the 
persistent presence of foreign mercenaries in Katanga, dictated 
a strengthening of ONUC's mandate with provision for the use of 
                                                                
tack." Brady LEE, "Peacekeeping, the Congo, and Zones of Peace", Peace 
Review, vol. 9(2), June 1997, p. 190. 
      30  SCOR, 15th yr. , 917th mtg, 10 Dec. 1960, para. 62 (statement of the 
Secretary-General). And see: idem, para. 64; SCOR, 15th yr., 920th mtg., 
13-14 Dec. 1960, para. 85. 
      31  See SCOR, 15th yr., 920th mtg., 13-14 Dec. 1960, paras. 82 and 85. 
      32  SCOR, 16th yr., 935th mtg., 15 Feb. 1961, para. 27. And see: Goulding, 
supra, note 4, p. 8; D.W. BOWETT, United Nations Forces (London, Stevens 
and Sons, 1964), p. 201. 
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force. Although the UN's underlying objectives in the Congo 
remained the stabilization of the internal situation, on the one 
hand, and the elimination of foreign intervention, on the other, 
ONUC's specific responsibilities were extended to areas not 
covered in the original mandate. While there is general 
agreement in the literature that, as previously indicated, 
ONUC's initial mandate was one of peace-keeping, the proper 
characterization of ONUC's later functions is much less clear. 
We will now examine these functions to see whether they in fact 
took ONUC into the realm of enforcement. 
 
 
 
 The Prevention of Civil War 
 
 Resolution 161, adopted just after Lumumba's assassination, 
with the Congo drifting towards full-scale civil war, authorized 
ONUC to: 
 
take immediately all appropriate measures to prevent the 
occurrence of civil war in the Congo, including arrangements for 
cease-fires, the halting of all military operations, the 
prevention of clashes, and the use of force, if necessary, in the 
last resort;33
 
On its face, the provision appeared to authorize ONUC to use 
force beyond that for self-defence ─ i.e., to take the 
initiative in the use of armed force for the purpose of 
preventing civil war, albeit "in the last resort". Yet 
Hammarskjöld held that, although the provision extended ONUC's 
responsibilities to include the prevention of civil war, it did 
not give it new powers, specifically enforcement powers, for the 
fulfilment of this mandate.34 Thus, ONUC could not "take the 
initiative" in order to stop a civil war clash, but it could 
take up positions "to prevent a civil war risk" and forcibly 
defend these if challenged pursuant to its basic right of self-
 
      33  SCR 161, S/4741, 21 Feb. 1961, para. A1. 
      34  SCOR, 16th yr., 942nd mtg., 20-21 Feb. 1961, paras. 216 and 218. S/4752, 
27 Feb. 1961, Annex VII. 
  
39
                                                               
defence.35
 
 In essence, the provision, as interpreted by Hammarskjöld, 
gave ONUC clear authority to take up and defend positions in 
prevention of civil war clashes although, crucially, it could 
not interpose itself between rival factions once fighting had 
begun.36 As Hammarskjöld was the one responsible for the overall 
conduct of the operation, in the absence of any expression of 
contrary intent by the Security Council, it was this interpreta-
tion that prevailed, at least initially.37
 
 Following the resolution of the constitutional crisis and 
the establishment of a new Central Government led by Cyrille 
Adoula in August 1961, the UN position changed in two 
significant respects. First, paragraph A1 of Resolution 161 
notwithstanding, the UN Secretariat decided that it would not 
interfere with military operations conducted by the Adoula 
Government for the purpose of suppressing secession.38 The 
mandate to prevent civil war was, rather, to be exercised as 
against all other armed Congolese groups.39 Significantly ─ and 
this is the second change in position ─ it appears that the UN 
was prepared to use force beyond that for self-defence for this 
purpose. 
 
 Thus, on 31 October 1961, the ONUC representative in 
Katanga formally warned the Katangese authorities that, unless 
 
      35  S/4752, 27 Feb. 1961, Annex VII. 
      36  Abi-Saab, supra, note 88, p. 106. Schachter, supra, note 112, p. 218. 
      37  Abi-Saab, supra, note 88, p. 106. 
      38  SCOR, 16th yr., 982nd mtg., 24 Nov. 1961, para. 104 (statement of Acting 
Secretary-General U Thant). Abi-Saab indicates that "[t]his was saying 
aloud what Hammarskjöld had said in the privacy of the Advisory Committee 
after the constitution of the Adoula Government." Supra, note 88, p. 165 
(n. 114). And see Seyersted, supra, note 110, p. 74. Note that this 
position was perfectly consistent with the Memorandum on Implementation of 
the Security Council Resolution of 9 August 1960, Operative Paragraph 4, 
paragraph 8 of which stated that "the United Nations ... has no right to 
forbid the Central Government to take any action which by its own means ... 
it can carry through in relation to Katanga." S/4417/Add.6, 12 Aug. 1960, 
para. 8. 
      39  SCOR, 16th yr., 982nd mtg., 24 Nov. 1961, para. 104. 
  
40
                                                               
they halted their bombing raids on the neighbouring province of 
Kasai, the UN would "take all necessary counter-action." This 
would include, if necessary, pursuing Katangese aircraft into 
Katanga and destroying them or even "bringing down such aircraft 
operating in Katanga and eventually destroying them by air to 
ground action."40 Similar warnings were issued to the Katangese 
authorities in August and November 1962, requiring them to halt 
military action in North Katanga where they had clashed with 
Central Government forces, failing which ONUC said it would 
intervene militarily.41
 
 In short, the UN Secretariat interpreted paragraph A1 of 
Resolution 161 as conferring upon ONUC a power of enforcement, 
though only against armed groups other than the Central Govern-
ment. This is reflected in the rejection, for the purposes just 
described, of the three core principles of peace-keeping. First, 
the use of force would clearly exceed any reasonable interpreta-
tion of self-defence. Second, although ONUC had relied on the 
consent of the Katangese authorities before deploying to the 
province, it was prepared to disregard Katangese wishes in order 
to prevent civil war clashes. Finally, the UN's decision, after 
August 1961, to treat the Central Government differently from 
all other armed Congolese groups in implementing paragraph A1 of 
Resolution 161 involved a breach of the impartiality principle. 
 
 
 Ending Secession 
 
 The UN's support for the "territorial integrity and 
political independence" of the Congo, while reflected in several 
of the early resolutions on the Congo Crisis,42 was stated most 
explicitly in Security Council Resolution 169, when it was 
listed as one of the "policies and purposes of the United 
 
      40  S/4940/Add.12, 2 Nov. 1961, paras. 9-10. And see S/4940/Add. 13, 15 Nov. 
1961, para. 21. 
      41  See: S/5053/Add.11, 20 Aug. 1962, paras. 57-61 and Annex XXV; 
S/5053/Add.14, 11 Jan. 1963, paras. 13-14 and Annex VI. 
      42  See: SCR 145, S/4405, 22 July 1960, para. 2; GAR 1474 (ES-IV), 20 Sept. 
1960, preambular para. 4 and operative paras. 2 and 5. 
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Nations with respect to the Congo".43 In that same resolution, 
the Security Council stated its firm opposition to the Katangese 
secession44 and, further "demand[ed] that such [secessionist] 
activities which are now taking place in Katanga shall cease 
forthwith".45 Yet, ONUC was not authorized to use force, or take 
any other specific action, in support of this directive. It was 
mandated, simply, "to assist [the Central Government of the 
Congo], in accordance with the decisions of the United Nations, 
to maintain ... national integrity".46 No other resolution gave 
ONUC any power or mandate more specific than this. 
 
 Nevertheless, four major military operations mounted by 
ONUC in Katanga were widely perceived as having the termination 
of the Katangese secession as their principal aim. In fact, all 
but one of these operations resulted in a significant, though at 
first temporary, weakening of Katangese military power. 
Nevertheless, each of the operations was carried out, at least 
officially, in pursuit of other aims. The first two, conducted 
in August and September 1961, will be analyzed in the next 
section of this chapter since they were ostensibly concerned 
with the removal of foreign military personnel from Katanga. The 
third operation, "Unokat", conducted in December 1961, was 
designed 
 
to regain and assure [ONUC's] freedom of movement, to restore law 
and order, and to ensure that for the future the United Nations 
forces and officials in Katanga are not subjected to such attacks; 
and meanwhile to react vigorously in self-defence to every assault 
on our present positions, by all the means available to us.47
 
In fact, Unokat remained within these limits.48
 
      43  SCR 169, S/5002, 24 Nov. 1961, pream. para. 3. 
      44  See ibid., preambular para. 5 and operative paras. 1 and 8. 
      45  Ibid., para. 8. 
      46  SCR 169, S/5002, 24 Nov. 1961, para. 9. 
      47  S/5035, 19 Dec. 1961, sec. III. 
      48  See: Abi-Saab, supra, note 88, pp. 171-72 and 174-75; Hoskyns, supra, 
note 109, pp. 454-56; S/4940/Add.18, 20 Dec. 1961, especially paras. 17 and 
20; S/4940/Add.19, 22 Dec. 1961, especially paras. 2 and 7. For a detailed 
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 "Operation Grandslam" (December 1962 - January 1963), the 
fourth and last in the series of operations, was also aimed at 
the restoration of ONUC's security and freedom of movement.49 
Yet, Grandslam went further than Unokat in that ONUC, having 
quickly cleared road blocks mounted by the gendarmerie 
(Katangese army) around Elisabethville, then proceeded to assert 
its right of freedom of movement outside the capital. Force was 
thus used, not merely to defend positions already held, but also 
to overcome armed resistance to the taking up of new positions 
in such Katangese towns as Kipushi, Kaminaville and Jadotville.50 
In the event, this was enough to bring the secession to an end.51
 
 ONUC's right of freedom of movement throughout the Congo 
was enunciated in the "Basic Agreement", concluded between the 
UN and the Central Government on 27 July 1960,52 and in the more 
extensive Status of Forces Agreement of 27 November 1961.53 The 
principle is often seen as a "concrete application" of a peace-
keeping force's right of self-defence, necessary to the 
preservation of its security.54 Yet, as Operation Grandslam 
demonstrated, it affords much wider scope for the use of force 
than does the self-defence principle, strictly defined. In fact, 
it is questionable whether the use of force to occupy new 
 
account of the December action, see: Hoskyns, pp. 447-58; S/4940/Adds.16-
19, 6-22 Dec. 1961. 
      49  See S/5053/Add.14, 11 Jan. 1963, Annex XXXI. 
      50  See: S/5053/Add.14, 11 Jan. 1963, paras. 46-74; Abi-Saab, supra, note 88, 
pp. 175 and 189. 
      51  For a detailed account of Operation Grandslam, see: S/5053/Add.14, 11 
Jan. 1963;  S/5053/Add.15, 30 Jan. 1963. 
      52  S/4389/Add.5, 29 July 1960, para. 1. And see S/4389, 18 July 1960, para. 
9. 
      53  Agreement between the United Nations and the Republic of the Congo 
(Leopoldville) relating to the Legal Status, Facilities, Privileges and 
Immunities of the United Nations Organization in the Congo (27 Nov. 1961), 
UNTS, vol. 414, para. 30. 
      54  Abi-Saab, supra, note 88, p. 174. And see: Simmonds, supra, note 110, p. 
132; G.I.A.D. DRAPER, "The Legal Limitations upon the Employment of Weapons 
by the United Nations Force in the Congo", International and Comparative 
Law Quarterly, vol. 12(2), April 1963, pp. 400-01. 
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positions really remains within the boundaries of peace-
keeping.55
 
 
 
 Eliminating Foreign Intervention 
 
 The functions we have examined to date all relate to ONUC's 
fundamental task of stabilizing the internal situation in the 
Congo. Yet, as described earlier, it was no less essential to a 
resolution of the Congolese Crisis that its foreign component be 
dealt with. Initially this responsibility was indirect. The mere 
fact of ONUC's deployment in the Congo, for the purpose of 
restoring and maintaining law and order was supposed to, in fact 
did, pave the way for the withdrawal of Belgian troops from the 
country. The exception was Katanga where, although regular 
Belgian forces were withdrawn after ONUC's deployment in August 
1960, many Belgian officers and other soldiers remained to 
command the Katangese gendarmerie. This problem was exacerbated 
by the arrival in the province of foreign mercenaries of various 
nationalities.56
 
 Security Council Resolution 161, for the first time, 
mandated ONUC to take 
 
measures ... for the immediate withdrawal and evacuation from the 
Congo of all Belgian and other foreign military and paramilitary 
personnel and political advisers not under the United Nations 
 
      55  Draper offers the following reflections on ONUC's right of freedom of 
movement: "We are thus confronted with a telling example of the expanding 
nature of the right of self-defence. It is an interesting and not entirely 
academic speculation to determine at what point that right has yielded up 
all that it can properly provide and the moment when it becomes necessary 
to invoke the right of the Force to take all military action necessary to 
carry out its mandate." Ibid., p. 401. And see Schachter, supra, note 7, p. 
409. Compare Simmonds, supra, note 110, p. 132. 
      56  In his Second Progress Report, the Special Representative of the 
Secretary-General in the Congo estimated that, as of 31 October 1960, a 
total of 231 Belgian nationals (114 officers and 117 soldiers of other 
ranks) were in the Katangese gendarmerie, with a further 58 Belgian 
officers in the Katangese police. S/4557, 2 Nov. 1960, para. 35. 
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Command, and mercenaries;57
 
Yet, specific authorization to use force for this purpose was 
not granted until Security Council Resolution 169 of 24 November 
1961, where, in paragraph 4, the Security Council 
 
Authorizes the Secretary-General to take vigorous action, 
including the use of the requisite measure of force, if necessary, 
for the immediate apprehension, detention pending legal action 
and/or deportation of all foreign military and paramilitary 
personnel and political advisers not under the United Nations 
Command, and mercenaries, as laid down in paragraph 2 of Security 
Council resolution 161 A (1961) of 21 February 1961; 
 
 The first attempts to expel foreign personnel from Katanga 
were made in August and September 1961. "Operation Rumpunch" was 
launched at the end of August 1961 following the UN's failure to 
secure, through diplomatic means, the departure of foreign 
officers and mercenaries. The operation had the full backing of 
the Central Government which, on 24 August, issued an ordinance 
for the expulsion from the Congo of all non-Congolese officers 
and mercenaries serving with the Katangese forces and requested 
the UN to assist in its implementation.58 While it was hoped that 
the swift and resolute execution of Rumpunch would ensure that 
the Katangese authorities complied peacefully, the UN neverthe-
less envisaged using force, if necessary.59
 
 Rumpunch was launched in the early hours of 28 August. The 
Katangese were taken by surprise and ONUC met no resistance as 
 
      57  SCR 161, S/4741, 21 Feb. 1961, para. A2. Concerning the categories of 
personnel the provision was specifically concerned with, see Simmonds, 
supra, note 110, p. 94. 
      58  Hoskyns, supra, note 109, pp. 403-04. 
      59  Brian URQUHART, Hammarskjold (New York, Alfred Knopf, 1972), pp. 555-56. 
Hoskyns, supra, note 109, p. 402. Two days before Rumpunch was launched, 
the Secretary-General expressed the view that paragraph A2 of Resolution 
161 should be interpreted so as to allow for the use of force, this despite 
his earlier, more restrictive interpretation of that provision. Concerning 
the Hammarskjöld interpretation, see: Abi-Saab, supra, note 88, pp. 129-31; 
Urquhart, ibid., p. 555. For other views on this issue, see: Abi-Saab, 
ibid., pp. 129-31; Simmonds, supra, note 110, p. 95. 
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it moved to blockade the residence of the hardline Minister of 
the Interior and take control of the radio, post office 
(containing the telephone exchange) and gendarmerie 
headquarters. Having thus disabled the capacity of the Katangese 
to mount any organized resistance, UN troops proceeded to arrest 
foreign officers in the Katangese capital Elisabethville and 
other parts of the rebel province. The sweep was not complete, 
however, and many foreign officers remained at liberty when 
ONUC, under pressure from the local consular corps, agreed to 
transfer responsibility for the expulsions to the Belgian 
consul.60
 
 As relations between the UN and Katangese authorities 
deteriorated, the UN opted for follow-up action. Under a plan 
devised by the Chief of the UN Civilian Operation in the Congo, 
Mahmoud Khiari, named Katangese leaders were to be arrested on 
the authority of warrants issued by the Central Government. 
Katangese President Tshombé would be blockaded at his residence 
while the ONUC representative in Elisabethville, Conor Cruise 
O'Brien, tried to persuade him "that his only hope lay in co-
operating with the United Nations, and in peacefully liquidating 
the secession of Katanga." UN forces would meanwhile take 
control of the radio station and post office and raid the 
offices of the Sûreté and Ministry of Information, removing 
files and apprehending Europeans and senior African personnel 
working there. The Congolese flag was to be raised on public 
buildings and UN buildings. An official was expected from 
Leopoldville in order to assume Central Government authority 
over the province.61
 
 What was envisaged was basically a repeat of Rumpunch, but 
for the purpose, this time, not simply of expelling foreign 
military personnel, but of putting an end to the secession 
itself.62 Yet, the circumstances under which "Operation Morthor" 
 
      60  Hoskyns, supra, note 109, pp. 406-08. 
      61  Conor Cruise O'BRIEN, To Katanga and Back (London, Hutchinson, 1962), p. 
249. O'Brien's description of the Khiari plan has been corroborated by 
other ONUC officials. Hoskyns, supra, note 109, p. 415. 
      62  Hoskyns, supra, note 109, p. 417. 
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was launched were very different from those of Rumpunch ─ not 
only were the Katangese expecting UN action, they were much 
better prepared for it.63 Morthor, initiated in the early hours 
of 13 September 1961, went badly from the start. Attempts to 
seize control of the radio station and post office met with 
heavy resistance. Only one Katangese leader was arrested and, 
crucially, Tshombé's residence was not blockaded, apparently 
because of a misunderstanding between different ONUC military 
contingents. Control of the radio station and post office was 
eventually secured, but only after intense fighting.64
 
 On the basis of these modest results, O'Brien declared that 
Katanga was back under Central Government control. He also 
justified Morthor on the basis of paragraph A1 of Resolution 161 
authorizing ONUC to use force for the prevention of civil war.65 
O'Brien was almost immediately overruled by Dag Hammarskjöld who 
presented the operation as a continuation of Rumpunch, aimed at 
the rounding up and expulsion of foreign military personnel. 
While this was clearly at odds with the facts,66 it appears that, 
for Hammarskjöld, there was no question of presenting Morthor as 
an attempt to forcibly end the Katangese secession since, in 
particular, he saw no basis for such an action in either the 
Security Council resolutions defining ONUC's mandate or the UN 
Charter.67 Indeed, given the operation's real aim, i.e. to end 
 
      63  See Hoskyns supra, note 109, pp. 417-19. 
      64  Hoskyns, supra, note 109, pp. 419-20. 
      65  O'Brien would later write: "My instructions taken as a whole, had the 
unmistakeable meaning of ending the secession of Katanga, following the 
application of A.1 (preventing civil war). I saw no point in attempting to 
pretend that our action had any other character, and I declared that the 
secession of Katanga was at an end." Supra, note 148, p. 266. 
      66  Significantly, the official UN report on Operation Morthor, issued on 14 
September, made no mention of the attempt to arrest Katangese leaders, 
clearly unrelated to the claimed objective of rounding up foreign military 
personnel. See: S/4940, 14 Sept. 1961; Abi-Saab, supra, note 88, pp. 141-
43; Hoskyns, supra, note 109, pp. 422-23. 
      67  Hoskyns, supra, note 109, p. 421. Abi-Saab, supra, note 88, p. 146. There 
was, however, more to Hammarskjöld's decision than this. See: Abi-Saab, pp. 
143-48; Hoskyns, pp. 421-22. Note also that Hammarskjöld, though he had 
sketched out the broad outlines of follow-up action to Rumpunch, had not 
specifically approved Morthor. See Abi-Saab, pp. 133-39 and 145. 
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the secession, one must conclude that Morthor was ultra vires 
ONUC's mandate.68
 
 It seems clear that Operations Rumpunch and Morthor both 
took ONUC beyond the bounds of peace-keeping. In each case, ONUC 
took ─ or, in the case of Rumpunch, was prepared to take ─ the 
initiative in the use of force in order to realize its objec-
tives. Of course, neither operation had the consent of the 
Katangese authorities; yet, both had the full support of the 
Central Government. A Central Government ordinance for the 
expulsion of foreign military personnel preceded Rumpunch, while 
Central Government warrants formed the basis for the, mostly 
unsuccessful, attempt to arrest Katangese leaders during 
Operation Morthor. 
 
 Given these facts, it would appear, at first glance, that 
both operations involved breaches of the impartiality principle. 
Most observers saw the assistance lent the Katangese administra-
tion by the foreign officers and political advisers as the main 
prop for the secession. Thus, whether ONUC moved to expel the 
foreign personnel or instead moved directly to end the 
secession, it arguably amounted to the same thing; in both 
cases, ONUC was helping the Central Government end the secession 
and thus taking the side of one disputant against another. 
 
 Yet, the principle of impartiality as formulated by 
Hammarskjöld looked only to the internal aspect of the conflict 
between the Central Government and the Katangese secessionists. 
Specifically, it merely required that ONUC do nothing which 
would affect the relative power of the two parties, considered 
independently of any foreign intervention. 
 
Likewise, it follows from the rule that the United Nations units 
must not become parties in internal conflicts, that they cannot be 
used to enforce any specific political solution of pending 
problems or to influence the political balance decisive to such a 
solution.69
 
      68  Concerning ONUC's mandate for the promotion of the "national integrity" 
of the Congo, see text accompanying notes 129-33, supra. 
      69  S/4389, 18 July 1960, para. 13 (emphasis added). Note that the key 
elements of this formulation of the impartiality principle are derived, 
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ONUC's task was thus limited to the elimination of the foreign 
intervention.70
 
 Clearly, Operation Rumpunch, aimed at the apprehension and 
expulsion of foreign military personnel, was consistent with the 
principle of impartiality as formulated by Hammarskjöld. 
Operation Morthor, on the other hand, ran afoul of the 
principle. By aiming, not at their foreign supporters, but at 
the Katangese leaders themselves, ONUC, in Morthor, sought to 
alter the relative power of the two rivals, considered indepen-
dently of the foreign intervention. 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 Our brief review of ONUC's functions has highlighted 
several areas which brought the force very close to the line 
dividing peace-keeping from enforcement action. ONUC's mandate 
for the protection of civilians and its vigorous assertion of 
its right of freedom of movement in Operation Grandslam put 
considerable strain on the principle limiting the use of force 
to self-defence. While these cases could be seen to straddle the 
divide between peace-keeping and enforcement action, in other 
instances ONUC stepped quite clearly over this line into the 
enforcement realm. The warnings issued to the Katangese in 
implementation of ONUC's mandate to prevent civil war would 
constitute one set of examples, Operations Rumpunch and Morthor 
another. 
 
 With the possible exception of Operation Rumpunch, these 
instances of enforcement action did not come very close to the 
model of peace enforcement, underpinned by impartiality, which 
                                                                
word for word, from Hammarskjöld's Summary Study of the UNEF I experience 
(A/3943, 9 Oct. 1958, para. 167). And see Abi-Saab, supra, note 88, p. 131. 
Note that he discusses this requirement within the framework of the 
principle of non-intervention. 
      70  See: S/4417/Add.6, 12 Aug. 1960, para. 6; A/3943, 9 Oct. 1958, para. 166; 
Abi-Saab, supra, note 88, pp. 131 and 167-68; Schachter, supra, note 112, 
p. 223; Higgins, supra, note 88, p. 49. 
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was outlined in chapter 1 since they saw ONUC take the side of 
the Congolese Central Government in its conflict with the 
Katangese secessionists. A peace-keeping operation had, in 
certain instances, become involved in something other than 
peace-keeping, though what, exactly, was unclear. The initial 
impact of the Congo experience on the conceptualization, by the 
UN, of peace-keeping was, sadly, to subvert the principle of the 
non-use of force except in self-defence.71
 
 Beginning with the establishment of the United Nations 
Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), in 1964, the principle 
was stretched well beyond the limits previously set by Dag 
Hammarskjöld. Thus, Secretary-General U Thant's Aide-Mémoire of 
10 April 1964, after asserting, in line with Hammarskjöld, that 
the "[t]roops of UNFICYP shall not take the initiative in the 
use of armed force",72 added: 
 
17.  No action is to be taken by the troops of UNFICYP which is 
likely to bring them into direct conflict with either community in 
Cyprus, except in the following circumstances: 
... 
  c) Where specific arrangements accepted by both communities have 
been, or in the opinion of the commander on the spot are about to 
be, violated, thus risking a recurrence of fighting or endangering 
law and order.73
 
Further, among the examples of "situations in which troops may 
be authorized to use force",74 the Aide-Mémoire listed: "Attempts 
by force to prevent [the troops] from carrying out their 
responsibilities as ordered by their commanders".75
 
 The latter component of this quite radical reworking of the 
self-defence principle was retained for the Second United 
 
      71  This process, described in the following paragraphs, is summarized in 
Goulding, supra, note 4, p. 8. 
      72  S/5653, 11 April 1964, para. 16. 
      73  S/5653, 11 April 1964, para. 17. 
      74  S/5653, 11 April 1964, para. 18. 
      75  S/5653, 11 April 1964, para. 18(c). 
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Nations Emergency Force (UNEF II), launched in October 1973. 
 
The Force will be provided with weapons of a defensive character 
only. It shall not use force except in self-defence. Self-defence 
would include resistance to attempts by forceful means to prevent 
it from discharging its duties under the mandate of the Security 
Council.76
 
This extended formulation of the self-defence principle was 
applied to other peace-keeping operations established during the 
Cold War after UNEF II.77 As we will see in chapters 3 (Somalia) 
and 4 (Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1992-95), it has also been applied to 
peace-keeping operations launched by the UN in the post-Cold War 
period. 
 
 Despite the relatively wide authority that the commanders 
of UN peace-keeping operations have had, since 1964, for the use 
of force, the vulnerability of their lightly armed, widely 
dispersed forces and the need to preserve party cooperation have 
made them extremely reluctant to use it in practice.78 Peace-
keeping, since the Congo, has been a consistently passive 
affair. 
 
      76  S/11052/Rev. 1, 27 Oct. 1973, para. 4(d). 
      77  With respect to the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), see 
S/12611, 19 March 1978, para. 4(d). 
      78  Goulding, supra, note 4, p. 9. Goulding, supra, note 29, p. 455. 
3  SOMALIA (1992-93) 
 
 
 Four separate initiatives were launched by the 
international community over the 1992-95 period in an attempt to 
resolve the Somali Crisis. An ineffectual peace-keeping mission 
(UNOSOM I) gave way to coercive operations conducted, first, by 
a multinational coalition (UNITAF) and, subsequently, by the UN 
(UNOSOM II), at least until, in February 1994, the UN recast 
UNOSOM II in a peace-keeping mould. While our focus in this 
section will lie with the two coercive operations, the initial 
peace-keeping mission is also worth a quick look. 
 
 
 
UNOSOM I 
 
 The United Nations Operation in Somalia I (UNOSOM I), 
established by the UN Security Council in its Resolution 751 of 
24 April 1992, comprised a group of 50 military observers, 
deployed to Mogadishu in July 1992 for the purpose of monitoring 
a cease-fire between rival faction leaders General Mohamed Farah 
"Aideed" and Ali Mahdi Mohamed,1 along with a 500-troop security 
force, sent to Mogadishu in September 1992, but never fully 
deployed.2 The latter was to provide security for UN personnel, 
equipment and supplies at Mogadishu's port and airports and 
escort deliveries of humanitarian supplies from the port to 
distribution centres in Mogadishu and its immediate environs.3 
At least, this was the plan. 
 
 The security force was "to be guided by the existing 
principles and practices of United Nations peace-keeping 
                                                                
      1  See: S/23829, 21 April 1992, paras. 22-26, 33, and Annex I; SCR 751, 24 
April 1992, paras. 2-3;  S/24480, 24 Aug. 1992, para. 27. 
      2  See: S/23829, 21 April 1992, paras. 22-23, 27-29, 33 and Annex I; SCR 
751, 24 April 1992, paras. 2 and 4-5; S/24480, 24 Aug. 1992, para. 24. 
      3  The mandate of the security force is set out in S/23829, 21 April 1992, 
paras. 27-29. And see S/24480, 24 Aug. 1992, paras. 23-24. 
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operations"4 which, obviously, included the principle limiting 
the use of force to self-defence, except that, as explained in 
the last chapter, self-defence was "deemed to include situations 
in which armed persons attempted by force to prevent it from 
carrying out its mandate."5 In the case of Somalia, it was 
envisaged that UNOSOM I would "provide the United Nations 
convoys of relief supplies with a sufficiently strong military 
escort to deter attack and to fire effectively in self-defence 
if deterrence should not prove effective."6 Yet, this applica-
tion of extended self-defence could not be put to the test since 
UNOSOM I was unable to deploy as provided for in its mandate. As 
a peace-keeping force, UNOSOM I would not take up positions in 
Mogadishu without the consent of the local authorities, although 
it would forcibly defend positions it already held if attacked. 
 
 Although Aideed and Ali Mahdi consented in August 1992 to 
UNOSOM I's deployment in Mogadishu,7 it was not until 10 
November, almost two months after the first elements of the 
force arrived in the city, that it took control of Mogadishu 
airport with the agreement of the clan holding it. Aideed's 
subsequent demand for UNOSOM I's withdrawal, on the grounds that 
only he had the right to authorize such deployment, was refused. 
UNOSOM I held its airport positions despite the barrage of heavy 
machine-gun, recoilless rifle and mortar fire that this 
provoked. Yet, Aideed's persistent opposition did prevent UNOSOM 
I from deploying to the port, even though all other parties 
involved in port security favoured it.8
 
      4  S/24868, 30 Nov. 1992, p. 2. And see The United Nations and Somalia, 
1992-1996 (New York, UNDPI, 1996), "Introduction", para. 66. 
      5  S/24868, 30 Nov. 1992, p. 2. 
      6  S/23829, 21 April 1992, para. 28. 
      7  See: S/24451, 14 Aug. 1992; S/24480, 24 Aug. 1992, para. 24. 
      8  Note also that SCR 775 (28 Aug. 1992) authorized the deployment of four 
additional UNOSOM I contingents (750 troops each) for the purpose of 
protecting humanitarian relief operations in different parts of Somalia. 
These were never deployed, however. Consent was obtained only for the 
deployment of a contingent to Bosasso in north-eastern Somalia, which was 
cancelled following the authorization of the US-led intervention in 
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 Given UNOSOM I's manifest inability to improve security for 
the delivery of vital humanitarian assistance, the UN and its 
member states concluded that a more muscular approach to the 
problem was needed.9
 
 
 
UNITAF 
 
 Following the US offer to lead a multinational force into 
Somalia and its presentation to the Security Council by the UN 
Secretary-General,10 the Council, on December 3, "[a]cting under 
Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations," authorized 
the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) "to use all necessary means to 
establish as soon as possible a secure environment for 
humanitarian relief operations in Somalia".11 The rather open-
ended formulation of the mandate was to spark a lively dispute 
between the UN and US over what its terms meant exactly. 
 
 The problem of security was tackled in various ways. For 
example, UNITAF offered to guard the premises and payrolls of 
humanitarian agencies working in UNITAF-controlled areas and 
maintained radio links in case of emergencies affecting them.12 
In an effort to improve security, it put particular emphasis on 
                                                                
December 1992. Concerning the planned expansion of UNOSOM I, see: S/24480, 
24 Aug. 1992, paras. 23-26, 30-31 and 37; SCR 775, 28 Aug. 1992, paras. 2-
3; S/24531, 8 Sept. 1992; S/24532, 8 Sept. 1992; S/24859, 27 Nov. 1992, p. 
4. 
      9  For an account of the problems then facing the international relief 
effort in Somalia and a discussion of alternatives to peace-keeping, see: 
S/24859, 27 Nov. 1992; S/24868, 30 Nov. 1992. 
      10  See S/24868, 30 Nov. 1992. 
      11  SCR 794, 3 Dec. 1992, para. 10. And see para. 7. The operation undertaken 
by the multinational coalition in Somalia was called "Operation Restore 
Hope". 
      12  John HIRSCH and Robert OAKLEY, Somalia and Operation Restore Hope 
(Washington, D.C., United States Institute of Peace Press, 1995), p. 69. 
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the re-establishment of the Somali police force in Mogadishu and 
other cities.13 Yet, a large part of UNITAF's efforts in the 
security field concerned the problem of weapons proliferation in 
the country. It was here that its most important disagreement 
with the UN over the interpretation and implementation of its 
mandate lay. In his letter to the President of the Security 
Council of 29 November 1992, in which he presented the offer of 
a US-led force for Somalia, the UN Secretary-General stressed 
that 
 
to ensure, on a lasting basis, that the current violence against 
the international relief effort was brought to an end ... it would 
be necessary for at least the heavy weapons of the organized 
factions to be neutralized and brought under international control 
and for the irregular forces and gangs to be disarmed.14
 
It was a point he reiterated in an 8 December letter he sent to 
US President George Bush.15 The Bush administration's official 
position was that UNITAF would only do what was needed, in the 
short-term, to get relief aid to those Somalis who needed it 
before handing things back to the UN.16
 
 In practice, UNITAF went somewhat further than this. 
Although the rules were neither uniform nor consistent over 
time,17 UNITAF weapons policies were primarily designed to ensure 
 
      13  See: Hirsch and Oakley, ibid., pp. 87-92; S/25168, 26 Jan. 1993, para. 
23; Terrence LYONS and Ahmed SAMATAR, Somalia: State Collapse, Multilateral 
Intervention, and Strategies for Political Reconstruction (Washington, 
D.C., Brookings, 1995), p. 42. 
      14  S/24868, 30 Nov. 1992, p. 3. 
      15  The relevant excerpt is reproduced in S/24992, 19 Dec. 1992, para. 23. 
      16  "President Bush authorized and Eagleburger proposed to the secretary-
general an American-led operation limited in mandate, time, and 
geographical scope." John BOLTON, "Wrong Turn in Somalia", Foreign Affairs, 
vol. 73(1), Jan.-Feb. 1994, p. 59. Concerning the differing US and UN 
interpretations of the disarmament mandate, see: Bolton, pp. 58-62; Stanley 
MEISLER, United Nations: The First Fifty Years (New York, Atlantic Monthly 
Press, 1995), pp. 299-300. 
      17  See: Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Somalia (New York and Geneva, 
  
55
                                                               
the immediate security of the areas in which its contingents 
operated. Factions were given a choice of either moving their 
heavy weapons out of these areas or else storing them at 
designated sites, monitored by UNITAF. The movement of heavy 
weapons and the open or threatening display of light arms in 
UNITAF-controlled areas was generally prohibited.18 Although some 
weapons stores were raided and a certain quantity of weapons and 
ammunition forcibly seized,19 UNITAF normally relied on the 
Somalis themselves to comply with stated weapons policies. In 
fact, little real disarmament was carried out. Weapons, 
especially heavy weapons, were "put ... out of circulation",20 
but not permanently taken away or destroyed, in a policy more 
akin to "weapons management" than real disarmament.21
 
 Having reviewed the salient features of UNITAF's mandate in 
Somalia, we now turn to a more detailed consideration of the 
subject, using the analytical framework developed previously. 
 
 
 The Use of Force 
 
UNIDIR, 1995), pp. 78-79; Ken MENKHAUS with Louis ORTMAYER, Key Decisions 
in the Somalia Intervention (Pew Case Study no. 464, Washington, D.C., 
Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, 1995), pp. 12-13. 
      18  See: Kenneth ALLARD, Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned (Washington, 
D.C., National Defense University Press, 1995), pp. 36-37 and 64; S.L. 
ARNOLD, "Somalia: An Operation other than War", Military Review, vol. 73, 
December 1993, p. 31; Hirsch and Oakley, supra, note 177, pp. 57-59, 83, 
and 104; Lyons and Samatar, supra, note 178, pp. 41-42; "Playing the US 
against the UN", The Economist, 9 Jan. 1993; S/25126, 19 Jan. 1993, p. 3; 
Rules of Engagement for Operation Restore Hope, "Rules of Engagement" nos. 
8, 10 and 11 (reproduced in Peace Operations, Dept. of the Army, Field 
Manual No. 100-23, 30 Dec. 1994 [hereinafter "FM 100-23"], Appendix D). 
      19  See: Somalia Faces the Future: Human Rights in a Fragmented Society (New 
York, Human Rights Watch/Africa, April 1995), pp. 58-59; "Playing the US 
against the UN", ibid. 
      20  Hirsch and Oakley, supra, note 177, p. 104. 
      21  Jane BOULDEN, "Rules of Engagement, Force Structure and Composition in 
United Nations Disarmament Operations" (IN Managing Arms in Peace 
Processes: The Issues, New York and Geneva, UNIDIR, 1996), p. 139. And see 
S/25354, 3 March 1993, para. 100. 
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 As noted previously, UNITAF's mandate was explicitly 
grounded in chapter VII of the UN Charter. This, coupled with 
the authorization to "use all necessary means",22 meant that, in 
implementing its mandate, UNITAF could take the initiative in 
the use of force. In fact, force was occasionally used to 
neutralize threats posed to the security of international 
military and civilian personnel23 and to halt inter-factional 
fighting.24 There can be no doubt, in other words, that UNITAF 
was authorized and indeed prepared, where necessary, to use 
force to implement its mandate. 
 
 Nevertheless, more often than not, mission objectives were 
achieved without the use of force. The implicit threat of force, 
backed up by an abundance of military power deployed pursuant to 
the American strategic preference for "overwhelming force",25 was 
almost always sufficient to secure compliance with the mandate. 
Where force was to be used, US rules of engagement stressed the 
 
      22  SCR 794, 3 Dec. 1992, para. 10. 
      23  On 7 January 1993, US marines attacked a military compound belonging to 
Aideed in Mogadishu, destroying several buildings and seizing a large cache 
of weapons. The operation was carried out, in the first instance, in 
response to sniper fire which gunmen in the camp had earlier directed at US 
soldiers. Yet, it also appeared designed to stem a steady deterioration of 
the security environment in Mogadishu. See: Kenneth NOBLE, "400 U.S. 
Marines Attack Compound of Somali Gunmen", New York Times, 8 Jan. 1993, p. 
A1; Keesing's Record of World Events, Jan. 1993, p. 39255; "Playing the US 
against the UN", supra, note 183; Hirsch and Oakley, supra, note 177, p. 
60. 
      24  On 25 January 1993, US and Belgian forces blocked the advance of warlord 
Mohamed Said Hersi "Morgan" on the southern town of Kismayo. The operation 
was characterized by the US military as the first "pre-emptive or direct 
action to enforce" a cease-fire agreed by the faction leaders at Addis 
Ababa earlier that month. Col. Fred Peck (Marine Corps), quoted in Diana 
Jean SCHEMO, "U.S. Attacks Rebels in Somalia; Marine is Slain Later", New 
York Times, 26 Jan. 1993, p. A3. And see Hirsch and Oakley, supra, note 
177, pp. 76-77 and 94. 
      25  David BENTLEY and Robert OAKLEY, Peace Operations: A Comparison of 
Somalia and Haiti ("Strategic Forum" no. 30, Washington, D.C., National 
Defense University, May 1995), sec. 3. And see Hirsch and Oakley, supra, 
note 177, pp. 47 and 162. 
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need for restraint,26 with the use of deadly force almost 
entirely restricted to cases where armed Somalis posed a serious 
threat to the safety of US soldiers.27 Where contingents could 
operate with a "Chapter VI approach", they did so.28 There was a 
determination at the highest level to avoid armed confrontation 
with the factions wherever possible.29
 
 
 
 Consent 
 
 Neither the terms of UNITAF's mandate nor its deployment 
were subject to the approval of the factions or other political 
authorities. Operation Restore Hope was, in effect, imposed upon 
them. Nevertheless, whenever possible, UNITAF sought cooperation 
in reaching its goals. 
 
 UNITAF's deployment to Mogadishu was conducted unopposed.30 
Ali Mahdi had consistently supported international intervention 
 
      26  See Rules of Engagement for Operation Restore Hope, supra, note 183, 
"Rules of Engagement" (especially nos. 2, 3, 6, 7 and 10(b)) and "ROE 
Card". 
      27  See Rules of Engagement for Operation Restore Hope, supra, note 183, 
"Rules of Self-Protection for all Soldiers", "Rules of Engagement" 
(especially nos. 1, 3, and 10(a)), and "ROE Card". In the most significant 
exception to this restriction, Rule of Engagement 1(c) authorized the use 
of deadly force where "Armed elements, mobs, and/or rioters threaten human 
life, sensitive equipment and aircraft, and open and free passage of relief 
supplies." (emphasis added) Note that the US rules of engagement were used 
by most other UNITAF coalition members, though sometimes with 
modifications. Jonathan DWORKEN, "Rules of Engagement: Lessons from Restore 
Hope", Military Review, vol. 74(9), Sept. 1994, p. 32. 
      28  Hirsch and Oakley, supra, note 177, p. 162. The reference is to the 
United Nations Charter. Chapter VI is exclusively concerned with peaceful 
forms of dispute settlement, in contrast to chapter VII which includes 
provisions for the use of coercive measures. 
      29  See: Bentley and Oakley, supra, note 190, sec. 3; Hirsch and Oakley, 
supra, note 177, p. xviii and 51. 
      30  Discounting, that is, the swarm of TV reporters waiting to "shoot" the 
marines as they landed on the beaches of Mogadishu, on 9 December 1992. 
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while Aideed rallied to the idea at the last minute.31 Nor was 
any opposition encountered when UNITAF deployed to towns in 
Somalia's southern interior. These deployments were facilitated 
by the US Liaison Office (USLO) whose officials met with Somali 
authorities and militia leaders in these areas, in advance of 
deployment, in order to explain UNITAF's objectives and discour-
age potential resistance.32
 
 UNITAF's goals of securing the unopposed delivery of 
humanitarian assistance and controlling armaments, especially 
heavy weapons, were pursued, whenever possible, with the 
cooperation of the faction leaders and other authorities.33 A 
premium was put on continued dialogue and negotiation.34 A joint 
security committee, which brought together UNITAF officials and 
Somali faction leaders for regular meetings in Mogadishu, served 
to reduce tension and promote Somali understanding of and 
compliance with UNITAF goals.35
 
 The implicit threat of enforcement action was, in all 
cases, a prime component of the US strategy to achieve mission 
objectives at minimum cost by eliciting Somali cooperation.36 
This was not peace-keeping where mission objectives were 
essentially hostage to the dictates of host country authorities. 
Yet, neither was it war.37
 
      31  Concerning the reasons for Aideed's sudden change of heart, see: Menkhaus 
and Ortmayer, supra, note 182, p. 9; Lyons and Samatar, supra, note 178, p. 
39 (referring to a paper written by UNOSOM adviser John Drysdale). 
      32  See: Lyons and Samatar, supra, note 178, pp. 39-40; Hirsch and Oakley, 
supra, note 177, pp. 54 and 69-72. 
      33  See Hirsch and Oakley, supra, note 177, pp. 55-57 and 104. 
      34  See: Arnold, supra, note 183, p. 33; Allard, supra, note 183, p. 73; 
Hirsch and Oakley, supra, note 177, p. 153. 
      35  See: Hirsch and Oakley, supra, note 177, p. 58; Allard, supra, note 183, 
p. 73. 
      36  See: Hirsch and Oakley, supra, note 177, pp. 56-57 and 104. 
      37  The "ROE Card", summarizing the rules of engagement for American soldiers 
in Somalia, urged them to "Remember · The United States is not at war." 
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 Impartiality 
 
 The political and military leadership of Operation Restore 
Hope attached great importance to the principle of impartiality. 
Although, as indicated earlier, this principle is a cornerstone 
of peace-keeping, in the view of these officials it was no less 
indispensable to the success of their, more muscular, efforts. 
Although force might have to be used in certain instances, 
UNITAF sought, in all cases, to avoid generating "long-term 
animosity" on the part of any one faction.38 While the Force's 
relations with Aideed's SNA39 were often strained,40 it in fact 
succeeded in "maintaining and demonstrating military primacy 
without making a permanent adversary or national hero of any 
local actor".41 However tense relations with the SNA became, they 
never approached the catastrophic levels of hostility seen in 
the months following UNOSOM II's assumption of the Somali brief. 
 
 The greater problem for UNITAF lay not in dealing with the 
factions in an even-handed manner, but in striking the right 
balance between the factions, on the one hand, and what remained 
of Somali civil society, on the other. In the eyes of many 
observers, UNITAF and the USLO made a critical mistake ─ a 
 
Rules of Engagement for Operation Restore Hope, supra, note 183 (emphasis 
in the original). 
      38  Hirsch and Oakley, supra, note 177, p. 51. And see pp. 156-57. 
      39  In early 1993, the Somali National Alliance (SNA) comprised, under 
Aideed's leadership, Aideed's faction of the United Somali Congress (USC) 
and three other factions. In this chapter, the abbreviation "SNA" is used 
when referring to the SNA alliance as a whole and "USC/SNA" when the 
discussion focuses on the USC/SNA faction, based in South Mogadishu. The 
other USC faction, led by Ali Mahdi, was part of a separate alliance, which 
Ali Mahdi also headed, known at that time as the "Group of 11" or "G-11". 
      40  See: Hirsch and Oakley, supra, note 177, pp. 60, 62-63, and 78-79; Lyons 
and Samatar, supra, note 178, p. 48. 
      41  Chester CROCKER, "The Lessons of Somalia ─ Not Everything Went Wrong", 
Foreign Affairs, vol. 74(3), May-June 1995, p. 4. 
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mistake which would cost UNOSOM II dearly ─ in treating the 
faction leaders as principal interlocutors. Thus, it was argued, 
an opportunity was squandered to marginalize the warlords and 
actively promote the emergence of alternative Somali leader-
ship.42
 
 The US approach which, at one level, simply involved a 
recognition of existing power realities, was a necessary adjunct 
to the overall policy of avoiding confrontation with the 
warlords. Yet, there were other factors and other policies at 
work. First, the mere fact of the US intervention and the 
resultant, though provisional, taming of the warlords which it 
brought created a certain amount of space for the revival of 
Somali civil society.43 Moreover, UNITAF and the USLO took 
deliberate steps to encourage this development.44 US Special 
Envoy Robert Oakley, assiduous in soliciting the faction 
leaders' cooperation with UNITAF, went so far as to claim that 
the mission's ultimate goal was, in fact, their 
marginalization.45  
 
 
      42  See: Lyons and Samatar, supra, note 178, pp. 41 and 43; Operation Restore 
Hope: A Preliminary Assessment (London, African Rights, May 1993), p. 30; 
I.M. LEWIS, Making History in Somalia: Humanitarian Intervention in a 
Stateless Society (London, Centre for the Study of Global Governance, LSE, 
1993), p. 11. 
      43  See: Lyons and Samatar, supra, note 178, p. 47; Lewis, ibid., pp. 10-11; 
S/25354, 3 March 1993, para. 6. 
      44  Thus, US Special Envoy Robert Oakley met frequently with traditional 
leaders, Somali professionals and representatives of women's groups, in 
Mogadishu and elsewhere, for discussions on the country's political future. 
See: Hirsch and Oakley, supra, note 177, pp. 33, 69-72, 78, 83-84, and 92-
93; Lyons and Samatar, supra, note 178, pp. 47-48; Keith RICHBURG, "Some 
Somalis Regain a Voice", International Herald Tribune (WP), 29 Jan. 1993, 
p. 4. 
      45  "You take one feather at a time, and the bird doesn't think there's 
anything terrible going on ... Then one day he finds he can't fly. We did 
that from the beginning." Robert Oakley, quoted in Diana Jean SCHEMO, 
"Nearly Everything in Somalia Is Now Up for Grabs", New York Times, 21 Feb. 
1993, p. A3. And see John DRYSDALE, Whatever Happened to Somalia? (London, 
HAAN Associates, 1994), pp. 13 and 110. 
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 Yet, while US intervention undoubtedly did create space for 
Somali civil society, both as a matter of deliberate policy and 
as a byproduct of the military intervention, the decision of the 
US, in December 1992, to deal with the warlords kept them 
squarely in the political game. US policy was, in effect, "being 
pursued on two parallel tracks: The United States was talking to 
the warlords, and also encouraging the emergence of other 
groups".46 It would be up to UNOSOM II to come down on one side 
or the other of the political equation. 
 
 
UNOSOM II 
 
 In March 1993, the UN Security Council authorized the 
establishment of the first UN peace operation explicitly granted 
enforcement powers.47 While the second United Nations Operation 
in Somalia ("UNOSOM II") was formally a UN operation, commanded 
by the Secretary-General, it should be noted that the United 
States wielded considerable influence over policy and important 
operational decisions. Americans occupied key positions in the 
UNOSOM II hierarchy48 and the US Government provided crucial 
military and logistic support to the mission. While some 3,000 
US troops (for logistic support) were, for the first time ever, 
placed under UN command, the Quick Reaction Force, available at 
the outset of the mission, and the US Army Rangers and Delta 
Force commandos, sent to Mogadishu in August 1993 to hunt for 
Aideed, were commanded directly by the US.49
                                                                
      46  Richburg, supra, note 209. And see Menkhaus and Ortmayer, supra, note 
182, pp. 12-13. 
      47  ONUC's enforcement powers were, as noted earlier, not explicit, but could 
nevertheless be deduced from certain of the mandates assigned the force and 
the practical interpretation accorded to them. See The United Nations and 
Somalia, 1992-1996, supra, note 169, "Introduction", paras. 5, 114 and 121. 
      48  Both the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Somalia, ret. 
Admiral Jonathan Howe, and the Deputy Force Commander, Major-General Thomas 
Montgomery, were Americans. 
      49  Concerning the US role in shaping UNOSOM II policy in the aftermath of 
the USC/SNA's 5 June attacks on UNOSOM II soldiers, see Menkhaus and 
Ortmayer, supra, note 182, p. 16. For more information on the US military 
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 UNOSOM II's overall mandate was wide and included many 
aspects of nation-building. Thus, the Security Council requested 
the Secretary-General, through his Special Representative, to 
assist the Somali people in, inter alia, the provision of relief 
assistance and the economic rehabilitation of the country, the 
re-establishment of Somali police forces, and the advancement of 
national reconciliation through, in particular, the re-
establishment of national and regional institutions and civil 
administration throughout Somalia.50
 
 The enforcement powers51 conferred upon the UNOSOM II Force 
were basically tied to the task of consolidating, expanding and 
maintaining security throughout the country.52 In this respect, 
they built upon commitments made by the factions53 at Addis Ababa 
in January54 and March 199355 to abide by a cease-fire, disarm 
 
contribution to the UNOSOM II mission, including the exceptional command 
and control arrangements applicable to US forces, see Allard, supra, note 
183, pp. 18-19, 24-25, 31 and 57-59. 
      50  SCR 814, 26 March 1993, subparas. 4(a), (c), and (d). Other non-military 
tasks are enumerated in the other subparagraphs of paragraph 4. 
      51  UNOSOM II's authority to take enforcement action derived from sec. B of 
SCR 814 (26 March 1993) and paras. 58 and 63 of S/25354 (3 March 1993). And 
see: paras. 91 and 97 of the latter report; note 235, infra. 
      52  See: SCR 814, 26 March 1993, preambular para. 16 and operative para. 14; 
SCR 837, 6 June 1993, preambular para. 9; S/25354, 3 March 1993, paras. 58, 
79, 85, and 91. 
      53  With the exception of the Somali National Movement (SNM) of the 
secessionist north-west ("Republic of Somaliland"), the key Somali factions 
were represented at the January and March meetings. 
      54  The General Agreement Signed in Addis Ababa on 8 January 1993 
[hereinafter "General Agreement"]. Agreement on Implementing the Cease-fire 
and on Modalities of Disarmament (Supplement to the General Agreement 
Signed in Addis Ababa on 8 January 1993), 15 January 1993 [hereinafter 
"Cease-fire and Disarmament Agreement"]. These are reproduced in S/25168, 
26 Jan. 1993 (Annexes II-III). 
      55  Addis Ababa Agreement of the First Session of the Conference on National 
Reconciliation in Somalia, 27 March 1993 [hereinafter "Addis Ababa 
Agreement of 27 March 1993"]. Reproduced in The United Nations and Somalia, 
1992-1996, supra, note 169, pp. 264-66. 
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their militia and cooperate with the international relief 
effort.56 Thus, as with the model of peace enforcement outlined 
in paragraph 44 of An Agenda for Peace,57 cease-fire enforcement 
was one of the main tasks of the UNOSOM II Force.58 In addition, 
it was called upon to enforce the disarmament process agreed by 
the factions at their January meeting59 and to "secure or 
maintain security at all ports, airports and lines of communica-
tions required for the delivery of humanitarian assistance".60 
For these purposes, then, UNOSOM II could take enforcement 
action. 
 
 UNOSOM II assumed responsibility for military operations in 
Somalia on 4 May 1993. US and UN officials thought it likely 
that the factions, in particular Aideed's SNA, perceiving the 
new force to be significantly weaker than its predecessor, would 
test it early on.61 In fact, the test came on 5 June when 24 
 
      56  The link between UNOSOM II's enforcement mandate and the January Addis 
Ababa agreements emerges quite clearly from paragraph 8 of SCR 814 (26 
March 1993) wherein the Security Council "Demands" that the factions comply 
with the January agreements, especially the Cease-fire and Disarmament 
Agreement (supra, note 219). This demand was reiterated by the Security 
Council in paragraph 4 of SCR 837 (6 June 1993). The link between UNOSOM 
II's enforcement powers and the Addis Ababa agreements is also examined in 
the section on "Consent", infra. 
      57  Supra, note 4. 
      58  SCR 814, 26 March 1993, para. 5. S/25354, 3 March 1993, subparas. 57(a) 
and (b). And see: SCR 814, para. 8; SCR 837, 6 June 1993, para. 4. 
      59  SCR 814, 26 March 1993, para. 5. S/25354, 3 March 1993, subparas. 57(c) 
and (d). And see: SCR 814, para. 8; SCR 837, 6 June 1993, para. 4; S/25354, 
paras. 59-69 ("Cease-fire and Disarmament Concept"). 
      60  SCR 814, 26 March 1993, para. 5. S/25354, 3 March 1993, subpara. 57(e). 
      61  Hirsch and Oakley, supra, note 177, pp. 115-16. At the time of the 
handover, UNOSOM II had only 17,000 troops in Somalia plus the 1100 member 
Quick Reaction Force. This compared with UNITAF's peak force level of some 
37,000 troops and UNOSOM II's approved force level of 28,000 military 
personnel. The United Nations and Somalia, 1992-1996, supra, note 169, "In-
troduction", para. 143. Hirsch and Oakley point, however, to other factors 
as inspiring the Somali perception of UN weakness, notably the failure of 
Pakistani troops in Mogadishu to patrol the city as aggressively as UNITAF 
forces had done. See Hirsch and Oakley, pp. 115-16. 
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Pakistani soldiers serving with UNOSOM II were killed in a 
series of attacks in South Mogadishu, stronghold of the 
USC/SNA.62
 
 The Security Council responded quickly with the adoption, 
on 6 June, of Resolution 837. Therein, the Council: 
 
Re-emphasizes the crucial importance of the early implementation 
of the disarmament of all Somali parties ... and of neutralizing 
radio broadcasting systems that contribute to the violence and 
attacks directed against UNOSOM II;63
 
In paragraph 5 of the resolution, the Council: 
 
Reaffirms that the Secretary-General is authorized under 
resolution 814 (1993) to take all necessary measures against all 
those responsible for the armed attacks [of 5 June], including 
against those responsible for publicly inciting such attacks, to 
establish the effective authority of UNOSOM II throughout Somalia, 
including to secure the investigation of their actions and their 
arrest and detention for prosecution, trial and punishment; 
 
Paragraphs 3 and 10 of the resolution's preamble pointed to the 
USC/SNA as the party responsible for the "premeditated armed 
attacks".64 By the terms of these provisions and the fact that 
Resolution 837 was adopted under chapter VII of the UN Charter, 
 
      62  Fifty-six other Pakistani soldiers were wounded on June 5, of whom 11 
were crippled for life. Probably the most complete account of the events of 
that day may be found in the report of the Commission of Inquiry 
established pursuant to SCR 885 (16 Nov. 1993). See S/1994/653, 1 June 
1994, paras. 94-124 and 176-227. And see note 204, supra. 
      63  Para. 3 
      64  US and UN officials were convinced of Aideed's responsibility at the 
time. Michael GORDON, "For Clinton, a Cautiously Limited Goal", 
International Herald Tribune (NYT), 19-20 June 1993, p. 2. Menkhaus and 
Ortmayer, supra, note 182, p. 14. Professor Tom Farer, an independent 
expert asked by the UN to carry out an investigation of the June 5 attacks, 
would subsequently conclude that Aideed's responsibility for the attacks 
was "supported by clear and convincing evidence." S/26351, 24 Aug. 1993, 
para. 24. 
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it was clear that they authorized enforcement action. Unless one 
considers that UNOSOM II already possessed these powers under 
its broad mandate for "the consolidation, expansion and mainten-
ance of a secure environment throughout Somalia",65 the task of 
"neutralizing" SNA-controlled Radio Mogadishu and of taking "all 
necessary measures" against those responsible for the 5 June 
attacks would involve extensions of the same. 
 
 The failure of efforts to capture or otherwise subdue 
Aideed led to a fundamental change of mandate. UNOSOM II's 
enforcement strategy was effectively abandoned in October 1993 
in the wake of a battle which saw 1 Malaysian and 18 American 
soldiers killed.66 This was eventually formalized, on 4 February 
1994, with the adoption of Security Council Resolution 897. It 
revoked UNOSOM II's powers for the enforcement of the cease-fire 
and disarmament process agreed within the Addis Ababa framework67 
and limited its military tasks to the protection of essential 
infrastructure (including major ports and airports), humanitar-
ian supply routes, and the personnel, installations and 
equipment of the UN and other international agencies.68
 
 Some observers have erroneously tagged UNOSOM II as a 
"mixed mission" where a peace-keeping force, operating in strict 
adherence to peace-keeping principles of consent, the non-use of 
force except in self-defence, and impartiality, is given 
enforcement tasks incompatible with these premises.69 The 
 
      65  SCR 814, 26 March 1993, para. 14. And see note 216, supra. This 
interpretation is supported by the language used in the provisions of SCR 
837 quoted above: "Re-emphasizes" (para. 3); "Reaffirms that the Secretary-
General is authorized under resolution 814 (1993)" (para. 5). 
      66  For a detailed account of the events of 3-4 October, see the two-part 
series written by Rick ATKINSON for the Washington Post (published in the 
International Herald Tribune on 31 Jan. and 1 Feb. 1994). 
      67  SCR 897, 4 Feb. 1994, subpara. 2(a). S/1994/12, 6 Jan. 1994, para. 57. 
      68  SCR 897, 4 Feb. 1994, subparas. 2(b) and (g). S/1994/12, 6 Jan. 1994, 
para. 57. 
      69  Boulden, supra, note 186, p. 155. And see: Agenda Supplement, supra, note 
1, paras. 34-35; Boutros-Ghali, supra, note 54, p. 12. 
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preceding review of the evolution of UNOSOM II's mandate clearly 
shows that it was conceived as an enforcement operation at the 
outset. On this point, the instruments defining the mandate are 
unambiguous.70
 
 As just mentioned, a change of approach did occur in 
October 1993, with the move away from enforcement and back to 
peace-keeping. UNOSOM II's final period (October 1993-March 
1995) marked the fourth distinct phase in the international 
intervention in Somalia which had begun with peace-keeping 
(UNOSOM I), before shifting to enforcement (UNITAF, UNOSOM II 
May-Oct. 1993). UNOSOM II's peace-keeping phase need not detain 
us here. Our enquiry is, rather, focused on the period from May 
to October 1993. 
 
 
 
 The Use of Force 
 
 As we have seen, UNOSOM II, in its initial phase, had 
extensive powers of enforcement: (1) to ensure compliance with 
the cease-fire and (2) the disarmament process agreed within the 
Addis Ababa framework; (3) to ensure the security of 
humanitarian relief operations; (4) to "neutralize" SNA-
controlled Radio Mogadishu; and (5) "to take all necessary 
measures" against those responsible for the 5 June attacks on UN 
soldiers.71 Moreover, the rules of engagement used by UNOSOM II 
permitted a more aggressive use of force than those used by 
UNITAF.72
 
      70  One should note, however, that the key operative provision in SCR 814, 
paragraph 5, simply approves the recommendations made by the Secretary-
General in respect of the mandate in his report of 3 March 1993 (S/25354). 
UNOSOM II's mandate, including its enforcement mandate, is in fact defined 
in paragraphs 56 to 88 of the latter report. 
      71  See text accompanying notes 216-25 and 230, supra. To these specific 
powers, one might arguably add a general power of enforcement for "the 
consolidation, expansion and maintenance of a secure environment throughout 
Somalia". See text accompanying note 217, supra. 
      72  A change in rules of engagement, which came into effect shortly after the 
handover from UNITAF to UNOSOM II, allowed UN soldiers to fire upon 
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 Thus, on paper, UNOSOM II had broad scope for the use of 
force. The hunt for Aideed would see these powers exercised to 
their limit. While, as a general rule, UNOSOM military 
operations were constrained by the need to limit civilian 
casualties and unintended property damage,73 occasional mis-
takes74 and the SNA's use of human shields seriously undermined 
this policy during the period of armed conflict with the SNA.75
 
 
 
 Consent 
 
 Enforcement implies, at some level, a lack of consent. 
Thus, the Secretary-General, in paragraph 97 of his 3 March 1993 
 
technicals on sight, whether or not they showed hostile intent. Allard, 
supra, note 183, pp. 36-37. 
      73  See: Menkhaus and Ortmayer, supra, note 182, p. 17; Allard, supra, note 
183, pp. 65-66. 
      74  UNOSOM II's 12 July missile attack on the "Abdi House" was, in contrast 
to standard policy, conducted without warning. The aim, in fact, was to 
kill top SNA leaders, including Aideed. Though denied by the UN, it is 
widely believed that, at the time it was attacked, the house was being used 
by clan elders to discuss ways of ending the hostilities between Aideed and 
UNOSOM II. Casualty estimates ranged from a low of 20 (UNOSOM) to a high of 
73 (SNA) killed (the ICRC gave a figure of 54). See: Somalia Faces the 
Future, supra, note 184, pp. 62-64; Menkhaus and Ortmayer, supra, note 182, 
p. 17; Hirsch and Oakley, supra, note 177, p. 121; "The Mire", The 
Economist, 11 Sept. 1993; Allard, supra, note 183, pp. 65-66; S/26738, 12 
Nov. 1993, para. 63; S/1994/653, 1 June 1994, paras. 153-55 and Annex 5 
(pp. 79-80). 
      75  Somali casualties over the period from 5 June to 3 October 1993 were an 
estimated 6,000 to 10,000 (dead and wounded), a large majority of which 
occurred in the USC/SNA's stronghold of South Mogadishu. These figures, 
which could not be broken down more precisely, resulted from interfactional 
fighting as well as clashes with UNOSOM II. Two-thirds of the casualties 
were reported to be women or children, many of whom were used as human 
shields by SNA militiamen. "Americans Cite 6,000 Somali Casualties", 
International Herald Tribune (NYT), 9 December 1993, p. 2. UNOSOM II 
fatalities as of 14 October 1993 (just after the end of the UNOSOM - SNA 
conflict) stood at 81. United Nations Peace-keeping Operations ─ October 
1993, UN Information Service (Geneva), Press Release GA/PK/3, 25 Oct. 1993. 
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report, states: 
 
the deployment of UNOSOM II ... will be at the discretion of the 
Secretary-General, his Special Representative and the Force 
Commander acting under the authority of the Security Council. Such 
deployment would not be subject to the agreement of any local 
faction leaders.76
 
Yet, UNOSOM II was not to be an army of occupation or coloniz-
ation. To some extent, it did rely on consent. 
 
Notwithstanding the compelling necessity for authority to use 
enforcement measures as appropriate, I continue to hold to my 
conviction that the political will to achieve security, reconcili-
ation and peace must spring from the Somalis themselves. Even if 
it is authorized to resort to forceful action in certain 
circumstances, UNOSOM II cannot and must not be expected to 
substitute itself for the Somali people. Nor can or should it use 
its authority to impose one or another system of governmental 
organization. It may and should, however, be in a position to 
press for the observance of United Nations standards of human 
rights and justice.77
 
 
 In fact, in the Addis Ababa Agreement of 27 March 1993, 
concluded the day after the Security Council voted to establish 
UNOSOM II, the Somali factions committed themselves to those 
same objectives whose realization UNOSOM II was mandated to 
secure, if necessary, through the use of force, namely a cease-
fire,78 disarmament,79 and the provision of a secure environment 
 
      76  S/25354, 3 March 1993, para. 97. 
      77  S/25354, 3 March 1993, para. 92. UNOSOM II's first chief of mission, 
(Ret.) Admiral Jonathan Howe, has written that "[s]uccess [in implementing 
UNOSOM II's initial mandate] depended on the willingness of Somali leaders 
to cooperate." Jonathan HOWE, "The United States and United Nations in 
Somalia: The Limits of Involvement", The Washington Quarterly, vol. 18(3), 
summer 1995, p. 52. 
      78  Addis Ababa Agreement of 27 March 1993, supra, note 220, sec. I, paras. 
4-6; referring to the General Agreement, supra, note 219, point 2, and the 
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for relief, reconstruction and rehabilitation operations.80 More-
over, in the 27 March Agreement, the factions expressed their 
consent to the first two components of UNOSOM II's enforcement 
mandate. Specifically, they "Urge UNITAF/UNOSOM to apply strong 
and effective sanctions against those responsible for any 
violation of the Cease-fire Agreement of January 1993".81 Thus, 
in March 1993, a consensual framework of a kind underlay the 
UNOSOM II mission. 
 
 The question arises as to whether this consensual framework 
was entirely sound. Were the commitments made by the faction 
leaders in the Addis Ababa meetings genuine? Although the 
official justifications offered for UNITAF's destruction, on 7 
January 1993, of a USC/SNA military compound in Mogadishu 
centred on the security of international military and civilian 
personnel,82 the incident was believed to have played an 
important role in getting Aideed to end his obstruction of the 
January 1993 Addis Ababa meeting.83 Similarly, the agreement 
reached at the March Addis Ababa Conference was pried out of the 
faction leaders with threats of the imminent imposition, by the 
UN, of a transitional administration which would leave them on 
 
Cease-fire and Disarmament Agreement, supra, note 219, sec. II. 
      79  Addis Ababa Agreement of 27 March 1993, supra, note 220, sec. I, paras. 
2-5; referring to the Cease-fire and Disarmament Agreement, supra, note 
219, sec. I. 
      80  Addis Ababa Agreement of 27 March 1993, supra, note 220, sec. II, para. 
5. And see: para. 6 of the latter agreement; General Agreement, supra, note 
219, point 6. 
      81  Addis Ababa Agreement of 27 March 1993, supra, note 220, sec. I, para. 6. 
Note that, in the January 1993 Cease-fire and Disarmament Agreement (supra, 
note 219), the factions committed themselves to both a cease-fire and 
disarmament. 
      82  See note 188, supra. 
      83  See: Paul LEWIS, "Somali Factions Take a Tentative Step Toward Reconcili-
ation", New York Times, 8 Jan. 1993, p. A8; Lyons and Samatar, supra, note 
178, pp. 44-45; The Europa World Year Book 1993, vol. II (London, Europa 
Publications, 1993), p. 2557; "Quatorze factions ont signé un accord de 
principe pour un cessez-le-feu", Le Monde, 10-11 janv. 1993, p. 3. 
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the sidelines in the absence of any accord.84
 
 Of course, such pressures are frequent companions of 
agreements designed to end armed conflicts. More serious was the 
fact that, as we will see in the next section ("Impartiality"), 
the Addis Ababa agreements masked fundamental disagreement ─ 
among the factions and between the factions and UNOSOM II ─ over 
such matters as disarmament and the re-establishment of Somali 
governance structures. 
 
 The consensual foundations of the operation, such as they 
were, came under significant stress almost from the beginning of 
UNOSOM II's mission in Somalia. The violent conflict which raged 
between UNOSOM II and the SNA from June - October 1993 did the 
most damage to these foundations; yet, problems arose even 
before this. UNOSOM II's apparent determination to make 
uncompromising use of its enforcement powers, even in such areas 
of prime concern to the Somali factions as disarmament, 
constituted one important source of pressure on the mission's 
consensual foundations.85 Equally problematic was UNOSOM II's 
tendency to act as a governing authority ─ i.e., to impose 
policies in such areas as the re-establishment of the judiciary 
and police or the national reconciliation process where it was 
only supposed to "assist".86
 
 These cases will also be reviewed in the next section of 
the chapter since they played a key role in the deterioration of 
relations between UNOSOM II and the SNA. Yet, it is worth noting 
here that UNOSOM II's evident desire to govern, as opposed to 
facilitate, in the political domain is seen by some observers as 
 
      84  Drysdale, supra, note 210, pp. 115 and 164. And see: Lyons and Samatar, 
supra, note 178, p. 50; note 221, supra. 
      85  See: S/1994/653, 1 June 1994, paras. 193-97; Chopra et al, supra, note 
61, p. 63. 
      86  See SCR 814, 26 March 1993, para. 4. See also: S/1994/653, 1 June 1994, 
paras. 51-52, 93 and 199-205; Hirsch and Oakley, supra, note 177, pp. 153 
and 158; Drysdale, supra, note 210, pp. 175-76. 
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a leading cause of its armed conflict with the SNA.87
 
 That conflict clearly represented the end of cooperation ─ 
the end of consent ─ as far as the SNA was concerned. It is a 
simplification, however, to claim that the war fatally 
undermined the consensual foundations of UNOSOM II's mission in 
Somalia. First, there remained a significant group of factions, 
allied with Ali Mahdi, who whole-heartedly supported military 
action against the SNA, indeed who asserted that this was the 
price of their own continuing cooperation with the UN mission.88 
Moreover, among those Somalis who did not consider themselves 
allied to any particular faction, many welcomed UNOSOM II's 
military initiatives against the SNA as a necessary first step 
in the process of defanging all warlords.89
 
 With respect to Aideed's Habr Gedir clan, some analysts 
have claimed that Aideed's conflict with the UN weakened his 
base of support within the clan.90 Yet, most observers assert, on 
the contrary, that the war helped him to consolidate91 his hold 
on the Habr Gedir and even brought him support, including armed 
volunteers, from outside the clan.92 UNOSOM II's attack on the 
"Abdi House"93 appears as something of a watershed in this 
 
      87  See S/1994/653, 1 June 1994, paras. 198-210. 
      88  See: S/26530, 4 October 1993, pp. 2-3; Menkhaus and Ortmayer, supra, note 
182, p. 15; Hirsch and Oakley, supra, note 177, pp. 123-24. 
      89  Menkhaus and Ortmayer, supra, note 182, p. 15. 
      90  See: Hope Restored? ─ Humanitarian Aid in Somalia 1990-1994 (Report of 
the Refugee Policy Group, Nov. 1994), p. 41 (citing the USLO); "Somalia: 
Aydeed Faces His Own People", Africa Confidential, vol. 34(24), 3 Dec. 
1993. 
      91  Aideed's grip on the Habr Gedir was never as firm as popular imagination 
would have it. See: "Somalia: Aydeed Faces His Own People", ibid.; Somalia 
Faces the Future, supra, note 184, p. 68; Michael MAREN, "Somalia: Whose 
Failure?", Current History, vol. 95, no. 601, May 1996, p. 203. 
      92  See: Menkhaus and Ortmayer, supra, note 182, p. 18; Hirsch and Oakley, 
supra, note 177, pp. 121-23; Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Somalia, 
supra, note 182, p. 96; S/1994/653, 1 June 1994, para. 235. 
      93  See note 239, supra. 
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respect, ending all dissension within Habr Gedir ranks and 
arousing considerable sympathy for Aideed and his clan on the 
part of other clans as well.94
 
 Thus, while UNOSOM II retained the support of much of 
Somali society, including, in particular, the clans allied to 
Ali Mahdi, it lost considerable support among the Habr Gedir, 
other SNA adherents and other Somalis who were receptive to 
Aideed's claim that he was waging a war against UN-led attempts 
to re-colonize Somalia. Which is to say that although the UNOSOM 
- SNA conflict did not entirely sweep away UNOSOM II's 
consensual foundations, they were at least partly undermined. 
The situation had become more polarized with many Somalis taking 
sides, for or against the UN mission. 
 
 
 
 Impartiality 
 
 At the outset of its mission, it was clear that UNOSOM II 
was to remain strictly impartial vis-à-vis the Somali factions. 
Impartiality, in this context, meant that UNOSOM II would 
implement its mandate, including its enforcement mandate, in a 
rigorously even-handed manner. This was reflected in the 
Secretary-General's report of 3 March 1993 which included the 
following military tasks in its definition of UNOSOM II's 
mandate: 
 
(a) To monitor that all factions continue to respect the cessation 
of hostilities and other agreements to which they have agreed, 
particularly the Addis Ababa agreements of January 1993; 
 
(b) To prevent any resumption of violence and, if necessary, take 
appropriate action against any faction that violates or threatens 
to violate the cessation of hostilities;95
 
      94  See: Hirsch and Oakley, supra, note 177, pp. 120-22; Hope Restored?, 
supra, note 255, p. 41; S/1994/653, 1 June 1994, para. 156. 
      95  S/25354, 3 March 1993, para. 57 (emphasis added). These provisions were 
made part of UNOSOM II's mandate through paragraph 5 of SCR 814 (26 March 
1993). The plans drawn up by the UN for disarmament also assume impartial-
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 Nevertheless, impartiality almost immediately became an 
issue with the UN Force. On the night of 6-7 May 1993, just days 
after the command of the military operation in Somalia passed 
from UNITAF to UNOSOM II, the forces of faction leader Omar Jess 
were repelled by Belgian troops when they tried to mount an 
attack on a rival in the southern port city of Kismayo.96 
Aideed's SNA, which included Jess' faction, accused the UN of 
bias, noting that several months earlier the rival faction 
leader General Morgan had managed to infiltrate his men into 
Kismayo and drive out Jess though the city was then under UNITAF 
control.97
 
 Other developments in May widened the rift between UNOSOM 
II and the SNA. Specifically, UNOSOM II, in its efforts for the 
re-establishment of the Somali judiciary and police, was accused 
of trying to usurp SNA prerogatives in these areas.98 A particu-
larly serious dispute arose in relation to a conference which 
Aideed sought to organize, with UN assistance, in order to 
resolve long-standing problems in the Galcayo region of central 
Somalia. UNOSOM II, suspicious of Aideed's motives, wanted to 
broaden both the conference agenda and participation. Convinced 
that the UN was deliberately trying to undermine him, Aideed 
eventually convened his own conference, independent of the UN.99 
In fact, by this time, just days before the 5 June attacks on UN 
soldiers, key UN and US officials had already identified Aideed 
 
ity. See S/25354, paras. 59-69 ("Cease-fire and Disarmament Concept"). For 
more evidence of impartiality, see SCR 814, paras. 8-9 and 13. Note finally 
that in the Addis Ababa Agreement of 27 March 1993, the Somali factions 
"Further affirm that disarmament must and shall be comprehensive, impartial 
and transparent" (supra, note 220, sec. I, para. 2). 
      96  S/26317, 12 Aug. 1993, para. 12. And see Lyons and Samatar, supra, note 
178, p. 56. 
      97  See Lyons and Samatar, supra, note 178, pp. 50 and 56. 
      98  See: S/1994/653, 1 June 1994, paras. 64-69; Drysdale, supra, note 210, 
pp. 175-76; Chopra et al, supra, note 61, pp. 93-94. 
      99  See: S/1994/653, 1 June 1994, paras. 74-80; Drysdale, supra, note 210, 
pp. 167-73 and 176-77; Hirsch and Oakley, supra, note 177, pp. 115-16. 
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as the principal obstacle to the implementation of the Addis 
Ababa agreements and had advocated taking action to bring him to 
heel.100
 
 ──── 
 
 One of the main criticisms levelled at UNOSOM II was that, 
in responding to the 5 June attacks with military action against 
the faction believed responsible and a warrant for the arrest of 
its leader,101 it had abandoned one of the guiding principles of 
its mission in Somalia, namely impartiality. We now consider 
this claim. 
 
 Among the various objectives pursued by the UN and US in 
the military operations launched against Aideed and the USC/SNA 
over the June-October 1993 period, four stand out. 
 
1) The restoration of peace  This objective, related to the 
agreement of the factions, at the Addis Ababa talks, to a 
binding cease-fire, was enunciated, at least implicitly, in 
Security Council Resolution 837102 and more explicitly in a 
series of statements, letters and reports issued by the Secre-
tary-General and the Security Council following UNOSOM II's 
first military operations against the USC/SNA, in June 1993.103
 
2) Disarmament  The importance of the disarmament process, 
                                                                
      100  See: Hope Restored?, supra, note 255, p. 40; Menkhaus and Ortmayer, 
supra, note 182, pp. 14-15; Drysdale, supra, note 210, pp. 166-67. Menkhaus 
and Ortmayer point out that UN and US animosity was rooted in the hostility 
Aideed had shown towards the UN, and on occasion UNITAF, since the 
beginning of 1993 (p. 14). 
      101  On 17 June 1993, SRSG Howe publicly called for Aideed's arrest and 
detention. A $25,000 reward was offered any Somali assisting in his 
capture. 
      102  See SCR 837, 6 June 1993, operative paras. 1 and 4, preambular paras. 4 
and 9. 
      103  See: The United Nations and Somalia, 1992-1996, supra, note 169, docs. 
56-59 (pp. 268-72); S/26022, 1 July 1993, paras. 17, 20, 30 and 32. 
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agreed by the factions at the January and March Addis Ababa 
talks, was emphasized in Security Council Resolution 837.104 The 
first series of military operations conducted by UNOSOM II 
against the USC/SNA, targeting its weapons stores, was presented 
as an application of UNOSOM II's enforcement powers in this 
area.
105
 The Secretary-General stressed that the 
 
effective disarmament of all the factions and warlords is conditio 
sine qua non for other aspects of UNOSOM's mandate, be they 
political, civil, humanitarian, rehabilitation or reconstruc-
tion.106
 
3) Aideed's capture or marginalization  A third objective, 
explicitly laid out in Security Council Resolution 837,107 was 
the capture of SNA leader Aideed, widely believed to have 
ordered the 5 June attacks.108 Yet, UNOSOM II's inability to 
capture the General in the first weeks following the attacks led 
UN and US officials to stress that the real aim was not so much 
to capture Aideed as to isolate him within his Habr Gedir clan ─ 
along with those other SNA officials responsible for the 5 June 
attacks ─ and to encourage the emergence of alternative leader-
ship which, it was hoped, would take the SNA and the Habr Gedir 
back into the peace process.109
                                                                
      104  See SCR 837, 6 June 1993, operative paras. 3 and 4, preambular para. 8. 
      105  See: The United Nations and Somalia, 1992-1996, supra, note 169, docs. 
56-57 and 59 (pp. 268-72); S/26022, 1 July 1993, paras. 17, 19, 22, 25, 28, 
and 30; S/26317, 17 Aug. 1993, para. 16; Jonathan HOWE, "Somalia: 
Frustration in a Failed Nation" (IN Soldiers for Peace, ed. by B. Benton, 
New York, Facts on File, 1996), pp. 269-70; Menkhaus and Ortmayer, supra, 
note 182, p. 18. 
      106  S/26317, 17 Aug. 1993, para. 73. 
      107  6 June 1993, operative para. 5 (reproduced after note 228, supra). And 
see preambular para. 11 and operative para. 6 of the resolution. 
      108  See note 229, supra. 
      109  See: Howe, supra, note 270, pp. 170-72; Howe, supra, note 242, p. 57; 
Menkhaus and Ortmayer, supra, note 182, p. 17. This strategy of 
marginalization also involved an attempt at pure and simple elimination in 
the form of a missile attack on a house where the UN believed top SNA 
officials, including Aideed, were meeting. See: Menkhaus and Ortmayer, p. 
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4) Punishment  More generally, UNOSOM II's forceful response to 
the 5 June attacks was designed to punish the USC/SNA for its 
deadly revolt against UNOSOM and the peace process and deter it 
and other factions from similar conduct in the future.110 This 
broad strategy served a number of more specific policy goals, 
which included: preserving UNOSOM II's credibility;111 ensuring 
the safety of UN personnel, both in Somalia and elsewhere;112 
ensuring the continuing participation in UNOSOM II of those 
countries, in particular Pakistan, who insisted on a punitive 
response to the 5 June attacks;113 and demonstrating the UN's 
ability to rise to the challenges of its new peace enforcement 
role.114
 
 Each of the four objectives just described arguably ran 
afoul of the impartiality principle in that they were directed 
                                                                
17; Hirsch and Oakley, supra, note 177, p. 121; note 239, supra. 
      110  See Menkhaus and Ortmayer, supra, note 182, pp. 15-16. 
      111  "In Somalia, negotiating with Aideed after the killing of twenty-four 
Pakistani troops would be perceived as weakness and timidity by watchful 
Somali factions." Menkhaus and Ortmayer, supra, note 182, p. 15. And see 
Howe, supra, note 270, p. 169. 
      112  See: Howe, supra, note 270, pp. 169 and 172; Howe, supra, note 242, p. 
57; The United Nations and Somalia, 1992-1996, supra, note 169, "Introduc-
tion", paras. 145 and 147. The UN Security Council's insistence on the 
"neutralization" of SNA-controlled Radio Mogadishu bore a particularly 
close relationship to this policy goal since the Radio was accused of 
encouraging violence against UNOSOM II. See: SCR 837, 6 June 1993, 
preambular para. 11 and operative para. 3; S/26022, 1 July 1993, para. 30. 
Note also that the question of the safety of UN personnel was already being 
considered by other UN organs, including the General Assembly (see GAR 
47/72, 14 Dec. 1992), the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations 
(see A/48/173, 25 May 1993, sec. III D), and the Secretary-General (see An 
Agenda for Peace, supra, note 4, sec. VIII). 
      113  Menkhaus and Ortmayer, supra, note 182, p. 15. 
      114  See Menkhaus and Ortmayer, supra, note 182, p. 15. The UNOSOM II mission 
was widely perceived as the first practical application of paragraph 44 of 
An Agenda for Peace. See Samuel MAKINDA, Seeking Peace from Chaos: 
Humanitarian Intervention in Somalia (Boulder, Co., Lynne Rienner, 1993), 
p. 77. 
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against a single party, although the first and second derived 
from UNOSOM II's broad, initial mandate, applicable to all the 
factions. Yet, all four objectives, whether directly (the first 
and second) or indirectly (the third and fourth), were 
ultimately designed to secure SNA participation in the Addis 
Ababa peace process. The success or failure of these efforts was 
obviously of vital importance to the peace process as a whole, 
determining, in particular, the attitude the other factions 
would take towards it. 
 
 Although, as described earlier, both sides had been moving 
towards confrontation in the period leading up to 5 June, it 
seems clear that UNOSOM II's military campaign against the 
USC/SNA was a direct response to SNA armed opposition and not 
the result of a pre-existing bias against the faction. In 
striking at the faction and its leader after 5 June, UNOSOM II 
was merely striking at the point of greatest resistance to its 
mandate in Somalia. Retired Admiral Jonathan Howe, head of 
mission at the time of the UNOSOM - SNA conflict, puts the 
argument thus: 
 
Critics allege that we committed a fatal peacekeeping mistake on 
June 17 by publicly taking sides among competing factions. They 
tend to ignore that all Somali faction leaders had started with a 
clean slate. Although some had argued that certain warlords should 
be punished for past deeds, we considered it our mandate to look 
forward to the future ─ not backward to the past. We were 
determined to facilitate an even-handed political process in which 
the Somalis picked their future leaders. It would then be up to 
newly elected Somali authorities to deal with any accusations of 
past misdeeds. General Aideed had distinguished himself on June 5 
from other Somali leaders by "taking sides" against the U.N. By 
brutally attacking Pakistani peacekeepers, he had demonstrated his 
hostility to the lawful actions of the international community.115
 
 
 In the absence of any a priori intent on UNOSOM's part to 
 
      115  Howe, supra, note 270, p. 172. And see S/26022, 1 July 1993, para. 41. 
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treat the factions differently, we can therefore conclude that 
it did adhere to the principle of impartiality. Its implementa-
tion of its mandate remained even-handed in the sense that the 
means it used to that end were determined by the degree of 
resistance or cooperation it encountered. Throughout the 
hostilities with the USC/SNA, UNOSOM's abiding concern, in 
accordance with its mandate, was the preservation of the Addis 
Ababa peace process. 
 
 ──── 
 
 Yet, if we evaluate UNOSOM II's conduct on the basis of the 
definition of impartiality advanced by Dag Hammarskjöld in the 
context of the UN's Congo initiative, the picture looks rather 
different. Hammarskjöld's definition focused on the effects of 
UN action. Specifically, UN forces were not to "become parties 
in internal conflicts" or otherwise "influence the political 
balance decisive to" their resolution.116
 
 The claim that UNOSOM II became a party to the Somali 
conflict ─ at least in practice, if not as a matter of actual 
intention ─ is persuasive. Indeed, UNOSOM's efforts to capture 
and/or marginalize Aideed took it to the heart of a conflict 
which, since early 1991, had been driven, in large measure, by 
Aideed's fight with Ali Mahdi for supreme power. Removing Aideed 
from the scene would have changed the political equation 
dramatically. Yet the problem went further than this. Not only 
was UNOSOM II evidently bent on sweeping Aideed from the 
political scene, as the UNOSOM - SNA conflict dragged on, the 
USC/SNA, indeed the Habr Gedir as a whole, came to believe that 
they too had been targeted by the UN for physical elimination.117 
 
      116  S/4389, 18 July 1960, para. 13. See text accompanying note 156, supra 
for the full quote. 
      117  Hirsch and Oakley, supra, note 177, p. 123. Menkhaus and Ortmayer, 
supra, note 182, p. 18. There were two main reasons for the identification 
of the Habr Gedir with the USC/SNA's fight against UNOSOM II. First, the 
USC/SNA was essentially the militia of the Habr Gedir clan. By weakening 
the USC/SNA, UNOSOM II also weakened the Habr Gedir. Second, the principle 
of collective responsibility, a linchpin of Somali social order, bound the 
fate of the clan to its militia and militia leader (Aideed). Menkhaus and 
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It thus appeared to many that UNOSOM II had aligned itself, not 
merely against a particular faction leader, but against an 
entire faction and the clan which it represented. 
 
 Officially, UNOSOM II had no intention of disrupting the 
prevailing balance of military and political power among Somali 
factions. Thus, the UN indicated that the coercive disarmament 
of the USC/SNA would be followed, as soon as possible, by a 
programme of cooperative disarmament in the rest of the coun-
try.118 Moreover, in an effort to mitigate the effects of a 
disarmament policy which, in its initial, coercive phase was 
entirely selective, UNOSOM II sent letters to the leaders of 
factions opposed to Aideed "cautioning [them] against taking 
advantage of a weakened SNA."119 Yet, these efforts could not 
alter the reality on the ground. The four-month conflict with 
UNOSOM cost both Aideed120 and his clan121 dearly. In fact, it 
appears that the UN was on the verge of prevailing when, as a 
result of the political fallout from the 3 October battle, it 
was forced to retreat from peace enforcement.122
 
 ──── 
 
 So far, we have been considering whether UNOSOM II, in its 
dealings with the Somali factions, remained impartial. Yet, the 
problem of impartiality may be posed at another, deeper level. 
UNITAF, with its "two-track" approach, sought to steer a neutral 
course between the realities of power (the factions), on the one 
 
Ortmayer, p. 18. 
      118  S/26022, 1 July 1993, paras. 30 and 41. 
      119  Howe, supra, note 270, p. 170. 
      120  See "Somalia: Aydeed Faces His Own People", supra, note 255. 
      121  See note 240, supra. 
      122  "Indeed, casualties on the SNA side were so high [after the 3 October 
battle] that most observers believe the Habr-Gedr clan were on the verge of 
suing for peace on U.N. terms, jettisoning General Aideed's policy as too 
costly for the clan." Menkhaus and Ortmayer, supra, note 182, p. 19. 
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hand, and the needs of a barely renascent Somali civil society, 
on the other.123 It was in the nature of its role in Somalia, 
namely to implement a lasting solution to the problem of 
warlord-induced misery,124 that UNOSOM II would find itself 
necessarily "aligned against" the factions. 
 
 The national reconciliation process furnishes one example 
of this. Initially, UNOSOM II, even more than UNITAF, appeared 
to put the faction leaders at the centre of the political 
process. Thus, the agreements which emerged from the January and 
March Addis Ababa meetings, held under UN auspices, were 
negotiated and signed by the faction leaders alone, despite the 
attendance, especially at the March meeting, of Somalis repre-
senting a broad cross-section of their society.125
 
 Nevertheless, the Addis Ababa Agreement of 27 March 1993 
appeared to endorse the "bottom-up" approach to the task of re-
establishing Somali governance structures, long advocated by 
various experts in the field.126 Specifically, the Agreement's 
provisions for the establishment of district and regional 
councils opened the door to the re-emergence of local leadership 
independent of the factions ─ or at least of those factions 
which did not have local support.127
 
      123  See "UNITAF: Impartiality" section, supra. 
      124  See Crocker, supra, note 206, p. 107. 
      125  See: Lyons and Samatar, supra, note 178, pp. 44-45 and 49-50; "Addis 
'Reconciliation' Conference Opened", Somalia News Update, vol. 2(11), 16 
March 1993; Sture NORMARK, "Building Local Political Institutions ─ 
District and Regional Councils" (Paper presented at the Comprehensive 
Seminar on Lessons Learned from United Nations Operation in Somalia 
(UNOSOM), Plainsboro, N.J., 13-15 Sept. 1995). 
      126  The bottom-up strategy, inspired by the decentralized, though not 
anarchic, nature of traditional Somali society, was articulated in a series 
of meetings and consultations held under the auspices of the Life and Peace 
Institute in Uppsala, Sweden. See: Lewis, supra, note 207, p. 11; Normark, 
ibid., pp. 1-3; Local Administrative Structures in Somalia (A Case Study of 
the Bay Region Carried Out by the Life and Peace Institute (LPI), Horn of 
Africa Program), June 1995, p. 5. 
      127  See: Addis Ababa Agreement of 27 March 1993, supra, note 220, sec. IV; 
Lyons and Samatar, supra, note 178, pp. 52, 54 and 68. 
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 Yet, the 15 factions, signatories of the 27 March 
Agreement, signed a separate document, on 30 March, which sought 
to refocus the reconciliation process on the prompt 
establishment of the top-level structure envisaged in the 27 
March Agreement, the Transitional National Council (TNC), while 
ensuring that it remained firmly under the factions' control.128 
UNOSOM II basically ignored the 30 March Agreement and, through 
1993,129 worked to promote the establishment of district and 
regional councils in cooperation with local leaders.130 This 
policy, disliked by many of the factions, was actively opposed 
by the SNA.131
 
 The threat which the UN's interpretation of the political 
process posed to many of the warlords was, however, overshadowed 
by an even more fundamental challenge to their authority ─ 
disarmament. While some factions genuinely supported the 
disarmament process, many others did not.132 It was probably no 
 
      128  Agreements Reached between the Political Leaders at the Consultations 
Held in Addis Ababa, 30 March 1993. Note that this agreement is not 
reproduced in the UN's major compilation of documents on the Somalia 
intervention (The United Nations and Somalia, 1992-1996, supra, note 169), 
but can be found in I.M. Lewis, Understanding Somalia (London, Haan 
Associates, 2nd ed., 1993; Appendix II). It is also discussed by the 
Commission of Inquiry established pursuant to SCR 885 (1993). See 
S/1994/653, 1 June 1994, paras. 60-63 and 206-09. 
      129  Concerning the policy in 1994-95, see: Ken MENKHAUS, "The Betrayal of 
the Somali People", Horn of Africa Bulletin, vol. 6(4), Aug.-Sept. 1994, p. 
1; Normark, supra, note 290, p. 4. 
      130  See: Menkhaus and Ortmayer, supra, note 182, p. 13; S/1994/12, 6 Jan. 
1994, para. 10. 
      131  See: Lyons and Samatar, supra, note 178, p. 55; Hirsch and Oakley, 
supra, note 177, pp. 98-99, 124 and 135-36; Local Administrative Structures 
in Somalia, supra, note 291, pp. 7 and 10; S/1994/12, 6 Jan. 1994, paras. 
10-11. 
      132  The Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) was probably the strongest 
supporter of the disarmament process. As a result, it got much further in 
the SSDF's north-eastern stronghold than in the south of the country. See 
Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Somalia, supra, note 182, pp. 91-92. For 
a general assessment of the attitudes of the factions towards the 
disarmament process, see Hirsch and Oakley, supra, note 177, p. 99. 
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coincidence that the 5 June attacks coincided with UNOSOM II's 
resolute assertion of its right to inspect five authorized 
weapons storage sites (AWSS) belonging to the USC/SNA.133 It is 
almost certainly here that the real roots of the UNOSOM - SNA 
conflict lie. While other factors may have helped bring the 
situation to the boiling point by early June 1993,134 armed con-
frontation over disarmament was probably inevitable.135
 
      133  Concerning these inspections, see S/1994/653, 1 June 1994, paras. 94-
103, 193-97 and 211. The SNA's decision to launch the 5 June attacks can 
also be traced to the threat the inspections appeared to pose to Radio 
Mogadishu, the site of one of its AWSS. In the face of the SNA's 
increasingly hostile, anti-UN broadcasts, UNOSOM II officials, prior to 5 
June, had seriously considered seizing the station or otherwise silencing 
it. This was known to the SNA. See: S/1994/653, 1 June 1994, paras. 80-91, 
94-95, and 210-11; Drysdale, supra, note 210, pp. 173-74; Chopra et al, 
supra, note 61, p. 95. 
      134  See text accompanying notes 261-65, supra. 
      135  See: Theo FARRELL, "Sliding into War: The Somalia Imbroglio and US Army 
Peace Operations Doctrine", International Peacekeeping (London), vol. 2(2), 
summer 1995, p. 201; Hirsch and Oakley, supra, note 177, p. 99; S/1994/653, 
1 June 1994, para. 45. 
 4  BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA (1992-95) 
 
 
 A variety of initiatives were launched by the international 
community in an effort to tame the armed conflicts which raged 
in the former Yugoslavia over the 1991-95 period. Most of these 
initiatives were non-coercive in nature, including the UN 
peacekeeping forces deployed to Croatia in 1992 and Macedonia in 
1993.1 Our search for practical applications of the concept of 
peace enforcement is on firmer ground in Bosnia-Herzegovina2, 
though here too non-coercive approaches to the conflict tended 
to dominate, at least until late in the day. 
 
 As an extension of UNPROFOR-Croatia, the small UNPROFOR 
detachment present in Bosnia-Herzegovina during the first months 
of the Bosnian War (spring 1992) shared the latter's peace-
keeping foundations.3 Beginning in June 1992, with the con-
clusion of the Sarajevo airport agreement, the Security Council 
gave UNPROFOR a series of functions related to the Bosnian 
conflict and expanded its size in the Republic accordingly. 
Although some of these functions suggested a shift away from 
peace-keeping and towards enforcement, in practice UNPROFOR-
Bosnia would shake off its peace-keeping mantle only with the 
greatest reluctance. 
 
 
 
THE SARAJEVO AIRPORT AGREEMENT 
 
 UNPROFOR was assigned a key role in the implementation of 
the agreement for the reopening of Sarajevo airport, signed by 
                                                                
      1  The same name ─ "United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR)" ─ was 
assigned to the three UN forces deployed to Croatia, Macedonia, and Bosnia-
Herzegovina up until 31 March 1995 when UNPROFOR─Croatia was renamed the 
"United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia" (UNCRO, SCR 
981) and UNPROFOR─Macedonia was renamed the "United Nations Preventive 
Deployment Force" (UNPREDEP, SCR 983). UNPROFOR─Bosnia retained the name 
"UNPROFOR" (see SCR 982). 
      2  Note that since the conclusion of the Dayton accords, in December 1995, 
the country's exact name is "Bosnia and Herzegovina". 
      3  See S/23280, 11 Dec. 1991, Annex III, especially paras. 2 and 4. 
  
84
the warring parties on 5 June 1992. Specifically, it was to 
"ensure the immediate security of the airport and its installa-
tions" and "ensure the safe movement of humanitarian aid and 
related personnel" through the establishment of security 
corridors between the airport and Sarajevo city.4 Yet, UNPRO-
FOR's ability to fulfil these tasks depended entirely upon the 
consent and cooperation of the parties. When these were withheld 
─ not infrequently on the Bosnian Serb side ─ UNPROFOR could 
"ensure" nothing.5
 
 
 
HUMANITARIAN CONVOYS 
 
 Extensive media coverage in early August 1992 of Serb-run 
concentration camps fuelled demands for Western nations to "do 
something". Resolution 770, adopted by the Security Council on 
13 August 1992 under chapter VII of the UN Charter, promised, on 
its face, enforcement action: 
 
[The Security Council] 2. Calls upon States to take nationally or 
through regional agencies or arrangements all measures necessary 
to facilitate in coordination with the United Nations the delivery 
by relevant United Nations humanitarian organizations and others 
of humanitarian assistance to Sarajevo and wherever needed in 
other parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina6
 
 
 Yet, no ad hoc coalitions would be sent to Bosnia to force 
through the delivery of humanitarian assistance to all parts of 
                                                                
      4  S/24075, 6 June 1992, para. 4. And see the Agreement of 5 June 1992 on 
the Reopening of Sarajevo Airport for Humanitarian Purposes, annexed to 
S/24075. This mandate and corresponding Force enlargement were approved in 
SCR 758 (8 June 1992) and SCR 761 (29 June 1992). 
      5  See S/1995/444, 30 May 1995, paras. 23 and 24. 
      6  Those Security Council representatives who addressed the question at the 
time of the resolution's adoption were of the opinion that it authorized 
the use of force, if necessary, for the stated purposes. See S/PV.3106, 13 
Aug. 1992. And see Marc WELLER, "Peace-keeping and Peace-enforcement in the 
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina", Zeitschrift für ausländisches 
öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht, vol. 56, nos. 1-2, 1996, pp. 97-98. 
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the Republic. On the basis of a commitment made by the warring 
parties at the London Conference on the former Yugoslavia (26-27 
August 1992),7 it was decided instead to expand UNPROFOR's 
mandate and resources within a continuing, peace-keeping 
framework.8 Although it was stated to be "in implementation of 
paragraph 2 of resolution 770 (1992)",9 the enabling instrument, 
Resolution 776 (14 September 1992), made no mention of chapter 
VII, nor used any other language which would suggest that 
UNPROFOR's assigned tasks, in particular the protection of UNHCR 
relief convoys,10 would be conducted on anything other than a 
consensual basis. The 10 September report of the Secretary-
General, setting out the mandate in detail, is explicit: 
 
In providing protective support to UNHCR-organized convoys, the 
UNPROFOR troops concerned would follow normal peace-keeping rules 
of engagement. They would thus be authorized to use force in self-
defence.11
 
Except that, once again, the extended definition of self-defence 
would apply: 
 
It is to be noted that, in this context, self-defence is deemed to 
include situations in which armed persons attempt by force to 
prevent United Nations troops from carrying out their mandate.12
 
      7  The parties agreed they would collaborate fully in the delivery of 
humanitarian aid by road throughout Bosnia. Specific Decisions by the 
London Conference, LC/C7 (FINAL), 27 Aug. 1992, para. 5(i). This commitment 
was noted by the Security Council in its Resolution 776 (14 Sept. 1992) ─ 
2nd preambular para. 
      8  Concerning this shift of approach, partly motivated by a reluctance to 
put an enforcement operation alongside the pre-existing peace-keeping 
mission (UNPROFOR), see Trevor ROWE, "U.S., Britain and France Drop Plans 
for Bosnia Military Role", International Herald Tribune (WP), 26 Aug. 1992, 
p. 2. 
      9  SCR 776, 14 Sept. 1992, para. 2. 
      10  For the full list of tasks, see S/1995/444, 30 May 1995, para. 27. 
      11  S/24540, 10 Sept. 1992, para. 9. And see para. 1. 
      12  S/24540, 10 Sept. 1992, para. 9. Note that the extended definition of 
self-defence was incorporated into the rules of engagement adopted for 
UNPROFOR. See Force Commander's Policy Directive Number (13) Rules of 
Engagement, Part I: Ground Forces, issued 24 March 1992, revised 19 July 
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 As noted in chapter 2, on the Congo, extended self-defence 
has only rarely been applied in practice. Bosnia was no excep-
tion. The movement of relief convoys was wholly dependent on the 
consent of the warring factions, which they withheld whenever it 
served their interests.13 UNPROFOR used force to repel armed 
attacks launched against convoys which they escorted,14 but not 
for the purpose of forcing the same through roadblocks or other 
obstacles mounted by the factions. Thus, the UN Secretary-
General would observe in his May 1995 report on UNPROFOR: 
"Military protection serves primarily to dissuade random or 
unorganized attacks; it cannot substitute for the consent and 
cooperation of the parties."15
 
 
 
UNPROFOR'S MANDATE AND CHAPTER VII 
 
 Beginning with Resolution 807 (19 February 1993), the 
Security Council invoked chapter VII of the UN Charter to 
underline its determination "to ensure the security of UNPRO-
FOR".16 This formulation was extended in Resolution 815 (30 March 
1993) to cover, in addition to UNPROFOR's security, "its freedom 
of movement for all its missions".17 This wider formulation was 
                                                                
1993, paras. 2 and 5 (reproduced in Bruce BERKOWITZ, "Rules of Engagement 
for U.N. Peacekeeping Forces in Bosnia", Orbis, vol. 38(4), fall 1994). 
      13  See: S/25264, 10 Feb. 1993, para. 18; S/1994/300, 16 March 1994, para. 
21; S/1995/444, 30 May 1995, paras. 28 and 29; John KIFNER, "U.N. Aides 
Angry at the Serbs' Blocking of Relief", The New York Times, 12 Dec. 1993, 
p. A11; Wider Peacekeeping, Army Field Manual, vol. 5, part 2, London, 
HMSO, 1995 [hereinafter "Wider Peacekeeping"], pp. 8-9 of "UNPROFOR" 
supplement. 
      14  See "Les «casques bleus» britanniques ont pour la première fois 
vigoureusement répliqué à une attaque serbe", Le Monde, 12 janv. 1993, p. 
4. 
      15  S/1995/444, 30 May 1995, para. 29. 
      16  ─ final preambular paragraph. 
      17  ─ final preambular paragraph. 
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reiterated in subsequent Security Council resolutions dealing 
with UNPROFOR.18
 
 Notwithstanding the usual association between chapter VII 
and enforcement action,19 it appears clear that these references 
to chapter VII did not involve any change of mandate. As a 
peace-keeping force, UNPROFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina was already 
empowered to use force for its own defence, including the 
preservation of its freedom of movement.20 The Security Council's 
invocation of chapter VII in this connection could be seen as an 
expression of its commitment to the safety of the Force and 
perhaps as a threat of tougher action were the warring parties 
to continue to threaten UNPROFOR's security or impede its 
freedom of movement. Yet, these references to chapter VII could 
not, by themselves, transform UNPROFOR's role from one of peace-
keeping to one of enforcement.21
 
 
 
THE NO-FLY ZONE 
 
 Concern for the safety of relief flights22 and the bombard-
ment by Bosnian Serb aircraft of civilian populations led the 
Security Council to impose a "ban on military flights" over 
Bosnia in its Resolution 781 of 9 October 1992.23 The resolution, 
                                                                
      18  SCR 847 (30 June 1993) made it clear that it applied to UNPROFOR in both 
Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina (final pream. para.). 
      19  Certain provisions in chapter VII, to be examined in some detail in 
chapter 8, infra, give the Security Council the power to order or recommend 
coercive measures for the maintenance of international peace and security. 
      20  See text accompanying notes 32 and 134-42, supra. 
      21  See: Weller, supra, note 306, pp. 99-100; Boulden, supra, note 186, p. 
160. It should, however, be noted that the reference to chapter VII is not 
technically incorrect. Article 40, situated within chapter VII, is widely 
viewed as a possible, even preferred, Charter basis for UN peace-keeping. 
In this regard, see text accompanying note 764, infra. 
      22  The UN airlift to Sarajevo was suspended from 4 September to 3 October 
1992 after an Italian aircraft was shot down by a missile of undetermined 
origin. 
      23  ─ para. 1. An exception was made for "[UNPROFOR] flights or ... other 
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which was not adopted under chapter VII of the UN Charter,24 made 
no provision for its enforcement in case of non-compliance.25 
While NATO monitored compliance with the no-fly zone from the 
air,26 UNPROFOR personnel were deployed to airfields in Bosnia, 
Croatia, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) (Serbia 
and Montenegro) for the purpose of monitoring activity there and 
approving non-military flights destined for Bosnia.27  
 
 Although numerous violations of the no-fly zone were noted 
by ground and air monitors,28 the ban did appear to rein in 
aerial combat operations29 ─ for the most part. The continuing 
violations of the zone,30 including the bombing of two Bosnian 
 
flights in support of United Nations operations" (para. 1). SCR 786 (10 
Nov. 1992) subsequently specified that the ban applied to all aircraft, 
whether fixed-wing or rotary-wing (helicopters) (para. 2). SCR 816 (31 
March 1993) extended the ban to cover "flights by all fixed-wing and 
rotary-wing aircraft" (not only "military flights") in Bosnian airspace, 
excepting humanitarian flights and other flights consistent with relevant 
Security Council resolutions, authorized by UNPROFOR (paras. 1 and 2). 
      24  Note, however, that the Security Council, in the last preambular 
paragraph of Resolution 781, states that it is "Acting pursuant to the 
provisions of resolution 770 (1992) aimed at ensuring the safety of the 
delivery of humanitarian assistance in Bosnia and Herzegovina," which, as 
noted earlier, were adopted under chapter VII. 
      25  In paragraph 6 of the resolution, the Security Council simply "Undertakes 
to examine without delay all the information brought to its attention 
concerning the implementation of the ban on military flights in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and, in the case of violations, to consider urgently the 
further measures necessary to enforce this ban". 
      26  In response to the Security Council's request for technical monitoring 
assistance, NATO activated "Operation Sky Monitor" in October 1992. See: 
SCR 781, 9 Oct. 1992, para. 5; Operation Deny Flight (Final Fact Sheet), 
NATO, 21 Dec. 1995, "History and Significant Events"; Dick LEURDIJK, The 
United Nations and NATO in Former Yugoslavia, The Hague, Netherlands 
Atlantic Commission and the Netherlands Institute of International 
Relations "Clingendael", 1994, pp. 31-32. 
      27  See: SCR 781, 9 Oct. 1992, paras. 2 and 3; SCR 786, 10 Nov. 1992; 
S/24767, 5 Nov. 1992; S/24848, 24 Nov. 1992, paras. 41 and 42; SCR 816, 31 
March 1993, paras. 2 and 3. 
      28  See S/24848, 24 Nov. 1992, para. 48. 
      29  See S/25264, 10 Feb. 1993, para. 20. 
      30  In his statement of 17 March 1993 (S/25426 of the same date), the 
President of the Security Council noted that a total of 465 violations had 
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villages by aircraft apparently originating in the FRY,31 finally 
pushed the Security Council to adopt measures for its 
enforcement.32 "Acting under Chapter VII" of the UN Charter,33 
the Security Council, in its Resolution 816: 
 
Authorizes Member States, seven days after the adoption of this 
resolution, acting nationally or through regional organizations or 
arrangements, to take, under the authority of the Security Council 
and subject to close coordination with the Secretary-General and 
UNPROFOR, all necessary measures in the airspace of the Republic 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in the event of further violations, to 
ensure compliance with the [no-fly zone], and proportionate to the 
specific circumstances and the nature of the flights34
 
 
 NATO agreed to undertake the enforcement operation, which 
it initiated on 12 April 1993 under the code name "Operation 
Deny Flight".35 The rules of engagement, drawn up by NATO in 
consultation with the UN,36 provided for the use of force only 
against military aircraft which refused to heed warnings to 
leave the no-fly zone.37 Significantly, in contrast to the 
 
been reported by the UN since the beginning of monitoring operations. And 
see S/25443, 19 March 1993. 
      31  See S/25444, 19 March 1993. 
      32  See: S/25426, 17 March 1993; SCR 816, 31 March 1993, preambular paras. 4 
and 5. 
      33  SCR 816, 31 March 1993, pream. para. 8. In the previous preambular 
paragraph, the Security Council determined "that the grave situation in the 
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina continues to be a threat to 
international peace and security". This determination, a prerequisite under 
UN Charter article 39 to Security Council action under chapter VII, was 
first made in respect of the Bosnian conflict in SCR 757 (30 May 1992) 
which imposed economic sanctions on the FRY. 
      34  SCR 816, 31 March 1993, para. 4. 
      35  Operation Deny Flight (Final Fact Sheet), NATO, 21 Dec. 1995, "History 
and Significant Events". NATO Starts Operation of No-Fly Zone Enforcement, 
NATO Press Release (93)29, 12 April 1993. 
      36  See: S/25567, 10 April 1993; Gregory SCHULTE, "Former Yugoslavia and the 
New NATO", Survival, vol. 39(1), spring 1997, p. 27. 
      37  Michael R. GORDON, "Firing to Be NATO Planes' Last Resort", International 
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measures adopted for the protection of UNPROFOR and the safe 
areas, to be examined in the next section, NATO conducted no-fly 
zone enforcement operations independently of the UN. It did not 
require UN approval prior to the downing of aircraft violating 
the zone.38 In only one instance did NATO, in fact, do this ─ on 
28 February 1994 when four of six Serb aircraft on a bombing 
mission over Bosnia were shot down after failing to heed 
warnings to land or leave the no-fly zone.39
 
 Less serious violations of the no-fly zone, involving non-
combat aircraft, mostly helicopters transporting individuals, 
were, however, common. These were routinely intercepted and 
warned, but not shot down.40 At the point of its termination, on 
20 December 1995,41 a total of 7,552 "apparent violations" of the 
no-fly zone had been recorded by the UN.42
 
 
 
 The Three Criteria 
 
 The enforcement of the no-fly zone shared several features 
of the model of peace enforcement sketched out in chapter 1. 
First, it involved potential enforcement action. NATO could, in 
fact did, take the initiative in the use of force, albeit as a 
 
Herald Tribune (NYT), 13 April 1993, p. 2. 
      38  Barbara STARR, "NATO Ready for Wider Air Strikes on Serbs", Jane's 
Defence Weekly, 30 April 1994, p. 4. Schulte, supra, note 336, p. 27. 
Théodore CHRISTAKIS, L'ONU, le chapitre VII et la crise yougoslave (Paris, 
Montchrestien, 1996), pp. 166-67. 
      39  See: Operation Deny Flight (Final Fact Sheet), NATO, 21 Dec. 1995, 
"History and Significant Events"; S/1994/5/Add. 13, 1 March 1994. 
      40  See: S/1994/300, 16 March 1994, para. 24; S/1995/444, 30 May 1995, para. 
31; Schulte, supra, note 336, p. 21; Rick ATKINSON, "NATO Airmen, 
Nonchalant, to Keep Up Bosnia Pressure", International Herald Tribune (WP), 
3 March 1994, p. 5. 
      41  See: SCR 1031, 15 Dec. 1995, para. 19; S/1995/1050, 20 Dec. 1995. Since 
20 December 1995, the NATO-led forces sent to ensure implementation of the 
Dayton accords have exercised control over Bosnian airspace under the 
provisions of that agreement. 
      42  S/1995/5/Add.67, 27 Feb. 1996. 
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last resort, for the purpose of securing compliance with the 
ban. 
 
 Second, there was consent of a kind to the no-fly zone 
itself, though not to the measures subsequently taken for its 
enforcement. The Security Council's decision, in October 1992, 
"to establish a ban on military flights" over Bosnia43 was, in 
fact, based on an identical commitment made by the warring 
parties at the London Conference (26-27 August 1992).44 That 
commitment was not honoured, however. The continuing use of Serb 
aircraft in combat missions prompted the Bosnian Government to 
appeal to the international community, in early October 1992, to 
enforce compliance with the ban.45 Since the Bosnian Muslims had 
almost no potential for air combat themselves, this was entirely 
in their interest. 
 
 As just suggested, the application of the third component 
of our earlier model of peace enforcement, i.e. impartiality, is 
much more problematic in the case of the no-fly zone. Although 
the prohibition and its associated enforcement measures applied, 
on their face, to the warring parties in equal measure, the 
Bosnian Serbs bore the brunt of their actual application. The 
enforcement of the no-fly zone, though formally impartial, 
involved in reality the elimination of the Bosnian Serb 
advantage in air power.46
 
      43  SCR 781, 9 Oct. 1992, para. 1. 
      44  See Specific Decisions by the London Conference, LC/C7 (FINAL), 27 Aug. 
1992, sec. 3 ("confidence-building measures"). See also S/24634, 8 Oct. 
1992, Annex, Enclosure. These undertakings were noted by the Security 
Council in the third and fifth preambular paragraphs of its Resolution 781 
(9 October 1992) establishing the no-fly zone. 
      45  See S/24616, 5 Oct. 1992. 
      46  Some observers have, however, questioned the relative military signifi-
cance of that advantage. See: "Picking Over the Pieces of War", The 
Economist, 17 Oct. 1992, p. 34; "The Dirty Work in Bosnia", International 
Herald Tribune (Wash. Post editorial), 3-4 April 1993, p. 4; Gordon, supra, 
note 337. 
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THE SAFE AREAS 
 
 An assault by the Bosnian Serbs on Srebrenica in March-
April 1993, led the Security Council, in Resolution 819 (16 
April), to declare the enclave "a safe area which should be free 
from any armed attack or any other hostile act" (para. 1). The 
Council demanded ("Demands") that "all parties and others 
concerned" recognize this status (para. 1), while the Bosnian 
Serbs were specifically told to immediately cease their attacks 
and withdraw their forces from the areas surrounding the safe 
area (para. 2). In Resolution 824 (6 May 1993), the Security 
Council added five other Bosnian cities and towns to the list of 
safe areas: the capital Sarajevo, along with Tuzla, Biha_, _epa 
and Gora_de. The basic elements of the safe areas regime were 
identified by the Secretary-General as: 
 
─Freedom from armed attack or other hostile acts; 
 
─Withdrawal of Bosnian Serb and other military or paramilitary 
units except those of the Government of Bosnia and Herzego-
vina; 
 
─Maximum restraint and an end to all provocative and hostile 
actions in and around the safe areas by all parties and 
others concerned; 
 
─Occupation of key points on the ground by UNPROFOR troops and 
monitoring by the Force in the safe areas; 
 
─Free and unimpeded access for UNPROFOR and international 
humanitarian agencies and full respect for their safety; 
 
─Participation by UNPROFOR in the delivery of humanitarian relief 
to the population in the safe areas.47
 
 
 Neither Resolution 819 or 824 provided any means of 
enforcing respect for the safe areas.48 Security Council 
                                                                
      47  S/1994/1389, 1 Dec. 1994, para. 44. As indicated by the Secretary-General 
in the latter paragraph of his report, the safe areas regime is defined in 
Security Council Resolutions 819 (16 April 1993), 824 (6 May 1993), 836 (4 
June 1993), 913 (22 April 1994), and 959 (19 Nov. 1994). 
      48  In paragraph 4 of Resolution 819 (16 April 1993), the Security Council 
requested the Secretary-General, "with a view to monitoring the 
humanitarian situation in the safe area, to take immediate steps to 
increase the presence of UNPROFOR in Srebrenica and its surroundings" 
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Resolution 836, adopted on 4 June 1993 under chapter VII of the 
Charter, was ostensibly designed to fill this gap. Thus, in 
order "to ensure full respect for the safe areas referred to in 
resolution 824 (1993)"49, the Security Council, in paragraph 5 of 
Resolution 836, 
 
Decides to extend ... the mandate of UNPROFOR in order to enable 
it ... to deter attacks against the safe areas, to monitor the 
cease-fire, to promote the withdrawal of military or paramilitary 
units other than those of the Government of the Republic of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina and to occupy some key points on the ground, in 
addition to participating in the delivery of humanitarian relief 
to the population as provided for in resolution 776 (1992) of 14 
September 1992 
 
In paragraph 9 of Resolution 836, UNPROFOR was authorized, 
 
in carrying out the mandate defined in paragraph 5 above, acting 
in self-defence, to take the necessary measures, including the use 
of force, in reply to bombardments against the safe areas by any 
of the parties or to armed incursion into them or in the event of 
any deliberate obstruction in or around those areas to the freedom 
of movement of UNPROFOR or of protected humanitarian convoys 
 
NATO's role in the protection of the safe areas derived from 
paragraph 10 of Resolution 836 in which the Security Council: 
 
Decides that, notwithstanding [the no-fly zone], Member States, 
acting nationally or through regional organizations or 
arrangements, may take, under the authority of the Security 
Council and subject to close coordination with the Secretary-
 
(emphasis added). Similarly, in Resolution 824 (6 May 1993), the Security 
Council authorized the strengthening of UNPROFOR by an additional 50 UN 
military observers, yet only for the purpose of monitoring the withdrawal 
of Bosnian Serb forces from the safe areas and the "humanitarian situation" 
therein (paras. 4(a) and 6). While chapter VII of the Charter was invoked 
in the latter resolution, this was only to stress the Security Council's 
determination to ensure UNPROFOR's security and freedom of movement (last 
paragraph of the preamble, referring to SCR 815). On this issue, see text 
accompanying notes 316-21, supra. 
      49  SCR 836, 4 June 1993, para. 4. 
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General and UNPROFOR, all necessary measures, through the use of 
air power, in and around the safe areas in the Republic of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, to support UNPROFOR in the performance of its 
mandate set out in paragraphs 5 and 9 above; 
 
 
 The exact meaning of these provisions, especially those 
relating to UNPROFOR, is not all clear. The reference to "self-
defence" in paragraph 9 of Resolution 836 evokes the limitations 
of a peace-keeping force, though that would be at odds with the 
Security Council's aim, stated in paragraph 4 of the resolution, 
"to ensure full respect for the safe areas".50 The Secretary-
General's May 1994 report on the safe areas contains what is 
perhaps the clearest expression of the safe areas mission, at 
least as understood by the UN Secretariat: 
 
To protect the civilian populations of the designated safe areas 
against armed attacks and other hostile acts, through the presence 
of its troops and, if necessary, through the application of air 
power, in accordance with agreed procedures.51
 
 
 In other words, UNPROFOR's role in the protection of the 
safe areas was to deter attacks by Bosnian Serb forces through 
its presence there.52 While this is nowhere stated explicitly, 
one would assume that deterrence through mere presence would 
derive: first, from the fact that international attention would 
automatically be drawn to any Bosnian Serb attack on the safe 
 
      50  As acknowledged by the Secretary-General in his May 1994 report on the 
safe areas, there was, in fact, considerable confusion in respect of the 
safe areas mandate. See S/1994/555, 9 May 1994, para. 16. 
      51  S/1994/555, 9 May 1994, para. 16. 
      52  Paragraph 13 of the May 1994 report is explicit in this respect: 
"UNPROFOR's protection role is derived from its mere presence." S/1994/555, 
9 May 1994. And see paragraph 21 of the latter report. See also 
S/1994/1389, 1 Dec. 1994, para. 59, wherein the Secretary-General makes an 
interesting distinction between deterrence and enforcement: "it is my view 
that the role of UNPROFOR of deterring violations of the safe-area regime 
should not be changed to one of enforcing the regime." Recall that 
paragraph 5 of Resolution 836 (4 June 1993) required UNPROFOR "to deter 
attacks against the safe areas". 
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areas; second, and more importantly, from UNPROFOR's function as 
a tripwire for NATO air strikes. It was clear that UNPROFOR was 
not expected to fight to defend the safe areas.53 That task fell 
to NATO54 which, as will be explained shortly, could either 
provide "close air support" to UNPROFOR troops who came under 
Bosnian Serb attack within the safe areas or launch air strikes 
in defence of the safe areas themselves. 
 
 In essence, UNPROFOR, on the ground, in a continuing peace-
keeping role, was to deter attacks against the safe areas 
through its presence in them, while NATO, from the air, would 
act as peace-enforcer if and when deterrence failed. This was 
the basic scheme. Its operational viability was another matter. 
Before we examine the unravelling of the safe areas regime in 
the months of May - August 1995, it is important to show, in 
some detail, how the mandates conferred upon UNPROFOR and NATO 
by Resolution 836 were interpreted and implemented, along the 
lines just sketched out, over the 1993-94 period. 
 
 
 
 UNPROFOR's Safe Areas Mandate 
 
 As noted already, Security Council Resolution 836 
emphasizes the notion of self-defence with respect to UNPROFOR's 
implementation of its safe areas mandate. In particular, 
paragraph 9, specifying the means UNPROFOR may employ in 
executing this mandate ("acting in self-defence"), would appear 
to prohibit it from using force except in situations where it is 
itself under threat.55 Nevertheless, the rules of engagement 
adopted for the Force authorized UNPROFOR personnel to use their 
weapons: 
 
 
      53  "UNPROFOR is neither structured nor equipped for combat and has never had 
sufficient resources, even with air support, to defend the safe areas 
against a deliberate attack or to hold ground." S/1994/555, 9 May 1994, 
para. 13. 
      54  See: S/25939, 14 June 1993, paras. 4 and 5; S/1994/555, 9 May 1994, 
paras. 16-17. 
      55  In support of this interpretation, see S/1995/444, 30 May 1995, para. 33. 
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a. to defend themselves, other U.N. personnel, or persons and 
areas under their protection against direct attack, ... 
 
c. to resist deliberate military or para-military incursions into 
the United Nations Protected Areas (UNPAs) or Safe Areas.56
 
 
 Reporting to the Security Council 10 days after the 
adoption of Resolution 836, the Secretary-General presented two 
options for the implementation of those provisions of the 
resolution concerning UNPROFOR. The first, designed "to ensure 
full respect for the safe areas", required approximately 34,000 
additional troops, while the second, "light option" envisaged a 
troop reinforcement of only around 7,600.57 The Secretary-General 
noted that, as the latter "option cannot, in itself, completely 
guarantee the defence of the safe areas, it relies on the threat 
of air action against any belligerents."58 The Security Council, 
responding to the report on 18 June, chose the "light option", 
although even this modest commitment to the protection of the 
safe areas proved difficult to fulfil ─ it would be a full year 
before the last of the 7,600 additional troops were deployed in 
the safe areas.59
 
 In any case, the Secretary-General had stressed that not 
much could be expected of this "minimal troop reinforcement".60 
It had "limited objectives" and assumed "the consent and 
cooperation of the parties".61 In implementing its safe areas 
mandate over the 1993-95 period, UNPROFOR was, in practice, very 
much dependent on party consent and cooperation. Bosnian Serb 
forces were able to obstruct access to the safe areas at will62 
 
      56  Force Commander's Policy Directive Number (13) Rules of Engagement, Part 
I: Ground Forces, supra, note 312, para. 5. And see para. 17. 
      57  S/25939, 14 June 1993, para. 5. 
      58  Ibid. 
      59  S/1994/1389, 1 Dec. 1994, paras. 2 and 54. 
      60  S/25939, 14 June 1993, para. 5. 
      61  Ibid., para. 6. 
      62  See S/1994/1389, 1 Dec. 1994, paras. 4, 5, 7, 11 and 17. 
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and even block the rotation of UNPROFOR contingents there.63 
Perhaps the only indication that UNPROFOR was, in fact, in the 
business of protecting the safe areas, came, in July 1995, when 
a Dutch platoon, having taken up positions at the entrance to 
Srebrenica, tried to block a Bosnian Serb advance into the town, 
They succeeded in stopping one infantry advance, but were later 
outflanked by another group which moved on to capture the town 
centre.64 Yet, this action basically involved the use of force 
for the purpose of holding existing positions and, as such, did 
not take UNPROFOR out of its peace-keeping role.65
 
 
 
 NATO's Safe Areas Mandate 
 
 Meeting in Athens on 10 June 1993, NATO foreign ministers 
offered "our protective airpower in case of attack against 
UNPROFOR in the performance of its overall mandate, if it so 
requests."66 Yet, although the text of the Athens communiqué 
suggested otherwise,67 this measure, which would come to be known 
as "close air support", was not designed for the defence of the 
safe areas or their civilian inhabitants, but rather for the 
protection of all UN forces in Bosnia, inside and outside of the 
 
      63  See S/1994/94, 28 Jan. 1994. 
      64  See: Chris HEDGES, "U.N. Warns Serbs of Bombing if They Attack Dutch 
Unit", The New York Times, 10 July 1995, p. A1; idem, "Serb Forces Fight 
Dutch U.N. Troops in Eastern Bosnia", The New York Times, 11 July 1995, p. 
A1; idem, "Bosnian Serbs Overrun Town Protected by U.N.", The New York 
Times, 12 July 1995, p. A1; Charles LANE, "The Fall of Srebrenica", The New 
Republic, 14 Aug. 1995, pp. 15-16. 
      65  Recall that the earliest formulations of the right of self-defence in 
peace-keeping permitted the use of force in response to "an attack with 
arms, including attempts to use force to make [peace-keepers] withdraw from 
positions which they occupy under orders". A/3943, 9 Oct. 1958, para. 179 
(quoted more fully in chapter 1 ─ text accompanying note 33, supra). 
      66  Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Athens, Greece (Final 
Communiqué), 10 June 1993 (source: NATO Communiqués 1993, NATO Office of 
Information and Press), para. 3. 
      67  The offer of "protective airpower" was stated to be a "response to UNSC 
Resolution 836 and the expanded UNPROFOR mandate related to safe areas". 
Ibid., para. 3. 
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safe areas.68
 
 While perhaps surprising to anyone who thought the interna-
tional community's primary concern should be the protection of 
the safe areas per se,69 this was not incompatible with the 
mandate conferred upon UNPROFOR in Resolution 836 which, as 
previously noted, limited its role in support of the safe areas 
to peace-keeping, with the right to use force only in self-
defence. 
 
 If UNPROFOR in fact occupies "some key points on the 
ground" within the safe areas,70 one would assume that most 
threats to the safe areas would also constitute threats to 
UNPROFOR and thus trigger its right of self-defence. Yet, the 
two types of threat (to UNPROFOR / to the safe areas) need not 
always coincide. The question of whether Resolution 836 can be 
read so as to confer, at least upon NATO, a right to use force 
in direct defence of the safe areas is thus of considerable 
practical importance. 
 
 Paragraph 10 of Resolution 836 authorizes NATO to use air 
 
      68  See "Conseil OTAN: Protection aérienne de toute la FORPRONU ...", 
Nouvelles atlantiques, no. 2534, 12 juin 1993, p. 1. Close air support was 
operational as of August 1993 (S/26335, 20 Aug. 1993). It was first applied 
in April 1994 during the Gorazde Crisis and in a handful of instances 
thereafter, mostly, but not exclusively, in and around the safe areas. Note 
that Resolution 908 (31 March 1994) extended close air support to cover 
UNPROFOR troops in Croatia. It is submitted that, as it was not tied to the 
safe areas per se, but rather to the defence of UNPROFOR anywhere in Bosnia 
(and Croatia), close air support requires legal grounds other than 
Resolution 836 ─ such as those contained in Resolutions 807 and 815 (see 
text accompanying notes 316-21, supra). Many legal scholars, however, make 
no distinction between close air support and air strikes for the defence of 
the safe areas themselves, identifying Resolution 836 as the legal basis 
for both. In this regard, see Linos-Alexandre SICILIANOS, "Le contrôle par 
le Conseil de sécurité des actes de légitime défense" (DANS Le chapitre VII 
de la Charte des Nations Unies, Paris, Pedone, 1995), p. 93. 
      69  The somewhat misplaced emphasis, in Security Council resolutions dealing 
with the safe areas, on the security of UN personnel, as opposed to that of 
the safe areas' civilian inhabitants, has not escaped comment. See Maurice 
TORRELLI, "Les zones de sécurité", Revue générale de droit international 
public, tome 99, 1995/4, pp. 842-43. 
      70   SCR 836, 4 June 1993, para. 5. 
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power "to support UNPROFOR in the performance of its mandate set 
out in paragraphs 5 and 9".71 If paragraphs 5 and 9 are 
separable, then NATO could employ air power, either for the ends 
specified in paragraph 9 (to defend UNPROFOR) or those specified 
in paragraph 5 ("to deter attacks against the safe areas"). The 
latter provision would effectively allow NATO to launch air 
strikes in defence of the safe areas, independently of any 
specific threat to UNPROFOR. If, however, paragraphs 5 and 9 are 
not separable, NATO would necessarily share the limitation of 
means imposed on UNPROFOR in paragraph 9. In other words, it 
could only use air power in defence of UNPROFOR. 
 
 In practice, at US insistence, the former interpretation of 
Resolution 836 was to prevail ─ NATO would have the right, 
subject to the specific approval of UN officials,72 to use force 
in direct defence of the safe areas73 ─ yet only after persistent 
Bosnian Serb pressure on the safe areas finally forced the 
issue. 
 
 At the end of July 1993, the Bosnian Serbs looked set to 
complete their stranglehold on Sarajevo with the capture of 
Mount Igman. The US, arguing for a broad interpretation of 
 
      71  Paragraphs 5, 9 and 10 of Resolution 836 are reproduced supra (text 
following note 349). 
      72  Resolution 836 (4 June 1993) had specified that NATO's use of air power 
in "support [of] UNPROFOR in the performance of its [safe areas] mandate" 
would be "subject to close coordination with the Secretary-General and 
UNPROFOR" (para. 10; and see para. 11). In the case of close air support, 
NATO merely acted upon UN request. Where air power was used for the defence 
of the safe areas, a "dual key" system of authorization applied ─ both NATO 
(after the Gorazde Crisis of April 1994) and the UN could call for action, 
while either one (in practice, this meant the UN) could veto such a request 
at any rung on the command chain. Both procedures were modified over the 
1993-95 period. The most significant change occurred with the UN Secretary-
General's delegation of authority to approve the use of air power down to 
the political and military commanders in the field (in February 1994 and 
July 1995). Concerning the delegation of July 1995, see note 390, infra. 
      73  The Russian Federation persistently opposed NATO's use of air power, 
whether for the defence of UNPROFOR or of the safe areas, claiming, in 
particular, that the Security Council had a continuing right of oversight 
in these areas. Concerning the Russian position, see Christakis, supra, 
note 338, pp. 181-85; Weller, supra, note 306, p. 111; Sicilianos, supra, 
note 368, p. 93. 
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Resolution 836, threatened unilateral action if its NATO allies 
did not agree to authorize the use of air power for the direct 
defence of the safe areas, including Sarajevo.74 In meetings held 
on 2 and 9 August, NATO's North Atlantic Council (NAC) indicated 
that the Alliance was prepared, in principle, to use air power 
for this purpose. Operational options for air strikes were drawn 
up and approved, although a final decision to authorize NATO 
commanders to launch air strikes at UN request was deferred.75
 
 Continued Bosnian Serb artillery and mortar attacks on 
Sarajevo finally led the Alliance, on 9 February 1994, to 
threaten immediate air strikes in case of further attacks on the 
city and issue an ultimatum for the withdrawal of all heavy 
weapons from a 20 kilometre "exclusion zone" around it.76 It 
followed this, two months later, with a similar set of 
ultimatums in respect of the Gora_de safe area, then under 
Bosnian Serb attack.77 The Bosnian Serb assault of November 1994 
 
      74  See: "Bosnie: Conseil extraordinaire de l'OTAN ...", Nouvelles atlan-
tiques, no. 2547, 4 août 1993, p. 1; Schulte, supra, note 336, p. 22. 
      75  See: Press Statement by the Secretary-General following the Special 
Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels on 2 August 1993 
(reproduced in NATO Review, 1993/4, p. 26); Decisions Taken at the Meeting 
of the North Atlantic Council on 9th August 1993, NATO Press Release 
(93)52. 
      76  Decisions Taken at the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council on 9th 
February 1994, NATO Press Release (94)15, 9 Feb. 1994. These decisions were 
prompted by the UN Secretary-General's request that the NAC authorize NATO 
commanders, when asked by the UN, to launch air strikes against Serb heavy 
weapons determined to be responsible for attacks against civilian targets 
in Sarajevo. NATO's imposition of the Sarajevo "exclusion zone" in fact 
went beyond the terms of the UN request. See S/1994/131, 7 Feb. 1994. 
      77  See: Decisions Taken at the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council on 22nd 
April 1994, NATO Press Release (94)31, 22 April 1994, paras. 5-7; Decisions 
on the Protection of Safe Areas Taken at the Meeting of the North Atlantic 
Council on 22nd April 1994, NATO Press Release (94)32, 22 April 1994, 
paras. 7 and 9 (reproduced in S/1994/495, 22 April 1994 and S/1994/498, 22 
April 1994, respectively). Note that the four safe areas not dealt with in 
earlier NAC decisions (Srebrenica, Zepa, Biha_ and Tuzla) were the focus of 
paragraphs 8 and 9 of the latter set of decisions. NATO commanders were 
authorized, under specified conditions, to impose military exclusion zones 
around these safe areas and to launch air strikes against Bosnian Serb 
heavy weapons attacking or threatening them. Legitimate target sets were to 
include Bosnian Serb heavy weapons "and other Bosnian Serb military assets, 
as well as their direct and essential military support facilities" (paras. 
9(a) and 9(b)). These broad powers went largely unused. As described below, 
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on the Biha_ safe area led the Security Council to adopt 
Resolution 958 (19 November) which extended the authorization to 
use air power pursuant to Resolution 836 to measures taken on 
Croatian territory.78
 
 Thus, NATO took on the task of enforcing respect for the 
safe areas, either by providing "close air support" to UNPROFOR 
troops who came under Bosnian Serb attack within them, or by 
launching air strikes, with UN approval, in direct defence of 
the safe areas. UNPROFOR's mission was to deter Bosnian Serb 
attacks on these areas within a strict, peace-keeping framework. 
This combination of peace enforcement and peace-keeping, not 
only within the same theatre of operations, but within the 
context of the same operation (the protection of the safe 
areas), constituted perhaps the best illustration of the 
international community's fundamental ambivalence in its 
approach to the Yugoslav Crisis. In fact, it was soon evident 
that peace enforcement and peace-keeping could not be made to 
coexist.79
 
the fall of the Srebrenica and Zepa safe areas in July 1995 prompted a new 
round of NATO decision-making covering similar ground. Note also that the 
request of the UN Secretary-General which prompted the NAC's 22 April 
decisions, like the request he had made in February concerning Sarajevo 
(see preceding note), made no mention of an exclusion zone. See S/1994/466, 
19 April 1994. While the UN Secretary-General was to assert that the NAC 
decisions of February and April 1994 were "in accordance with paragraph 10 
of Security Council resolution 836 (1993)," he noted "a certain ambiguity 
about the use of air power with regard to the exclusion zones around 
Sarajevo and Gorazde" given the lack of any reference to such zones in the 
Security Council resolutions concerning the safe areas. S/1995/444, 30 May 
1995, para. 49. On the question of the compatibility of the NATO-decreed 
exclusion zones with Security Council Resolution 836, see: Robert SIEKMANN, 
"The Lawfulness of the NATO Ultimatums Concerning the 'Safe Areas' in 
Bosnia", International Peacekeeping (The Hague), vol. 1(2), March-May 1994; 
Weller, supra, note 306, pp. 119-20; Christakis, supra, note 338, pp. 182-
84. 
      78  The NAC authorized NATO commanders to act on the basis of this wider 
authorization on 19 November. On 21 November 1994, in the largest air 
assault the Alliance had mounted to that point in the Bosnian war, 39 NATO 
aircraft struck the Udbina airbase in Serb-held Croatia, the launching 
point for Croatian Serb attacks against Biha_. 
      79  The safe areas experience has led many to comment on the perils of mixing 
peace-keeping and enforcement action within a single mission. See: Agenda 
Supplement, supra, note 1, paras. 33-36; Shashi THAROOR, "The Changing Face 
of Peacekeeping" (IN Soldiers for Peace, ed. by B. Benton, New York, Facts 
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 The Breakdown of the Safe Areas Regime 
 
 Air power proved far less effective in defending the safe 
areas than had been hoped. The Bosnian Serbs' deployment of air 
defence systems acted as one constraint on its utilization.80 
Even more problematic was the Bosnian Serb tactic of responding 
to limited air strikes81 by taking large numbers of UN personnel 
hostage and withholding all cooperation from UNPROFOR.82 By the 
end of May 1995, the UN's peace-keeping mission in Bosnia had 
reached a virtual impasse.83 Worse was to follow in July 1995 
with the fall of the Srebrenica and _epa safe areas.84
 
 The Bosnian Serbs' seizure of close to 400 UN personnel as 
hostages, in late May 1995, prompted France, the Netherlands and 
the UK to set up a "rapid reaction force", some 4,500 strong, 
for the Bosnian theatre. The initial proposal stressed that the 
 
on File, 1996), pp. 215-16; Sanderson, supra, note 51, p. 32; Robert 
SIEKMANN, "The Five Main Mistakes Regarding Bosnia in Retrospect", Interna-
tional Peacekeeping (The Hague), vol. 1(4), Sept.- Nov. 1994, p. 131. 
      80  See: S/1995/444, 30 May 1995, para. 40; Schulte, supra, note 336, p. 21. 
      81  Concerning the considerable restraint shown, before August 1995, in the 
use of NATO air power, see, for example, Meisler, supra, note 181, pp. 325-
27. One of the most significant uses of air power during this period was 
the bombing, on 21 November 1994, of the Udbina airfield in Serb-held 
Croatia. Yet, while the airport runway was severely damaged in the NATO 
raid, Serb planes were spared at the specific request of the UNPROFOR Force 
Commander. "Bosnie: l'OTAN a lancé avec succès une attaque contre 
l'aérodrome d'Udbina en Krajina (Croatie)", Nouvelles atlantiques, no. 
2672, 23 nov. 1994. Ivo DAALDER, Anthony Lake and the War in Bosnia (Pew 
Case Study no. 467, Washington, D.C., Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, 
1995), p. 5. 
      82  See: S/1995/444, 30 May 1995, para. 63; Patrick MOORE, "Karad_i_ Takes 
the International Community Hostage", Transition, vol. 1(12), 14 July 1995, 
pp. 2-4. 
      83  See S/1995/444, 30 May 1995, paras. 6-15. 
      84  For more information on the fall of Srebrenica, see the works cited in 
note 364, supra. As of November 1996, more than 6,500 Muslim men from the 
enclave remained unaccounted for and were presumed to have been massacred 
by the Bosnian Serbs immediately after its capture. John POMFRET, "Bosnian 
Serb Leader Ousts Mladic", International Herald Tribune (WP), 11 Nov. 1996, 
p. 5. 
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force "would not change the United Nations role to peace-
enforcement". Placed under UN military command, it "would act in 
support of UNPROFOR, functioning within its existing mandate".85 
Unlike UNPROFOR, it was, however, equipped for combat. Its first 
task, once deployed in late July 1995, was to protect UN convoys 
crossing the treacherous Mt. Igman route into Sarajevo. Signifi-
cantly, it would not do the same for Bosnian Government con-
voys,86 preferring, at least initially, to play no favourites. 
 
 The fall of the two safe areas led to the adoption of 
another inconsequential Security Council resolution87 and, more 
seriously, a series of decisions by Western leaders which 
resulted in important changes to the air strikes policy. The 
"pin-prick" strikes of the past were rejected. Any new Bosnian 
Serb threat to the safe areas was to be met with a "firm and 
rapid" use of NATO air power. The "zone of action" would not be 
limited to the safe area under threat and force could be used 
pre-emptively ─ in response to a perceived concentration of 
Bosnian Serb forces or any other activity presenting a direct 
threat to the safe areas.88
 
      85  S/1995/470, 9 June 1995. 
      86  Bruce NELAND, "War on All Fronts", Time, 7 Aug. 1995, p. 38. 
      87  In its Resolution 1004, adopted on 12 July 1995, just after the fall of 
Srebrenica, the Security Council requested the Secretary-General "to use 
all resources available to him to restore the status as defined by the 
Agreement of 18 April 1993 of the safe area of Srebrenica in accordance 
with the mandate of UNPROFOR" (para. 6). In fact, as the wording of this 
provision suggests, no new resources were to be made available to the 
Secretary-General for the purpose of reversing the Bosnian Serb capture of 
the safe area. Although the resolution was adopted under chapter VII of the 
UN Charter, UNPROFOR received no new enforcement powers. 
      88  These decisions were taken over the course of three meetings: the 21 July 
meeting, in London, of foreign and defence ministers of the Contact Group 
(France, Germany, Russia, the UK, and the US) and 11 other contributors to 
the UN peace-keeping forces in the former Yugoslavia; and the meetings of 
NATO's North Atlantic Council on 25-26 July and 1 August. A Memorandum of 
Understanding, signed by UN and NATO military commanders on 10 August 1995, 
incorporated these decisions into operational planning. See: "Allies Warn 
Bosnian Serbs of 'Substantial' Air Strikes if U.N. Enclave Is Attacked" 
(articles by S. Engelberg and J. Darnton, excerpts from a summary of the 
London meeting), The New York Times, 22 July 1995, pp. A1 and A4; "The 
International Conference on Bosnia ─ Now We Must Act" (Remarks by Secretary 
of State Christopher at a Press Briefing, London, 21 July 1995), U.S. 
Department of State Dispatch, vol. 6(30), 24 July 1995, p. 583; 
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 Operation Deliberate Force 
 
 On 28 August, a Bosnian Serb mortar struck a market in 
central Sarajevo, killing 37 people. Immediately afterwards, the 
UN completed its pull-out of peace-keepers from exposed 
positions in Bosnia with the departure of the last troops from 
the remaining eastern safe area of Gora_de.89 The stage was set 
for "Operation Deliberate Force". Beginning on 30 August, NATO 
aircraft conducted a wide-ranging bombing campaign against 
Bosnian Serb military targets throughout Bosnia while the rapid 
reaction force shelled Bosnian Serb targets in the Sarajevo 
area. These operations were jointly decided by NATO and UN 
military commanders90 and continued, with a four-day pause at the 
beginning of the month, until 14 September when Bosnian Serb 
leaders finally agreed to NATO and UN demands. 
 
 The basic objectives of Operation Deliberate Force were 
enunciated as: ending Bosnian Serb attacks on Sarajevo and the 
other safe areas; securing the withdrawal of Bosnian Serb heavy 
 
"Bosnie/OTAN: Après la Conférence de Londres, ...", Nouvelles atlantiques, 
no. 2738, 26 juill. 1995, p. 2; Statement by the Secretary General 
following North Atlantic Council Meeting in Permanent Session on the 
Situation in Gorazde, 25 July 1995 (source: NATO Communiqués 1995, NATO 
Office of Information and Press); Statement by the Secretary General 
following Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Permanent Session on the 
Situation in Gorazde, 1 Aug. 1995 (source: idem); NATO and UN Military 
Commanders Sign Memorandum of Agreement on Air Operations, AFSOUTH (NATO) 
Press Release 95-23, 10 Aug. 1995; Operation Deliberate Force (NATO 
Background Note), 6 Nov. 1995. 
      89  This process had begun in June with the abandonment of weapons collection 
points and observation posts in the Sarajevo exclusion zone. See: Tihomir 
LOZA, "From Hostages to Hostilities", War Report, no. 43, July 1996, pp. 
36-37; S/1995/623, 1 Aug. 1995, p. 2. 
      90  But see: Ed VULLIAMY, "The Defining Moment" (IN With No Peace to Keep, 
ed. by B. Cohen and G. Stamkoski, London, Grainpress, 1995), pp. 17-18; 
"The West's Two-Track Mind", The Economist, 9 Sept. 1995, p. 29; "Ratko 
Refuses to Leave the Sinking Ship", The Economist, 16 Sept. 1995, p. 37. At 
the end of July 1995, the UN Secretary-General delegated his authority to 
approve air strikes for the defence of the safe areas to the overall 
Commander of UN forces in the former Yugoslavia, Lt. Gen. Bernard Janvier. 
See: S/1995/623, 1 Aug. 1995; "Security Council Is Flouted by Islamic 
States, US Senate, Pushing Europe toward Wider War", International 
Documents Review, vol. 6(28), 31 July 1995, pp. 2-3. 
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weapons from the Sarajevo exclusion zone; and securing complete 
freedom of movement for UN forces and personnel, and NGOs, along 
with the unrestricted use of Sarajevo airport.91 Much of the 
evidence pointed, however, to a link between the bombing 
campaign and a US peace initiative for Bosnia.92 In any case, the 
objectives of Operation Deliberate Force, whatever they were, 
were pursued through the destruction of much of the Bosnian 
Serbs' military capability.93
 
 
 
 Consent and the Safe Areas 
 
 The Security Council resolutions defining the safe areas 
regime94 were imposed on the warring parties, specifically the 
 
      91  Statement by the Secretary General of NATO, NATO Press Release (95)79, 5 
Sept. 1995. Joint Statement by Admiral Leighton W. Smith, Commander in 
Chief, Allied Forces Southern Europe, and Lt. Gen. Bernard Janvier, Force 
Commander, United Nations Peace Forces, AFSOUTH (NATO) Press Release 95-43, 
21 Sept. 1995. 
      92  See: "Enter the Americans", The Economist, 19 Aug. 1995, p. 23; Steven 
GREENHOUSE, "U.S. Warns of Air Strikes Unless Serbs Negotiate", 
International Herald Tribune (NYT), 28 Aug. 1995, p. 1; "French Jet Lost, 5 
EU Aides Killed", International Herald Tribune (WP, AFP, AP), 31 Aug. 1995, 
p. 1 (comments of US State Dept. Spokesman); Rick ATKINSON, "Will Strikes 
Shorten War or Prolong It?", International Herald Tribune (WP), 31 Aug. 
1995, p. 1, at p. 6 (comments of NATO Secretary-General); Stephen 
ENGELBERG, "NATO to Intensify Use of Air Power against the Serbs", The New 
York Times, 7 Sept. 1995, p. A1, at p. A10; "Make War, Make Peace", 
Newsweek, 11 Sept. 1995, pp. 13-14; Vulliamy, supra, note 390, p. 19. Yet, 
according to Richard Holbrooke, chief American negotiator for Bosnia, the 
bombing had "nothing to do with the peace negotiations". "The West's Two-
Track Mind", supra, note 390, p. 29. 
      93  The operation's primary targets were "direct and essential military 
support" facilities located in Serb-held territory throughout Bosnia-
Herzegovina, especially in the south-eastern part of the Republic, specifi-
cally: air defence systems, command and control centres, transport and 
telecommunications links, ammunition and fuel depots, and equipment storage 
and repair facilities. Heavy weapons were also targeted, where possible, 
but not Bosnian Serb troop concentrations. See: Press Briefing (Update): 
NATO Operation Deliberate Force, AFSOUTH (NATO), Naples, 9 Sept. 1995 
(Briefer: Group Captain Trevor Murray, Chief Air Operations) (source of the 
quotation); Engelberg, ibid., pp. A1 and A10. 
      94  These are listed in note 347, supra. 
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Bosnian Serbs. In fact, they were adopted in direct response to 
Bosnian Serb attacks on these areas. Despite this, the 
Secretary-General repeatedly stressed that their effective 
protection depended, to a large extent, on the consent of the 
warring parties, including the Bosnian Serbs.95 Where such 
consent could not be found, it had to be manufactured. Thus, in 
respect of both the Srebrenica and _epa safe areas, the UN 
brokered agreements between the warring parties for a cease-
fire, the deployment of UNPROFOR troops, "ad hoc 
demilitarization" and "other measures including, in particular, 
a clear delimitation of the safe area".96 Anti-sniping agreements 
were reached in respect of Sarajevo (14 August 1994) and Gora_de 
(28 August 1994).97 Agreements relating to the withdrawal or 
placement under UNPROFOR control of heavy weapons (9 February 
1994) and freedom of movement (17 March 1994) were also reached 
in respect of Sarajevo.98
 
 Yet, as is well known, compliance with these agreements was 
at best partial.99 There was a further problem in that certain 
agreements were at variance with the Security Council 
resolutions defining the safe areas regime. Of particular 
importance, was the lack of provision in these resolutions for 
the demilitarization of the safe areas,100 a key element of the 
cease-fire agreement for Srebrenica (18 April 1993).101 Although 
 
      95  See: S/25939, 14 June 1993, para. 6; S/1994/291, 11 March 1994, para. 16; 
S/1994/300, 16 March 1994, para. 32; S/1994/555, 9 May 1994, para. 12; 
S/1994/1389, 1 Dec. 1994, para. 55. But see S/1994/94, 28 Jan. 1994, p. 2. 
      96  S/1994/1389, 1 Dec. 1994, para. 3. 
      97  S/1994/1067, 17 Sept. 1994, para. 17. 
      98  S/1994/1389, 1 Dec. 1994, paras. 7 and 9. 
      99  See ibid., paras. 3-20. 
      100  Neither SCR 819 nor SCR 824 required such demilitarization. In fact, SCR 
836 explicitly recognized the right of Bosnian Government forces to remain 
in all six safe areas (para. 5). 
      101  Concerning the relationship between SCR 819 and the local cease-fire 
agreement, see: S/25700, 30 April 1993, paras. 10-15; Managing Arms in 
Peace Processes: Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina (New York and Geneva, 
UNIDIR, 1996), pp. 124-26; Laura SILBER and Allan LITTLE, Yugoslavia: Death 
of a Nation (New York, TV Books / Penguin USA, 1996), pp. 270-74. The 
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steps were taken to implement the latter agreement, Srebrenica's 
Muslim defenders surrendered less than half of their weapons in 
the initial 72-hour period in which total demilitarization was 
to have occurred pursuant to its terms. Additional weapons and 
armed individuals flowed into Srebrenica thereafter and a formal 
military organization was retained in the enclave102 which, as 
described in the next section, remained a base for military 
activities. 
 
 In an effort to ground the safe areas regime more firmly in 
party consent, the Secretary-General proposed the following 
modifications to it: 
 
─ Delineation of the safe areas; 
 
─Demilitarization of the safe areas and cessation of hostilities 
and provocative actions in and around the safe areas; 
 
─Interim measures towards complete demilitarization; 
 
─Complete freedom of movement.103
 
Yet, these proposals barely scratched the surface of the 
problem. No arrangement in respect of the safe areas could ever 
really satisfy the Bosnian Serbs. 
 
 With the possible exceptions of Tuzla and one half of 
Sarajevo, the mere existence of the safe areas directly clashed 
with Bosnian Serb war aims ─ to exercise complete control over 
these territories.104 It appears clear that what limited "cooper-
 
cease-fire agreement is reproduced in the first two publications (Annex II 
and p. 187 respectively). 
      102   Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
ibid., p. 127. 
      103  S/1994/1389, 1 Dec. 1994, para. 45. See paras. 40-53. 
      104  The Bosnian Serb military commander, Ratko Mladi_, was to claim that the 
July 1995 seizure of Srebrenica and Zepa was motivated by the failure to 
demilitarize these zones pursuant to the agreements concluded in 1993. See: 
"Bosnie: L'OTAN est déterminée à effectuer des raids aériens pour protéger 
Gorazde ...", Nouvelles atlantiques, no. 2739, 28 juill. 1995, p. 3; 
Hedges, supra, note 364 (12 July), p. A6. In fact, from the beginning of 
the war, the Bosnian Serbs sought total control of eastern Bosnia, as 
evidenced by their repeated attacks on Srebrenica, Zepa, and Gorazde, both 
before and after they were made safe areas in April-May 1993. 
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ation" the latter gave UNPROFOR in respect of the safe areas was 
motivated by a fear of tougher action on the part of the 
international community. The Bosnian Serbs were simply deterred, 
for awhile, from seizing these areas by the threat of coercive 
action. When deterrence failed ─ when the Bosnian Serbs 
perceived they could capture certain safe areas without 
suffering the adverse consequences long threatened by the UN and 
NATO ─ they did so. 
 
 
 
 Impartiality and the Safe Areas 
 
 Impartiality was considered central to UNPROFOR's implemen-
tation of its mandate, including its mandate to deter attacks on 
the safe areas.105 It was also a central feature of the mandate 
of the rapid reaction force.106 The practical reality, however, 
was very different. The UN itself recognized that the defence of 
the safe areas involved a direct denial of Bosnian Serb war 
aims.107 Moreover, these areas often served as a base for Bosnian 
Government troops, weapons and military installations. Small-
scale militia raids and large-scale military offensives were 
launched and/or directed from these areas against surrounding 
Serb-held territory.108 Seen in this light, it is clear that the 
defence of the safe areas could not be an impartial act. 
 
      105  S/1994/555, 9 May 1994, paras. 20 and 25. S/1995/444, 30 May 1995, para. 
38. S/1994/94, 28 Jan. 1994, p. 4. The situation in respect of NATO, called 
upon to enforce several measures which targeted the Bosnian Serbs (in 
particular, the no-fly zone and the safe areas), was somewhat different. 
See Goulding, supra, note 4, p. 15. 
      106  S/1995/470, 9 June 1995. SCR 998, 16 June 1995, pream. para. 5. 
      107  See: S/1994/300, 16 March 1994, para. 34; S/1994/555, 9 May 1994, para. 
15. 
      108  See S/1994/1389, 1 Dec. 1994, paras. 34-37, together with the other UN 
sources listed in paragraph 34 of the report. See also: The Fall of 
Srebrenica and the Failure of U.N. Peacekeeping, Human Rights Watch/ 
Helsinki, October 1995, pp. 8-9; "Call that Safe?", The Economist, 15 July 
1995, p. 22. 
5  BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA (1995-97)1
 
 
 As of 1993, NATO began planning for a force which would 
help implement a peace accord between the warring factions in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina.2 The Dayton accords, signed in Paris on 14 
December 1995,3 made explicit provision for a "multinational 
military Implementation Force" ("IFOR")4 and set out its mandate 
in some detail. The UN Security Council authorized the 
establishment of IFOR on 15 December5 and the Force began 
operations in Bosnia ("Operation Joint Endeavour") on 20 
December. UNPROFOR's mandate, the no-fly zone and the safe areas 
regime, defined in various Security Council resolutions, also 
                                                                
      1  Note that this chapter covers developments up to the end of 1997, with 
the exception of the decisions reached by the Peace Implementation Council 
in Bonn, on 9-10 December 1997, during its review of Dayton Accord 
implementation. 
      2  See Schulte, supra, note 336, p. 24. 
      3  While the commonly used term "Dayton accords" will be used in the text, 
the latter in fact constitute a single legal instrument, comprising a 
series of treaties (including the central General Framework Agreement for 
Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina and its 12 annexes), unilateral 
declarations, and "endorsements". Our focus in this chapter will be on two 
of the annexes to the General Framework Agreement: Agreement on the 
Military Aspects of the Peace Settlement (Annex 1-A) and Agreement on 
Inter-Entity Boundary Line and Related Issues (Annex 2). These were signed 
by the Muslim-controlled administration based in Sarajevo ("Republic of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina"), the American-brokered institution which 
represented both the Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat communities 
("Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina") and the Bosnian Serb regime based 
in Pale and Banja Luka ("Republika Srpska" (RS)). The two annexes were also 
"endorsed" by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), comprising Serbia 
and Montenegro, and the Republic of Croatia. While there was some variation 
in the pattern of signature of the 12 annexes of the General Framework 
Agreement, the "Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina" and the RS, 
recognized by the Dayton accords as constituent "entities" of the newly 
renamed country, "Bosnia and Herzegovina", were signatories to all of them. 
The full text of the Dayton accords is reproduced in International Legal 
Materials, vol. 35, 1996, p. 75. Their complex structure is described in 
some detail in: Paul SZASZ, "Introductory Note [to the Dayton accords]", 
International Legal Materials, vol. 35, 1996, pp. 77-80; Paola GAETA, "The 
Dayton Agreements and International Law", European Journal of International 
Law, vol. 7(2), 1996, pp. 147-49. 
      4  Annex 1-A, ibid., art. I(1)(a). 
      5  SCR 1031, 15 Dec. 1995, para. 14. 
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terminated on 20 December 1995.6 Although comprising many 
contingents from non-NATO countries,7 IFOR was organized and 
commanded by NATO.8
 
 IFOR's successor, the Stabilization Force (SFOR),9 com-
menced operations ("Operation Joint Guard") on 20 December 1996 
at the expiration of IFOR's one-year mandate. It shares the 
basic features of IFOR just described, although, with force 
levels varying between 30,000 and 40,000 troops during 1997, it 
is significantly smaller than its predecessor.10
 
 
 
THE MANDATE: AN OVERVIEW 
 
                                                                
      6  Ibid., paras. 19 and 33. S/1995/1050, 20 Dec. 1995. 
      7  Eighteen non-NATO countries participated in IFOR. Fourteen of these were 
participants in NATO's "Partnership for Peace" programme. For the list of 
participants, see Gregory SCHULTE, "Bringing Peace to Bosnia and Change to 
the Alliance", NATO Review, 1997/2, p. 24. 
      8  Concerning the particular legal features of this arrangement, see Michael 
BOTHE, "Bosnia and Herzegovina: Farewell to UN Peacekeepers ─ Farewell to 
UN Peacekeeping?", International Peacekeeping (The Hague), vol. 2(6), Oct.-
Nov. 1995, p. 130. For details of the IFOR and SFOR command structure, see: 
NATO's Role in the Implementation of the Bosnian Peace Agreement, NATO Fact 
Sheet no. 11, March 1997; The NATO-led Stabilisation Force (SFOR) in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, NATO Fact Sheet no. 11, April 1997. 
      9  ─ authorized by the UN Security Council in paragraph 18 of its Resolution 
1088 (12 Dec. 1996). 
      10  IFOR had nearly 60,000 troops at peak deployment. SFOR force levels were 
generally higher towards the end of 1997, as compared with the first half 
of that year, with special reinforcement undertaken in connection with the 
September and November 1997 elections. Initial plans for a gradual 
reduction in SFOR force levels, leading to its withdrawal in June 1998, 
were on hold at the end of 1997. See Ministerial Meeting of the North 
Atlantic Council Held at NATO Headquarters, Brussels, on 16 December 1997 
(Final Communiqué), NATO Press Release M-NAC-2 (97)155, 16 Dec. 1997, para. 
17. Concerning the initial, four-phase plan for SFOR operations, see: "NATO 
to Set 'Enlargement Summit'", International Herald Tribune (Reuters, AFP), 
10 Dec. 1996, p. 5; Thierry TARDY, "Les forces de l'Otan en Bosnie-
Herzégovine: paix retrouvée et avenir incertain", Relations internationales 
et stratégiques, no. 28, hiver 1997. 
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 UN Security Council Resolutions 1031 (15 December 1995) and 
1088 (12 December 1996), together with the Dayton accords, 
define the IFOR and SFOR mandate. It should be noted that, as we 
will see in the next section, although the NATO-defined missions 
of the two forces have differed, SFOR's formal mandate is 
identical to that of IFOR. In each case, the Security Council 
authorized the Force "to fulfil the role specified in Annex 1-A 
and Annex 2 of the [Dayton accords]".11 Moreover, it explicitly 
stated that SFOR is "the legal successor to IFOR".12 Thus, the 
many provisions in the Dayton accords which refer to the 
"Implementation Force" or "IFOR" can be read as applying equally 
to SFOR. 
 
 Annex 2 of the Dayton accords,13 assigning I/SFOR14 the task 
of overseeing the delineation and marking of the Inter-Entity 
Boundary Line, Agreed Cease-Fire Line and their zones of 
separation, need not detain us here. Far more important is Annex 
1-A. The key provision therein is article VI(2)(a) which gives 
I/SFOR "the right ... to monitor and help ensure compliance by 
all Parties with this Annex".15
 
 While Annex 1-A, entitled "Military Aspects of the Peace 
Settlement", contains obligations of a mainly military nature, 
including a cease-fire,16 the withdrawal of foreign forces,17 and 
the separation, cantonment and partial demobilization of the 
parties' armed forces,18 it also contains several non-military 
obligations, including the maintenance of law and order19 and the 
 
      11  SCR 1031, 15 Dec. 1995, para. 14. SCR 1088, 12 Dec. 1996, para. 18. 
      12  SCR 1088, 12 Dec. 1996, para. 18. 
      13  Supra, note 411. 
      14  This abbreviation will be used to denote both IFOR and SFOR. 
      15  Annex 1-A, supra, note 411. 
      16  Annex 1-A, supra, note 411, arts. I(2)(a) and II. 
      17  Annex 1-A, supra, note 411, art. III. 
      18  Annex 1-A, supra, note 411, art. IV. 
      19  Annex 1-A, supra, note 411, art. II(3). 
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release of prisoners of war.20 Moreover, in Annex 1-A, the 
parties agree to: 
 
cooperate fully with all entities involved in implementation of 
[the Dayton accords] ... or which are otherwise authorized by the 
United Nations Security Council, including the International 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.21
 
 
 Yet, I/SFOR's responsibilities under Annex 1-A extend 
beyond ensuring the compliance of the parties with their Annex 
1-A obligations. The majority of the tasks specifically 
conferred upon I/SFOR under Annex 1-A, whether "principal",22 
i.e. military, tasks or non-military "supporting tasks",23 are, 
in fact, matched by corresponding obligations of the parties 
under the same annex. Yet, a few are not. 
 
 One important example of an I/SFOR task which has no 
corresponding party obligation, at least under Annex 1-A, is the 
prevention of interference with civilian freedom of movement.24 
Another is I/SFOR's broad mandate "to help create secure 
conditions for the conduct by others of other tasks associated 
with the [Dayton accords], including free and fair elections".25 
The latter provision, open-ended in its formulation, would 
appear to cover all activities related to the implementation of 
 
      20  Annex 1-A, supra, note 411, art. IX. 
      21  Annex 1-A, supra, note 411, art. X. And see art. II(4), also in Annex 1-
A. 
      22  Annex 1-A, supra, note 411, art. VI(3). 
      23  Ibid. 
      24  Annex 1-A, supra, note 411, art. VI(3)(d). Note that the obligation of 
the parties not to impede freedom of movement is, in Annex 1-A, enunciated 
only in favour of IFOR (art. VI(9)(a)) and "international personnel ... in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina pursuant to [the Dayton accords]" (art. II(4)). Only 
in Annex 4 is the general principle of freedom of movement, including that 
for civilians, articulated. See Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(Annex 4 to the General Framework Agreement, supra, note 411), art. I(4). 
      25  Annex 1-A, supra, note 411, art. VI(3)(a). 
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the Dayton accords, including those, such as the return of 
refugees and displaced persons to their homes, to which the 
parties have committed themselves within the Dayton framework 
but outside of Annex 1-A. 
 
 A final example of an I/SFOR task without a corresponding 
party obligation under Annex 1-A is the possibility of NATO's 
North Atlantic Council (NAC) assigning I/SFOR "additional duties 
and responsibilities ... in implementing [Annex 1-A]".26 Read, 
for example, in conjunction with the provision just discussed, 
this confers potentially sweeping authority on I/SFOR, taking it 
well beyond the confines of the tasks and obligations specifi-
cally enumerated in Annex 1-A.27 These cases, where I/SFOR's 
tasks are not matched by a corresponding party obligation under 
Annex 1-A, have particular relevance for our discussion of 
I/SFOR's enforcement mandate. 
 
 I/SFOR's enforcement powers derive from the same Security 
Council resolutions seen previously. Specific enforcement powers 
are conferred on I/SFOR for the purpose of controlling the 
airspace over Bosnia-Herzegovina.28 More generally, the Security 
Council: 
 
Authorizes [I/SFOR] to take all necessary measures to effect the 
implementation of and to ensure compliance with Annex 1-A of [the 
Dayton accords], stresses that the parties shall be held equally 
responsible for compliance with that Annex, and shall be equally 
subject to such enforcement action by [I/SFOR] as may be necessary 
to ensure implementation of that Annex and the protection of 
[I/SFOR], and takes note that the parties have consented to 
[I/SFOR's] taking such measures.29
 
      26  Annex 1-A, supra, note 411, art. VI(4). 
      27  Such features of I/SFOR's mandate have led several commentators to 
characterize the Force as something close to "an occupying army." Gaeta, 
supra, note 411, n. 18. And see Bothe, supra, note 416, p. 131. 
      28  SCR 1031, 15 Dec. 1995, para. 16. SCR 1088, 12 Dec. 1996, para. 21. 
      29  SCR 1031, 15 Dec. 1995, para. 15. SCR 1088, 12 Dec. 1996, para. 19. As 
the last and third-to-last preambular paragraphs of both resolutions 
indicate, the latter were adopted under chapter VII of the UN Charter. 
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 I/SFOR's power to enforce party compliance with their 
obligations under Annex 1-A appears clear from this provision. 
In effect, it confirms that I/SFOR's mandate under article 
VI(2)(a) "to monitor and help ensure compliance by all Parties 
with [Annex 1-A]" is an enforcement mandate. Yet, the question 
arises as to whether I/SFOR's enforcement authority extends to 
tasks, such as those mentioned above, which have no 
corresponding party obligation under Annex 1-A. If we interpret 
the word "implementation" in the provision quoted above as 
meaning implementation by the parties of their obligations under 
Annex 1-A, then it would not. It is submitted, however, that 
"implementation" means implementation by I/SFOR of its mandate 
under Annex 1-A. I/SFOR's enforcement mandate would, in other 
words, cover the entire range of responsibilities conferred upon 
it in Annex 1-A, including those which have no corresponding 
party obligation under the same annex. 
 
 This interpretation is supported, first of all, by the text 
of the provision quoted above. If one holds that "implementa-
tion" and "compliance" mean essentially the same thing, this 
leads to pointless redundancy in the text. Moreover, the 
separation of the two words in the latter part of the provision 
suggests that their meanings are indeed distinct. Second, 
although it is not always clear in this respect,30 Annex 1-A of 
the Dayton accords, which evidently inspired the Security 
Council provision under consideration, generally uses the word 
"implementation" to mean implementation of the Dayton accords by 
I/SFOR or states contributing to these missions.31
 
 Third, a broad interpretation of I/SFOR's enforcement 
mandate is supported by the fact that, in the Dayton accords, 
the parties consent to IFOR exercising extensive enforcement 
 
      30  See: Annex 1-A, supra, note 411, art. I, paras. (1)(third sentence), 
(2)(b), and (3). 
      31  See Annex 1-A, supra, note 411, arts. I(1)(a) ("IFOR will begin the 
implementation ..."), I(1)(c) ("other [i.e. non-NATO] States may assist in 
implementing ..."), VI(4), and X. 
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authority: 
 
The Parties understand and agree that the IFOR Commander shall 
have the authority, without interference or permission of any 
Party, to do all that the Commander judges necessary and proper, 
including the use of military force, to protect the IFOR and to 
carry out the responsibilities listed above in paragraphs 2, 3 and 
4, and they shall comply in all respects with the IFOR require-
ments.32
 
While party consent cannot, in and of itself, form the legal 
basis of IFOR's enforcement mandate,33 it is submitted that it 
does constitute persuasive evidence in favour of a broad 
interpretation of the enforcement mandate given by the Security 
Council. 
 
 Finally, a broad interpretation appears consistent with the 
wide authority otherwise conferred on the Force. As previously 
indicated, the sweeping authority given I/SFOR in respect of 
both the military and non-military aspects of the Dayton accords 
evokes comparisons with "an occupying army."34 A restrictive 
interpretation of I/SFOR's enforcement mandate cuts against this 
general tendency. 
 
 
 
BASIC MISSIONS 
 
 Having examined the formal I/SFOR mandate, it will be 
useful to consider, in a more general way, the roles of the 
Forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina as defined by NATO. We will see 
that the IFOR and SFOR "missions" draw upon only part of the 
                                                                
      32  Annex 1-A, supra, note 411, art. VI(5). Note that the consent expressed 
here would apply to the three tasks mentioned earlier for which there is no 
corresponding party obligation under Annex 1-A since these are set out in 
paragraphs 3 and 4 of article VI. And see note 523, infra. 
      33  See Bothe, supra, note 416, p. 130. 
      34  See note 435, supra. 
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formal mandate, focusing on those aspects which serve prevailing 
political goals. 
 
 IFOR's principal role was to oversee and, if necessary, 
ensure implementation by the parties of their military obliga-
tions under Annex 1-A of the Dayton accords, including a cease-
fire and the separation, cantonment and partial demobilization 
of their armed forces.35 Although NATO stressed that IFOR's 
primary contribution to the civilian implementation of the 
Dayton accords was the creation of a secure environment and the 
promotion of freedom of movement throughout the country, 
beginning in mid-April 1996, with its key military tasks largely 
complete, the Force lent increased support to civilian implemen-
tation, including the organization and conduct of the September 
1996 elections.36
 
 SFOR is designed to consolidate the achievements of its 
predecessor. This means, in the first instance, deterring any 
return to hostilities by the factions. In addition, SFOR is to 
stabilize and consolidate peace in Bosnia by helping provide the 
security needed for the implementation of a two-year civilian 
consolidation plan, agreed in Paris, in November 1996, and 
elaborated in London, in December 1996, in the form of an 
initial one-year "Action Plan".37 As in the case of IFOR, SFOR's 
 
      35  This focus on the military provisions of the Dayton accords is 
articulated in a wide variety of NATO documents concerning IFOR and SFOR. 
See, for example: NAC Declaration on IFOR's Role in the Transition to 
Peace, NATO Press Release (96)60, 29 April 1996, paras. 1 and 4; 
S/1996/1066, 24 Dec. 1996, Annex. It also emerges from those provisions 
concerning I/SFOR in Annex 1-A of the Dayton accords (supra, note 411). 
See, in particular, art. I(1). 
      36  See NAC Declaration on IFOR's Role in the Transition to Peace, ibid., 
paras. 4-5. For more information on IFOR support to civilian tasks, see: 
NATO Fact Sheet no. 11, March 1997, supra, note 416; Combined Joint Civil 
Military Cooperation ─ Operation Joint Guard, SFOR AFSOUTH Fact Sheet, 20 
Dec. 1996. 
      37  Stabilisation Force (SFOR) Fact Sheet, AFSOUTH, 20 Dec. 1996. Statement 
on Bosnia and Herzegovina (NAC Ministerial Meeting), NATO Press Release M-
NAC-2 (96)166, 10 Dec. 1996. The "Action Plan" is contained in the 
following texts: Official Summary of Conclusions and Bosnia and Herzegovina 
1997: Making Peace Work (both adopted at the Peace Implementation 
Conference, London, 4-5 December 1996). 
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contribution to the implementation of Dayton's civilian provi-
sions has, in practice, been wide-ranging.38
 
 
 
MANDATE IMPLEMENTATION 
 
 As already noted, IFOR and SFOR's main responsibility, as 
defined by both the Dayton accords and the NAC, has been to 
ensure implementation of and continuing compliance with the 
military provisions of the Dayton accords. Generally speaking, 
military implementation has been straightforward.39 Of greater 
interest is the role played by IFOR and SFOR in the implementa-
tion of the accords' civilian provisions. It has been clear from 
the earliest stages of the Dayton peace process that the 
effective reintegration of Bosnia-Herzegovina and indeed the 
success of the peace process as a whole depended on the 
implementation of the latter provisions. It has been just as 
obvious, given the extraordinary reluctance of the parties to 
cooperate in most aspects of civilian implementation, that the 
involvement of IFOR and SFOR in this area was crucial. 
Nevertheless, it has been in the area of civilian implementation 
that the gap between formal mandate and assigned "mission" has 
been widest ─ although it has narrowed somewhat since mid-1997. 
 
 IFOR began to shift its attention to Dayton's civilian 
provisions in the spring of 1996, with the implementation of the 
accords' key military provisions largely complete and the 
September 1996 elections on the horizon. Yet, it has been, 
surprisingly, the much smaller SFOR which has taken civilian 
implementation most seriously.40 Although the involvement of both 
                                                                
      38  For an overview of the various forms SFOR support in the civilian area 
has taken, see: NATO Fact Sheet no. 11, April 1997, supra, note 416; SFOR 
Support to Non-Military Tasks, SFOR Fact Sheet, 26 May 1997; SFOR's Support 
to Civil Implementation, SFOR Fact Sheet, 27 June 1997. 
      39  For details, see text accompanying notes 543-46, infra. 
      40  The shift to a far more assertive approach to civilian implementation has 
been led by the US and UK. It was signalled in a speech given by US 
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright in May 1997 and quickly received 
broad endorsement. See: Remarks at Annual Fleet Week Gala, Madeleine 
  
118
                                                               
forces in civilian implementation has, in practice, been wide-
ranging,41 we will focus in this section on four areas where IFOR 
and SFOR involvement, or lack of involvement, has had an 
especially strong impact on the fate of the peace process: 
freedom of movement, the return of refugees and displaced 
persons, the investigation and prosecution of war crimes, and 
media restructuring. 
 
 
 
 Freedom of Movement 
 
 In addition to securing their own freedom of movement,42 
I/SFOR have been mandated "to assist the movement of organiz-
ations in the accomplishment of humanitarian missions"43 and 
ensure that the parties to the Dayton accords comply with their 
obligation to facilitate the "free and unimpeded access and 
movement" of "international personnel ... in Bosnia and Herzego-
vina pursuant to [the Dayton accords]".44
 
 Yet, the focus of attention in this area ─ seen as a 
prerequisite to the effective reintegration of Bosnia-Herzego-
 
Albright, New York, 22 May 1997 
(<http://secretary.state.gov/www/statements/970522a.html>); S/1997/434, 5 
June 1997, Annex, paras. 2 and 6; Special Declaration on Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, North Atlantic Council, Madrid, 8 July 1997 (reproduced in 
NATO Review, 1997/4, p. 4). For background on the US policy shift, see 
Tyler MARSHALL and Tracy WILKINSON, "U.S. Team on Bosnia Takes Peacekeeping 
to the Limit", Los Angeles Times, 12 Nov. 1997, p. A1. 
      41  See text accompanying notes 444-46, supra. 
      42  I/SFOR's right of freedom of movement is enunciated in: Annex 1-A, supra, 
note 411, art. VI(9)(a); Agreement between the Republic of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) Concerning 
the Status of NATO and its Personnel, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, 
Ohio, 21 Nov. 1995, and Brussels, 23 Nov. 1995 (Appendix B to Annex 1-A), 
art. 9. See also the side letters in the latter appendix. And see: Annex 1-
A, arts. II(4) and VI(11); SCR 1031, 15 Dec. 1995, para. 18; SCR 1088, 12 
Dec. 1996, para. 23. 
      43  Annex 1-A, supra, note 411, art. VI(3)(b). 
      44  Annex 1-A, supra, note 411, arts. VI(2)(a) and II(4). 
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vina ─ has been I/SFOR's mandate to ensure civilian freedom of 
movement.45 After a slow start,46 IFOR and SFOR have played a key 
role in the promotion of freedom of movement throughout Bosnia-
Herzegovina. Their main contribution in this regard has been the 
removal of unauthorized checkpoints.47 They have also repaired or 
built roads, bridges and railways48 and have assisted initiat-
ives, such as inter-entity bus lines, launched by the UNHCR and 
other international agencies in order to facilitate movement 
across the Inter-Entity Boundary Line.49
 
      45  Annex 1-A, supra, note 411, art. VI(3)(d). 
      46  IFOR initially dismissed this part of its mandate as police work and, as 
such, the responsibility of the parties themselves and the United Nations 
International Police Task Force (IPTF). Yet, as IFOR's military tasks waned 
in importance with the successful separation, cantonment and partial 
demobilization of rival forces, IFOR began to shift troops away from the 
Inter-Entity Boundary Line and patrol more widely throughout Bosnia-
Herzegovina, with the September 1996 elections a particular focus for 
efforts to improve freedom of movement in the country. See: "Serbs Accused 
of Kidnappings", International Herald Tribune (AFP, AP), 3 Jan. 1996, p. 5; 
"Bosnia Serbs Buckle, Free All 16 Civilians," International Herald Tribune 
(Reuters, AP), 5 Jan. 1996, p. 10; S/1996/131, 26 Feb. 1996, Annex I, 
Appendix, para. 8; Patrick MOORE, "Serbs Blocking Freedom of Movement Near 
Doboj", Pursuing Balkan Peace (OMRI), no. 9, 5 March 1996; S/1996/465, 24 
June 1996, Annex, Appendix, para. 2; S/1996/600, 29 July 1996, Annex, 
Appendix, para. 4; Warren CHRISTOPHER, "Without Elections, There Will Be No 
Unified Bosnian State", International Herald Tribune, 15-16 June 1996, p. 
6; Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Defence Ministers Session, 13 
June 1996 (communiqué reproduced in NATO Review, Sept. 1996, p. 32), para. 
16. 
      47  Concerning IFOR, see Admiral Leighton W. SMITH, Jr., "The Pillars of 
Peace in Bosnia", NATO Review, 1996/4, pp. 11 and 16. A new checkpoint 
policy, introduced by the IPTF in May 1997, required the parties, subject 
to limited exceptions, to secure prior authorization for any checkpoint 
they set up. See: S/1997/468, 16 June 1997, para. 5; [Fifth] Monthly Report 
to the United Nations Security Council on SFOR Operations (NATO doc. 
covering the period 22 April - 22 May 1997), para. 21. Concerning SFOR's 
role in the implementation of the new policy, see the 6th to 12th monthly 
reports on SFOR operations (July 1997 - Jan. 1998), cited in the 
Bibliography (sec. I A) 3)). The IPTF was established under SCR 1035 (21 
Dec. 1995) in order to help the Bosnian factions meet their obligations for 
the maintenance of law and order in accordance with internationally 
recognized standards. See Agreement on International Police Task Force 
(Annex 11 to the General Framework Agreement, supra, note 411). 
      48  See S/1996/1066, 24 Dec. 1996, Annex. 
      49  See: S/1996/600, 29 July 1996, Annex, Appendix, para. 4; S/1996/696, 27 
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 By the end of 1997, these efforts had helped generate a 
marked improvement in freedom of movement throughout Bosnia-
Herzegovina, as compared with December 1995 when the Dayton 
accords were signed, though the situation was still far from 
perfect.50
 
 
 The Return of Refugees and Displaced Persons 
 
 The parties have a clear obligation under the Dayton 
accords to permit, in safety, the return of refugees and 
displaced persons to their homes.51 Nevertheless, by the end of 
1997, only about 400,000 of an estimated 2 to 2.5 million 
refugees and displaced persons had returned.52 Only 35,000 of 
these were returning to areas in which they were an ethnic 
 
Aug. 1996, Annex, Appendix, para. 10; Richard BOUDREAUX, "Passage of Time 
Breaking Down Barriers in Bosnia", Los Angeles Times, 16 Dec. 1997, p. A1; 
Greg HUNTER, "Bosnian Serbs Left Isolated as Dayton Continues to Drift", 
Jane's Intelligence Review, vol. 9(9), Sept. 1997, p. 400. In December 
1997, the bus service was carrying about 2,000 people a day between 35 
cities and towns. Boudreaux. 
      50  See: Boudreaux, ibid; "A Ghost of a Chance (A Survey of the Balkans)", 
The Economist, 24 Jan. 1998, p. S8; S/1997/966, 10 Dec. 1997, para. 10; 
S/1998/40, 16 Jan. 1998, paras. 58-59 and 71. The system of separate 
licence plates for the three ethnic territories, still in place at the end 
of 1997, constituted one serious impediment to freedom of movement as it 
enabled local police to easily identify drivers from other entities. See 
Hunter, ibid., pp. 396 and 399-400. 
      51   Annex 4, supra, note 432, art. II(5). Agreement on Refugees and 
Displaced Persons (Annex 7 to the General Framework Agreement, supra, note 
411), art. I. 
      52  The figure for the total number of persons internally displaced or forced 
to find refuge abroad as a result of the war varies depending on the 
source. Nevertheless, there was broad agreement on the figure of 250,000 
returnees for 1996. See, for example, Official Summary of Conclusions, 
supra, note 445, para. 3. The Reconstruction and Return Task Force 
estimated returns for 1997 at 160,000 (RRTF: Report December 1997, Office 
of the High Representative, sec. 3.1), while the UN Secretary-General, 
reporting to the Security Council on 10 December 1997, gave a figure of 
150,000 returns since the beginning of that year (S/1997/966, 10 Dec. 1997, 
para. 29). The Economist estimated total, post-Dayton returns, up to 
December 1997, at 400,000. "A Ghost of a Chance", supra, note 458, p. S9. 
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minority with returns of Croats or Muslims to the Serb-run 
Republika Srpska especially rare.53
 
 Local authorities have prevented returns through the use of 
property laws or administrative measures as well as through the 
use of violence and intimidation, and the destruction of houses. 
The latter, coercive measures have also been used to drive 
recent returnees out of certain areas. Moreover, many of those 
who escaped "ethnic cleansing" during the Bosnian War have 
fallen prey to the process in the post-Dayton period. Although 
the climate for minority returns appeared to improve somewhat in 
the latter part of 1997 (at least in central Bosnia, under 
Muslim and Croat control, and in parts of northern Bosnia, under 
Serb control), at the end of the year, the number of people 
forced from their homes since the conclusion of the Dayton 
accords far outweighed the number of minority returns.54
 
 Neither IFOR or SFOR have been explicitly mandated to 
support, and if necessary enforce, the return of refugees and 
displaced persons. It is submitted, however, that such a mandate 
emerges quite clearly from several, broadly-worded provisions of 
Annex 1-A of the Dayton accords. The party obligations to 
"provide a safe and secure environment for all persons in their 
respective jurisdictions"55 and arguably that to "cooperate fully 
with all entities involved in implementation of [the Dayton 
accords]"56 (including, presumably, the UNHCR) would constitute 
one foundation of a mandate in support of the right of return.57
 
      53  "A Ghost of a Chance", supra, note 458. The RRTF reported 8,138 
registered minority returns for 1997. RRTF: Report December 1997, ibid. 
      54  As reported above, total minority returns since Dayton have been 
estimated at 35,000. Christopher Bennett of the International Crisis Group, 
writing in late 1997, put the number of victims of post-Dayton ethnic 
cleansing at "more than 80,000 people". Christopher BENNETT, "No Flying 
Colors for Dayton ─ Yet", Transitions, vol. 4(7), Dec. 1997, p. 37. And see 
Ivo DAALDER, "Bosnia After SFOR: Options for Continued US Engagement", 
Survival, vol. 39(4), winter 1997-98, p. 6. 
      55  Annex 1-A, supra, note 411, art. II(3). 
      56  Annex 1-A, supra, note 411, art. X. 
      57  As explained earlier ("The Mandate: An Overview" section), I/SFOR have 
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 A separate basis for such a mandate would appear to lie in 
article VI(3) of Annex 1-A of the Dayton accords, defining 
I/SFOR's "supporting tasks", the first of which is "to help 
create secure conditions for the conduct by others of other 
tasks associated with the peace settlement".58 In addition, 
though the Force has received no explicit powers in this 
respect, several of the provisions just referred to would appear 
to enable I/SFOR to intervene to halt ethnic cleansing, if it 
felt so inclined.59
 
 In 1996, IFOR distinguished itself by its inaction, both in 
relation to publicized instances of ethnic cleansing60 and in 
respect of the right of return, which it said it would not 
enforce.61 Instead, IFOR assisted the return process in more 
modest ways, in particular by promoting freedom of movement 
across the Inter-Entity Boundary Line.62
 
 SFOR has continued to offer such indirect forms of assist-
ance to the return process. In fact, as civilian efforts to 
promote minority returns have intensified, SFOR's support for 
these activities has also been stepped up.63 But in certain 
 
been mandated to enforce compliance with party obligations contained in 
Annex 1-A of the Dayton accords. The right of return is explicitly 
enunciated within the Dayton framework, but only outside of Annex 1-A. See 
note 459, supra for details. 
      58  Annex 1-A, supra, note 411, art. VI(3)(a). And see subparas. (c) and (d). 
      59  See, in particular: Annex 1-A, supra, note 411, art. VI(3)(d) (assuming 
the latter part of the provision is not necessarily bound to the first 
part, dealing with civilian freedom of movement); Annex 1-A, art. II(3) 
(read in conjunction with art. VI(2)(a) of the same annex). 
      60  See John POMFRET, "Cleaning Up on Ethnic Cleansing", International Herald 
Tribune (WP), 12 Sept. 1996, p. 7. 
      61  See: SFOR Factsheet, supra, note 445; Patrick MOORE, "... And Ensure 
Freedom of Movement for Refugees?", Pursuing Balkan Peace (OMRI), no. 5, 6 
Feb. 1996. 
      62  See S/1996/696, 27 Aug. 1996, Annex, Appendix, para. 10. 
      63  For more information on these activities, typically involving informa-
tion-gathering, planning, and coordination functions, see: [Fifth] Monthly 
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cases, SFOR, in contrast to IFOR, has also directly assisted 
returns, specifically by ensuring the security of individual 
returnees.64
 
  Both IFOR and SFOR have also been called upon to restore 
order and, where possible, prevent clashes arising from attempts 
at resettlement by one group in areas controlled by another.65 
For these purposes, they have confiscated weapons,66 detained 
individuals,67 and restricted access to and activity in areas of 
confrontation.68
 
 
 
Report to the United Nations Security Council on SFOR Operations, supra, 
note 455, para. 23; S/1997/602, 31 July 1997, Annex, Appendix, para. 20; 
S/1997/636, 13 Aug. 1997, Annex I, Appendix, para. 19. 
      64  The most important example of this practice which, in 1997, was not 
widespread, is the Brcko area, where American SFOR soldiers have provided 
"near round-the-clock protection" to Muslim and Croat returnees. See Mike 
O'CONNOR, "Quiet U.S. Protection in Brcko", International Herald Tribune, 
30 July 1997, p. 2 (the source of the quotation). 
      65  From the summer of 1996 up until the following spring, the zone of 
separation in the Brcko area of northern Bosnia was the scene of repeated 
confrontation and occasional clashes between Bosnian Muslims attempting to 
resettle in the area and Bosnian Serbs anxious to prevent the Muslims from 
encroaching upon this narrow strip of land which connects the two halves of 
their "Republic". Other flashpoints over the 1996-97 period have included 
the areas around the Croat-held towns of Jajce, in central Bosnia, and 
Drvar, in north-western Bosnia. 
      66  See: "Serb Policemen Club Muslims", International Herald Tribune (WP, 
Reuters), 30 Aug. 1996, p. 5; Daria Sito SUCIC, "More Muslim Villagers Try 
to Go Home Despite NATO and the Serbs", Pursuing Balkan Peace (OMRI), no. 
38, 24 Sept. 1996; Patrick MOORE, "IFOR Rounds Up Weapons in Northeast 
Bosnia", Daily Digest (OMRI), 15 Nov. 1996; S/1996/970, 22 Nov. 1996, 
Annex, Appendix, para. 8. 
      67  See: "Serb Policemen Club Muslims", ibid.; "UN Police Complain U.S. 
Troops Failed To Rescue Them", International Herald Tribune (AP), 31 Aug. - 
1 Sept. 1996, p. 7; Patrick MOORE, "NATO, Serbian Police in Standoff", 
Pursuing Balkan Peace (OMRI), no. 35, 3 Sept. 1996. 
      68  See: "Bosnian Muslims Confront NATO", International Herald Tribune 
(Reuters, NYT, AP), 14 Nov. 1996, p. 7; S/1996/970, 22 Nov. 1996, Annex, 
Appendix, paras. 8-9; S/1997/193, 5 March 1997, Annex, Appendix, para. 6; 
S/1997/257, 27 March 1997, Annex, Appendix, para. 9; three news bulletins 
concerning an incident near Drvar in RFE/RL Newsline of 9 and 10 Oct. 1997. 
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 The Investigation and Prosecution of War Crimes 
 
 In keeping with their mandate to assist the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY),69 IFOR and 
SFOR have conducted aerial and ground surveillance of suspected 
mass grave sites, provided logistical support and local area 
security for ICTY teams investigating such sites, and trans-
ported to The Hague persons wanted by the Tribunal for question-
ing or trial.70
 
 The question of the detention and transfer to ICTY custody 
of persons indicted for suspected violations of international 
humanitarian law is rather more complex. There can be little 
doubt that IFOR and SFOR have had the legal authority to make 
such arrests.71 Nevertheless, in defining the operational 
parameters of its Bosnia missions, NATO has used only a fraction 
of this authority. As part of the Operational Plan (OPLAN) 
adopted for IFOR by the NAC on 16 December 1995, it was agreed 
that IFOR would 
 
      69  Annex 1-A, supra, note 411, art. VI(3)(a)-(c). A second basis for 
I/SFOR's authority in this area is Annex 1-A, art. VI(2)(a) combined with 
the obligation of the parties, under Annex 1-A, to cooperate with the 
International Tribunal and its personnel (arts. II(4), IX(1)(g) and X). As 
argued above ("The Mandate: An Overview" section), this mandate, in all its 
aspects, would be an enforcement mandate. Note that the ICTY was 
established under Security Council Resolution 827 (25 May 1993). 
      70  On 12 February 1996, two Bosnian Serbs were flown, via NATO aircraft, to 
The Hague for questioning and possible indictment. On 13 June 1996, NATO 
transported two Bosnian Muslims to the Hague for trial. All these 
individuals had been detained by the Bosnian Muslim authorities. Cases in 
which SFOR itself detained war crimes suspects before transferring them to 
ICTY custody are dealt with below. 
      71  See note 477, supra. Of particular relevance to the task under 
consideration are: Annex 1-A, supra, note 411, art. VI(3)(c); and art. 
VI(2)(a) in combination with art. X, both of Annex 1-A. Note further that 
several authors have argued that I/SFOR and/or states participating in 
these missions have had not merely the right, but in fact the duty to 
arrest and detain persons indicted for war crimes. See: John R.W.D. JONES, 
"The Implications of the Peace Agreement for the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia", European Journal of International Law, 
vol. 7(2), 1996, pp. 239-40; Niccolo FIGA-TALAMANCA, "The Role of NATO in 
the Peace Agreement for Bosnia and Herzegovina", European Journal of 
International Law, vol. 7(2), 1996, pp. 165 and 171-75. 
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detain and transfer to the ICTY persons indicted for war crimes, 
when coming into contact with them in carrying out its duties as 
defined by the military annex of the Peace Agreement.72
 
Statements made by NATO and US officials following IFOR's 
deployment to Bosnia-Herzegovina made it clear that this narrow 
NAC mandate would be strictly adhered to.73 In fact, following 
repeated sightings of Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karad_i_, 
occasionally in close proximity to IFOR troops,74 and wider 
revelations in the press concerning the high profile of other 
indicted war crimes suspects,75 some observers concluded that 
IFOR had a "deliberate policy ... not to arrest [war crimes 
suspects]."76
 
 The NAC mandate governing the detention of war crimes 
suspects was left unchanged with the establishment of SFOR in 
December 1996,77 despite appeals for a tougher approach.78 While 
 
      72  Press Statement on Signing of the Memorandum of Understanding between 
SHAPE and the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia, NATO 
Press Release (96)74, 9 May 1996. The latter document summarizes the key 
features of the classified "Memorandum of Understanding" of 9 May 1996 
which itself reiterates the policy in respect of suspected war criminals 
agreed by the NAC in December 1995. And see IFOR Assistance to the Interna-
tional Tribunal, NATO Press Release (96)26, 14 Feb. 1996. 
      73  See: "If They Come Upon a War Criminal", International Herald Tribune 
(WP), 5 Jan. 1996, p. 6; Chris HEDGES, "Bosnia and NATO Ease Off on Arrests 
Over War Crimes", International Herald Tribune (NYT), 13 Feb. 1996, p. 1. 
      74  See: Charles RECKNAGEL, "Radovan Karadzic Tests NATO's Resolve", RFE/RL 
News, 29 Feb. 1996; "Karadzic Seen in Banja Luka", International Herald 
Tribune (WP), 1 March 1996, p. 10; "Watching Karadzic Ride By", 
International Herald Tribune (Reuters), 12 Dec. 1996, p. 9. 
      75  See: Elizabeth NEUFFER, "Accused of War Crimes, but Policing Bosnia", 
International Herald Tribune (Boston Globe), 1 Nov. 1996, p. 1; Jan URBAN, 
"Monitor ─ But Don't Touch", Pursuing Balkan Peace (OMRI), no. 44, 5 Nov. 
1996; Patrick MOORE, "Indicted War Criminal Complains to UN Police for 
Arrest Attempt", Daily Digest (OMRI), 8 Nov. 1996; Jan URBAN and Yvonne 
BADAL, "War Criminals in Bosnia: Government Protection and IFOR's Blind 
Eye", Analytical Brief (OMRI), no. 481, 19 Nov. 1996. 
      76  Urban and Badal, ibid. And see Urban, ibid. 
      77  "NATO to Set 'Enlargement Summit'", supra, note 418. 
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diplomatic and economic pressure did succeed in securing the 
extradition or surrender of some suspects, most remained at 
large throughout 1997.79 It was against this background that SFOR 
mounted special operations on 10 July and 18 December which 
resulted in the capture of one Bosnian Serb and two Bosnian 
Croat suspects and the death of one Bosnian Serb suspect.80 Both 
operations, involving sealed (non-public) indictments,81 were 
planned in advance and could in no way be construed as 
accidental encounters occurring as SFOR soldiers carried out 
other duties.82 NATO officials insisted, nevertheless, that there 
had been no change in SFOR policy.83
 
      78  See: "ICTY Chief Urges IFOR Arrest Role", Reuters News Reports, 30 Sept. 
1996 (in International Peacekeeping News, vol. 2(4), Sept.-Oct. 1996); 
William DROZDIAK, "NATO Acts To Soothe Moscow on Expansion", International 
Herald Tribune (WP), 11 Dec. 1996, p. 1 at p. 8. 
      79  As of 22 December 1997, taking into account the two operations mentioned 
immediately below, there were 19 accused held in the Tribunal's custody 
against a total of 20 public indictments targeting 74 individuals, plus "a 
number of sealed indictments." Fact Sheet, ICTY, 22 Dec. 1997 (source: ICTY 
website: <http://www.un.org/icty>). 
      80  Both operations were conducted by special forces acting as part of SFOR. 
For details of the 10 July operation, see: Statement Concerning Detained 
Indicted War Criminal, SFOR, LANDCENT, 10 July 1997; Richard BOUDREAUX, 
"NATO Forces Kill Serb Suspect, Arrest Another", Los Angeles Times, 11 July 
1997, p. A1; Steven ERLANGER, "Raid in Bosnia: A Turning Point for 
Peacekeepers", International Herald Tribune (NYT), 12-13 July 1997, p. 1; 
"Progress at Last?", The Economist, 19 July 1997, p. 29. For details of the 
18 December operation, see: Statement by the Secretary General of NATO, Dr. 
Javier Solana, on SFOR's Action Against Indicted War Criminals, NATO Press 
Release (97)158, 18 Dec. 1997; Chris HEDGES, "Dutch Seize 2 Croats to Face 
War Tribunal", International Herald Tribune (NYT), 19 Dec. 1997, p. 1. 
      81  See: Charles TRUEHEART, "Tribunal Hails Arrest of Croatian Serb", 
International Herald Tribune (WP), 2 July 1997, p. 5; "En Bosnie, «les 
criminels de guerre se sentent en sécurité absolue dans le secteur 
français»" (interview with Louise Arbour, Chief Prosecutor, ICTY), Le 
Monde, 14-15 déc. 1997, p. 2. 
      82  See the sources cited in note 488, supra. 
      83  See: Statement by the Secretary General of NATO, Mr. Javier Solana on 
Actions by SFOR to Detain Indicted War Criminals at Prijedor, NATO Press 
Release (97)85, 10 July 1997; Statement Concerning Detained Indicted War 
Criminal, supra, note 488; Transcript: Press Conference SACEUR, SFOR, 
LANDCENT, 18 July 1997; NATO Press Release (97)158, supra, note 488; 
Transcript: Joint Press Conference, SFOR, LANDCENT, 19 Dec. 1997. 
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 While, by the end of 1997, it appeared that SFOR was 
prepared, on a selective basis, to arrest war crimes suspects, 
the two most notorious suspects ─ Radovan Karad_i_ and Ratko 
Mladi_, the Bosnian Serb political and military leaders ─ 
remained at large. Reported plans for a special operation to 
seize the heavily-guarded Karad_i_84 were not implemented, though 
American intelligence teams did closely monitor his movements.85 
It appeared that the international community preferred to try to 
marginalize the hard-line Bosnian Serb leader, specifically by 
vigorously supporting his chief rival in the Republika Srpska, 
RS President Biljana Plavši_.86
 
 
 
 Media Restructuring 
 
 Since August 1997, on the basis of authority previously 
conferred by the Steering Board of the Peace Implementation 
Council,87 the High Representative88 has led efforts to curb 
 
      84  See: Chris HEDGES, "Bosnian Serb Chief Fears for Life", International 
Herald Tribune (NYT), 7 July 1997, p. 7; Edward CODY, "Holbrooke Is Blunt: 
Remove Karadzic Now", International Herald Tribune (WP), 11 Aug. 1997, p. 
1; Edward CODY, "Going All-Out for Karadzic's Rival", International Herald 
Tribune (WP), 1 Sept. 1997, p. 7; James RISEN, "Vigilant Karadzic Guards 
Dim Outlook for Capture", International Herald Tribune (LAT), 4-5 Oct. 
1997, p. 2; "NATO Preparing to Catch Karadzic?", RFE/RL Newsline, vol. 
1(97), 18 Aug. 1997. 
      85  See: Risen, ibid.; Craig R. WHITNEY, "NATO Set to Extend Force's Stay in 
Bosnia", International Herald Tribune (NYT), 2 Dec. 1997, p. 1. 
      86  See: "Bosnia: U.S. Wants NATO to Support Serb President", RFE/RL News, 7 
July 1997; Chris HEDGES, "Western Support for the Figurehead Mrs. Plavsic 
Begins to Waver", International Herald Tribune (NYT), 28 Aug. 1997, p. 1; 
Doyle MCMANUS, "U.S. Backs Using Force to Aid Bosnian Chief", International 
Herald Tribune (LAT), 30-31 Aug. 1997, p. 2; Cody, supra, note 492; Tracy 
WILKINSON, "America's Unlikely Champion in Bosnia", Los Angeles Times, 22 
Nov. 1997, p. A1. 
      87  "The Steering Board is concerned that the media has not done enough to 
promote freedom of expression and reconciliation. It declared that the High 
Representative has the right to curtail or suspend any media network or 
programme whose output is in persistent and blatant contravention of either 
the spirit or letter of the [Dayton accords]." S/1997/434, 5 June 1997, 
Annex, para. 70 ("Sintra Declaration", 30 May 1997). The Peace 
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inflammatory media broadcasts in Bosnia. The principal target of 
these initiatives was the hard-line Bosnian Serb faction, based 
in Pale,89 but, during the latter part of 1997, all media in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina were subject to close international scrutiny 
and demands for reform.90
 
 SFOR has lent key support to these efforts, in particular 
by taking control of vital transmission facilities and placing 
them at the disposal of the more moderate Bosnian Serb faction 
led by Biljana Plavši_, based in Banja Luka.91 Since the provi-
 
Implementation Council (PIC) was set up in London, in December 1995, to 
supervise peace implementation in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Steering Board of 
the PIC gives the High Representative (see next note) political guidance on 
this question. See: S/1995/1029, 12 Dec. 1995, Annex, para. 21; Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 1997: Making Peace Work, supra, note 445, section on "Co-
ordination Structures", para. 4. 
      88  Under Annex 10 of the Dayton accords, the High Representative for 
Implementation of the Peace Agreement on Bosnia and Herzegovina is 
responsible for overseeing implementation of the accords' civilian aspects. 
Carlos Westendorp replaced Carl Bildt in the post in June 1997. See 
Civilian Implementation (Annex 10 to the General Framework Agreement, 
supra, note 411). And see previous note. 
      89  See: "More Inter-Ethnic Incidents Near Tuzla", RFE/RL Newsline, vol. 
1(86), 1 Aug. 1997; OHR Chronology, entry for 22 Aug. 1997 (obtained from 
<http://www.ohr.int>); K.P. FOLEY, "Yugoslavia: U.S. Envoy Meets President 
Milosevic", RFE/RL News, 1 Sept. 1997; "Demonizing NATO Forces", Bosnia 
Report (RFE/RL), vol. 1(9), 24 Sept. 1997. 
      90  See: S/1997/804, 16 Oct. 1997, Annex, Appendix, paras. 58 and 97; Tracy 
WILKINSON, "Trying to Extract War from Journalism", Los Angeles Times, 26 
Oct. 1997, p. A8; "OSCE Tells Croatian Journalists to Apologize", RFE/RL 
Newsline, vol. 1(149), 30 Oct. 1997; Transcript: Joint Press Conference, 
SFOR, LANDCENT, 31 Oct. 1997. 
      91  The Plavsic faction gained control of a transmitter in north-western 
Bosnia at the end of August 1997. See "War of the Airwaves", The Economist, 
30 Aug. 1997, p. 21. Yet, it was SFOR's seizure of four other transmitters, 
on 1 October 1997, that allowed Banja Luka to extend its broadcasts to 
cover the whole of Bosnian Serb territory. See: "NATO Seizes Four Bosnian 
Serb Transmitters", RFE/RL Newsline, vol. 1(129), 1 Oct. 1997; Statement by 
the Secretary General, Dr. Javier Solana, on the SFOR Operation against SRT 
Transmitters in Bosnia and Herzegovina, NATO Press Release (97)117, 1 Oct. 
1997. SFOR also intervened to thwart a subsequent attempt by Pale to knock 
its rival off the air. See: Tracy WILKINSON, "NATO Wrests Bosnian TV from 
Serbs", Los Angeles Times, 19 Oct. 1997, p. A12; Bosnia Report (RFE/RL), 
vol. 1(15), 5 Nov. 1997. The struggle between hard-line and moderate 
factions within the Bosnian Serb Republic is described in somewhat greater 
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sions of the Dayton accords which appear most relevant in this 
area,
92
 namely those dealing with freedom of expression / freedom 
of the press93 and reconciliation,94 are situated outside of 
SFOR's main domain, i.e. Annex 1-A, it appears that SFOR's 
formal mandate for the curtailment of media networks acting in 
contravention of Dayton would derive from article X of Annex 1-A 
in which the parties agree to "cooperate fully with all entities 
involved in implementation of [the Dayton accords]",95 including 
the High Representative.96 The NAC authorized SFOR to take up 
such assignments in August 1997.97
 
 
 
THE THREE CRITERIA 
 
 Having examined various aspects of the I/SFOR mandate and 
its implementation, we will now analyze these operations using 
the three criteria introduced earlier. 
                                                                
detail in the section dealing with "Impartiality", infra. 
      92  See paragraph 70 of the "Sintra Declaration" (reproduced in note 495, 
supra). 
      93  See: Agreement on Elections (Annex 3 to the General Framework Agreement, 
supra, note 411), art. I(1); Annex 4, supra, note 432, art. II(3); 
Agreement on Human Rights (Annex 6 to the General Framework Agreement, 
supra, note 411), art. I. 
      94  See: Annex 4, supra, note 432, preamble to the Constitution; Annex 7, 
supra, note 459, arts. I(3) and II(1). 
      95  Annex 1-A, supra, note 411. As explained earlier ("The Mandate: An 
Overview" section), article X would be read in conjunction with article 
VI(2)(a) of Annex 1-A, giving SFOR the task of ensuring compliance with 
Annex 1-A obligations (an enforcement mandate). It is submitted that 
article VI(3)(a) of the same annex, authorizing SFOR "to help create secure 
conditions for the conduct by others of other tasks associated with the 
peace settlement", does not provide an adequate basis for the actions in 
question as these involved much more than the provision or promotion of 
"secure conditions". 
      96  For the source of the High Representative's authority for the curtailment 
or suspension of media networks, see note 495, supra. 
      97  See Statement by the North Atlantic Council on the Situation in Republika 
Srpska, 30 Aug. 1997 (reproduced in NATO Review, 1997/5, p. 31). 
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 The Use of Force 
 
 As noted previously, I/SFOR's enforcement powers are 
extensive, underpinning a wide range of military and non-
military tasks. Although the rules of engagement which NATO, 
pursuant to Security Council Resolutions 1031 and 1088, adopted 
for IFOR and SFOR subject any use of force for the purpose of 
Dayton implementation to the requirements of international 
humanitarian law, including the "principles of proportionality 
and the use of minimum necessary force",98 they do not limit the 
scope of I/SFOR's enforcement powers in any way. Thus, the two 
forces have been given blanket authorization to use "deadly 
force ... [t]o safely implement the peace plan."99  
 
 Statements made by political and military authorities have 
emphasized IFOR and SFOR's capacity and determination to use 
force to secure implementation of the Dayton accords.100 That 
resolve was clearly demonstrated to the parties immediately 
after IFOR's deployment through the latter's vigorous assertion 
of its right of freedom of movement.101 Nevertheless, in the 
course of their missions, IFOR and SFOR have shown considerable 
restraint in the exercise of their enforcement powers. 
 
 A lack of party cooperation in the implementation of 
Dayton's military provisions, more frequent than is sometimes 
 
      98  IFOR/SFOR Rules of Engagement (unclassified summary provided to the 
author by NATO in May 1997). And see NATO Fact Sheet No. 11, March 1997, 
supra, note 416. 
      99  IFOR/SFOR Rules of Engagement, ibid. 
      100  See: Statement on Bosnia-Herzegovina, NATO Press Release M-NAC-2 
(95)119, 5 Dec. 1995; Transcript of the Lecture Given By COMIFOR, Admiral 
Leighton Smith at the Italian Armed Forces High Military Studies Center, 
Rome, 19 April 1996; Leighton Smith, supra, note 455, pp. 11-12; Statement 
on Bosnia and Herzegovina, supra, note 445; S/1997/636, 13 Aug. 1997, Annex 
I, Appendix, para. 25. 
      101  See Leighton Smith, supra, note 455, p. 11. 
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assumed,102 has led IFOR and SFOR to issue verbal warnings,103 
confiscate and destroy weapons and ammunition,104 impose bans on 
military training and the movement of armed forces,105 and, in 
particularly serious cases, mount shows of force.106 Given the 
two forces' undeniable military "leverage" over the parties,107 
this has been sufficient to secure party compliance when IFOR 
and SFOR have insisted on it, although, up until the middle of 
1997, they only insisted on compliance with the military 
provisions of the Dayton accords. 
 
 As previously indicated, it has been the smaller SFOR which 
has enforced, albeit selectively, Dayton's civilian provisions. 
Returning refugees have been protected,108 indicted war crimes 
 
      102  See text accompanying notes 543-46, infra. 
      103  See Yvonne BADAL, "IFOR Tested in the Republika Srpska", Pursuing Balkan 
Peace (OMRI), no. 32, 13 Aug. 1996. 
      104  See: Badal, ibid.; S/1997/602, 31 July 1997, Annex, Appendix, paras. 5-
8; Patrick MOORE, "1997 Year in Review: Bosnia Looks Toward Dayton's Third 
Year", RFE/RL Feature, 29 Dec. 1997. 
      105  Such bans have been linked, in particular, to the compliance by the 
parties with their de-mining obligations (Annex 1-A, supra, note 411, arts. 
IV and V). See: SFOR's Military Tasks, SFOR Fact Sheet, 27 June 1997; 
S/1997/602, 31 July 1997, Annex, Appendix, para. 13. 
      106  While IFOR, on occasion, sought to compel cooperation through the 
display of massive firepower, the actual use of force was invariably 
avoided. In 1996, the Bosnian Serb military headquarters at Han Pijesak was 
the site of several such confrontations. See: "NATO Shows Force to Get at 
Arms", International Herald Tribune (AP), 19 Feb. 1996, p. 8; Patrick 
MOORE, "IFOR Forces Serbs to Withdraw Weapons", Pursuing Balkan Peace 
(OMRI), no. 27, 9 July 1996; Patrick MOORE, "How to Deal with Inat", 
Pursuing Balkan Peace (OMRI), no. 32, 13 Aug. 1996; "NATO Moves to Increase 
Pressure on Bosnian Serbs", International Herald Tribune (Reuters), 13 Aug. 
1996, p. 5; "U.S. and NATO Press for Fair Polls in Bosnia", International 
Herald Tribune (Reuters), 14 Aug. 1996, p. 6. IFOR also mounted shows of 
force to compel cooperation by Bosnian Muslim forces. See: "NATO Planes 
Settle Showdown", International Herald Tribune (Reuters), 2 Feb. 1996, p. 
2; "Christopher Hopes to Bring Bosnia Factions to Heel", International 
Herald Tribune (Reuters, AFP), 3-4 Feb. 1996, p. 2. 
      107  "Peace Mission to Bosnia Is 'on Track'" (interview with the NATO 
Secretary-General), International Herald Tribune (IHT), 19 Feb. 1996, p. 8. 
      108  See text accompanying note 472, supra. 
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suspects have been seized,109 and hard-line media have been shut 
down.110 Yet, in all these operations, the actual use of force 
has typically been held in reserve ─ employed only as a last 
resort.111
 
 Consent 
 
 The parties to the Dayton accords112 expressed therein their 
consent to IFOR's establishment under NATO authority113 and to 
the various components of its mandate,114 including its enforce-
ment mandate.115 In addition, the parties agreed to "cooperate 
fully with all entities involved in implementation of [the 
Dayton accords]," including IFOR.116 This consent was, at NATO's 
express request, reaffirmed by the parties in respect of SFOR.117
 
 
      109  See text accompanying notes 488-90, supra. 
      110  See text accompanying note 499, supra. 
      111  In order to control unruly, even violent, civilian crowds, SFOR troops 
have fired warning shots and deployed crowd control agents such as tear 
gas. Concerning the Brcko incident of 28 August 1997, see: Chris HEDGES, 
"Bosnian Serbs Attack U.S. Troops", International Herald Tribune (NYT), 29 
Aug. 1997, p. 1; "Bosnian Serb Crowd Attacks NATO Troops", RFE/RL Newsline, 
vol. 1(106), 29 Aug. 1997; DoD News Briefing, Office of the Assistant 
Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), 28 Aug. 1997 (source: 
<http://www.defenselink.mil/news/>) 
      112  See note 411, supra. 
      113  See Annex 1-A, supra, note 411, arts. I(1) and VI(1). 
      114  See: Annex 1-A, supra, note 411, art. VI, paras. (2)-(4) and (9); Annex 
2, supra, note 411. 
      115  See: Annex 1-A, supra, note 411, art. I(2)(b); Annex 1-A, art. IV, 
paras. (2), (4) and (6); Annex 1-A, art. VI, paras. (5)-(6) and (9). See 
also text accompanying note 440, supra. 
      116  Annex 1-A, supra, note 411, art. X. And see art. II(4) of that annex. 
      117  See S/1996/1025 (10 Dec. 1996), including its annexes. Note that the 
letter from the members of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
confirming their acceptance of SFOR as "the legal successor to IFOR", 
carries the signatures of all three Presidency members (Muslim, Croat and 
Serb). 
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 American political and military leaders saw the consent of 
the Bosnian factions to the IFOR mission, and their commitment 
to the Dayton settlement generally, as essential preconditions 
to the participation of American troops in the NATO-led Force.118 
Although those American and NATO officials most closely associ-
ated with IFOR invariably glossed over this problem,119 the 
agreements, initialled at the Wright-Patterson Air Force Base 
near Dayton on 21 November and signed in Paris on 14 December 
1995, in fact masked fundamental discord. 
 
 In Dayton, the Bosnian Muslims were put under considerable 
pressure, especially by American negotiators, to reach a 
settlement with their Serb and Croat counterparts.120 Neverthe-
less, the Muslim delegation directly negotiated the Dayton 
accords and, after weighing their options, signed the resulting 
agreements freely.121 The situation in respect of the Bosnian 
Serbs was rather different. 
 
 Serbian President Slobodan Miloševi_, anxious to reach an 
 
      118  "Milosevic Persuades the Bosnian Serbs to Accept Accord", International 
Herald Tribune (Reuters, AFP, IHT), 24 Nov. 1995, p. 1. Michael DOBBS, 
"Clinton Won Assurances of Peacekeeper Security", International Herald 
Tribune (WP), 25-26 Nov. 1995, p. 1. Elaine SCIOLINO, Roger COHEN and 
Stephen ENGELBERG, "In U.S. Eyes, 'Good' Muslims And 'Bad' Serbs Did a 
Switch", New York Times, 23 Nov. 1995, p. A1 at p. A10. Eric SCHMITT, 
"Bosnian Serbs Balk at Pact, Imperiling U.S. Troop Plan", New York Times, 
23 Nov. 1995, p. A12. And see Statement on Bosnia-Herzegovina, supra, note 
508. 
      119  See: Statements by the President (US President Clinton's Address to the 
Nation), The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 27 Nov. 1995 
(source: US Dept. of State: 
<http://www.state.gov/www/current/bosnia/boshome.html>); Remarks by Adm. 
Leighton Smith, Commander, Implementation Force, at the Transfer of 
Authority Ceremony, Sarajevo, 20 Dec. '95 (source: NATO website: 
<http://www.nato.int>). 
      120  See: Sciolino et al, supra, note 526; Anthony BORDEN and Drago HEDL, 
"How the Bosnians Were Broken", War Report, no. 39, Feb.-March 1996, pp. 
28, 32, 39 and 42. 
      121  See the works cited ibid. A key consideration in this decision was the 
military assistance US negotiators had promised if the Muslims reached a 
peace settlement. Concerning the US-sponsored "train and equip" programme, 
see note 552, infra. 
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agreement at Dayton,122 deliberately kept the three Bosnian Serb 
members of his team out of the negotiations, revealing the final 
details of the settlement only just before it was initialled.123 
They then denounced the accord and boycotted the initialling 
ceremony.124 Those sections of the Dayton accords to which the 
Republika Srpska (RS) was a party125 were initialled for it by 
the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (FRY), Milan Milutinovi_.126
 
 Bosnian Serb opposition to the Dayton accords centred on 
the requirement that they surrender the four Sarajevo suburbs 
which they held and on the sweeping authority given to IFOR.127 
Although a subsequent meeting between Miloševi_ and Bosnian Serb 
leaders went some way towards securing the latter's grudging 
acceptance of Dayton,128 they remained dissatisfied. Shortly 
after IFOR's deployment, they appealed for a delay in the 
 
      122  See: Laura SILBER, "Dayton: histoire d'une négociation", Le trimestre du 
monde, no. 34, 1996/2, p. 107; Borden and Hedl, supra, note 528, p. 28. 
      123  See: Sciolino et al, supra, note 526; Borden and Hedl, supra, note 528, 
pp. 32, 34-35 and 41; "Les Serbes de Bosnie n'acceptent pas l'accord", Le 
Monde, 23 Nov. 1995, p. 2. 
      124  See: Sciolino et al, supra, note 526, p. 10; Schmitt, supra, note 526; 
"Les Serbes de Bosnie n'acceptent pas l'accord", ibid. 
      125  See note 411, supra. 
      126  Gaeta, supra, note 411, p. 150. The marginalization of the Bosnian Serbs 
at Dayton was made possible by an agreement, reached on 29 August 1995 
among Serb leaders from both Serbia and Bosnia, to form a joint FRY-RS 
delegation for purposes of negotiating and concluding future peace 
settlements concerning Bosnia-Herzegovina. This delegation, comprising 
three members from the FRY and three from the RS, represented the Serbs at 
Dayton. Pursuant to the terms of the 29 August accord, Milosevic headed the 
delegation and had a deciding vote in case of a split, 3-3 vote. As 
Milosevic already controlled the FRY side of the delegation, he could thus 
dictate the Serb, including Bosnian Serb, position in the Dayton 
negotiations. Depending on the subject at hand, the delegation acted as an 
organ of either the FRY or the RS. Gaeta, pp. 150-53. 
      127  Sciolino et al, supra, note 526, p. 10. Schmitt, supra, note 526. "The 
Enforcers", The Economist, 2 Dec. 1995, p. 36. 
      128  See: "Milosevic Persuades the Bosnian Serbs to Accept Accord", supra, 
note 526; Keesing's Record of World Events, Nov. 1995, p. 40831. 
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transfer of Serb-held Sarajevo to Federation control.129 They 
had, however, already given the game away. On 14 December, 
Bosnian Serb leader Nikola Koljevi_ signed those sections of the 
Dayton accords to which the RS was a party at the formal 
ceremony held for this purpose in Paris.130
 
 Thus, IFOR's consensual foundations, though real enough, 
were fragile. Not surprisingly, IFOR and SFOR have been quite 
assiduous in their attempts to nurture and sustain the cooper-
ation of the Bosnian factions. A principal means of achieving 
this has been the Joint Military Commission, provided for in the 
Dayton accords.131 Chaired by the I/SFOR Commander or his 
representative and bringing together the senior military 
commanders of the rival Bosnian forces,132 it allows I/SFOR to 
clarify matters relating to the implementation of Dayton's 
military provisions and resolve any problems arising in that 
context.133 The establishment of subordinate military commissions 
at various levels of the military command hierarchy allows 
problems to be resolved at the lowest possible level.134
 
 Party compliance with Dayton's military provisions has been 
good. Isolated incidents aside,135 the cease-fire has been 
 
      129  See: "For Peace Force, Rule Is Shoot First", International Herald 
Tribune (AP, Reuters, AFP), 28 Nov. 1995, p. 1 at p. 6; "The Enforcers", 
supra, note 535; "A Peace Still to Win", The Economist, 16 Dec. 1995, p. 
35;  Keesing's Record of World Events, Nov. 1995, p. 40831, and Dec. 1995, 
p. 40871. 
      130  See note 411, supra. Note that International Legal Materials (vol. 35, 
1996, p. 75) reproduces the accords exactly as signed in Paris, with the 
actual signatures. 
      131  See Annex 1-A, supra, note 411, art. VIII. 
      132  Annex 1-A, supra, note 411, art. VIII(3). 
      133  Annex 1-A, supra, note 411, art. VIII(2). S/1996/49, 23 Jan. 1996, 
Annex, Appendix, para. 10. 
      134  Annex 1-A, supra, note 411, art. VIII(8). S/1996/49, 23 Jan. 1996, 
Annex, Appendix, para. 10. 
      135  Many of the worst incidents involved attempts by Bosnian Muslims to 
resettle the zone of separation in northern Bosnia in the latter part of 
1996 and early 1997. See note 473, supra. The city of Mostar has been 
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observed, and provisions for the separation, cantonment and 
partial demobilization of the rival forces were basically 
complied with, though not always within the stated deadlines.136 
Yet, problems have arisen. The Bosnian Muslims were extremely 
slow to see off their foreign Islamic fighters and advisors as 
the accords require.137 Various other violations of the military 
provisions have been committed by the three sides, with the 
declaration and/or storage of weapons and ammunition in approved 
sites a particular problem, especially on the Bosnian Serb 
side.138
 
 The most serious problems of compliance have, however, 
arisen in respect of Dayton's civilian provisions. We have 
already examined, in some detail, four such areas ─ freedom of 
movement, the return of refugees and displaced persons, the 
investigation and prosecution of war crimes, and media restruc-
turing. Progress in other areas which are just as important to 
 
another flashpoint. Note that such violence has involved individuals and 
police forces or individual policemen, but not the rival armed forces as 
such. 
      136  The separation of the rival forces went according to schedule, yet 
significant delays occurred in the cantonment / partial demobilization of 
troops and the cantonment of heavy weapons. For details, see the monthly 
reports on IFOR operations listed in the Bibliography (sec. I A) 3)). 
      137  Article III of Annex 1-A (supra, note 411) requires all foreign forces 
to be withdrawn from Bosnia except for those, such as IFOR or SFOR, which 
are involved in implementing the Dayton accords under international 
mandate. On the question of compliance, see: S/1996/696, 27 Aug. 1996, 
Annex, Appendix, para. 8; John POMFRET, "Islamic Militants Terrorize 
Bosnians", International Herald Tribune (WP), 9 July 1996, p. 8; Bradley 
GRAHAM, "U.S's Training of Bosnians: Smoothing Its Exit?", International 
Herald Tribune (WP), 30 Jan. 1997, p. 1 at p. 7; Mike O'CONNOR, "Iranian 
Agents Reportedly Infiltrate U.S. Military Program in Bosnia", 
International Herald Tribune (NYT), 29-30 Nov. 1997, p. 2; Moore, supra, 
note 512. 
      138  See: S/1996/783, 25 Sept. 1996, Annex, Appendix, paras. 7-9; S/1997/193, 
5 March 1997, para. 4; S/1997/257, 27 March 1997, Annex, Appendix, paras. 5 
and 15; S/1997/369, 14 May 1997, paras. 6 and 8; S/1997/975, 13 Dec. 1997, 
para. 9; Badal, supra, note 511; Patrick MOORE, "A Remarkable Year Comes to 
a Close", Pursuing Balkan Peace (OMRI), 17 Dec. 1996; "U.S. Troops Begin 
Pullout, but Other GIs Bosnia Bound", International Herald Tribune (AP), 10 
Oct. 1996, p. 10; Schulte, supra, note 336, p. 25. See also the works cited 
in respect of the confrontations at Han Pijesak (note 514, supra). 
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the effective reintegration of Bosnia-Herzegovina, but where 
IFOR and SFOR's role has been much less central ─ such as the 
establishment and functioning of common national institutions ─ 
has also been slow. Each of the former warring factions bears 
some blame for the slow pace of civilian implementation and, as 
a result, Bosnia's continuing division into three ethnic terri-
tories,139 but the Bosnian Serbs have distinguished themselves in 
their obstructionism.140
 
 
 Impartiality 
 
 The IFOR and SFOR missions have both been premised on the 
principle of impartiality, understood as the "even-handed" 
implementation of the mandate, including the enforcement 
mandate.141 A link with the principle of consent is recognized, 
with I/SFOR's impartiality seen as a crucial determinant of 
party cooperation.142
 
 Despite some initial scepticism, especially on the part of 
 
      139  See: Moore, supra, note 512; Peter S. GREEN, "Bosnia's Continued 
Squabbling Blocks Reconstruction", International Herald Tribune, 11 Dec. 
1997, p. 13; "A Sporting Chance of Success?", The Economist, 6 Dec. 1997, 
p. 30. 
      140  See: S/1997/694, 8 Sept. 1997, para. 47; "Westendorp Threatens: 'Bye-Bye 
Mr. Krajisnik'", RFE/RL Newsline, vol. 1(150), 31 Oct. 1997; "A Ghost of a 
Chance", supra, note 458, pp. 6-7. 
      141  See: SCR 1031, 15 Dec. 1995, para. 15; SCR 1088, 12 Dec. 1996, para. 19; 
Dayton accords, Annex 1-A, supra, note 411, art. I(3); Statement on Bosnia-
Herzegovina, supra, note 508; NAC Declaration on IFOR's Role in the 
Transition to Peace, supra, note 443, para. 4; Ministerial Meeting of the 
North Atlantic Council, Berlin, 3 June 1996 (statement reproduced in NATO 
Review, 1996/4), para. 10; Statement on Bosnia and Herzegovina, supra, note 
445; Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Defence Ministers Session 
Held In Brussels on 2nd December 1997 (Final Communiqué), NATO Press 
Release M-NAC-D-2 (97)149, 2 Dec. 1997, para. 6; Ministerial Meeting of the 
North Atlantic Council Held at NATO Headquarters, Brussels, on 16 December 
1997 (Final Communiqué), supra, note 418, para. 17. The principle is also 
evoked in several of the NATO reports on IFOR and SFOR operations, issued 
as UN documents; see sec. I A) 3) of the Bibliography for references. 
      142  See S/1996/49, 23 Jan. 1996, Annex. 
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the Bosnian Serbs,143 that IFOR, once deployed, would really be 
impartial, the overall record tends to show that IFOR and SFOR, 
at least up to mid-1997, implemented their mandates in an even-
handed manner, carrying out their activities without regard to 
the identity of the parties they were dealing with, but only the 
fact of their compliance, or noncompliance, with the Dayton 
accords.144 The situation in the last half of 1997 has, at first 
glance, been rather different. 
 
 The last half of 1997 has been marked by a struggle for 
power between the elected President of the Republika Srpska, 
Biljana Plavši_, and a group of RS hard-liners, led by Radovan 
Karad_i_. By the end of 1997, Plavši_, confounding initial 
expectations of a quick defeat, had control of almost all of the 
western half of the RS, including the Republic's largest town, 
Banja Luka, leaving the hard-liners, based in Pale, with its 
eastern half. In this, Western support has been crucial.145 
Western governments, seeing Plavši_ as their best hope among the 
Bosnian Serbs for the implementation of Dayton's civilian provi-
sions, have given her extensive diplomatic support,146 offered 
 
      143  See Schulte, supra, note 336, pp. 25 and 32. 
      144  This is the author's own assessment, based on an extensive review of 
IFOR and SFOR activities over the stated period, including those cited in 
notes 510-19, supra. And see Schulte, supra, note 336, p. 25. It is 
submitted that the $400 million, US-sponsored "train and equip" programme, 
designed to bring the Muslim-Croat Federation Army up to military parity 
with its Bosnian Serb opponent, has not undermined the impartiality of the 
NATO-led forces given the complete lack of functional ties between the two. 
See Graham, supra, note 545, p. 1. Nevertheless, it may well be argued that 
"train and equip" has hurt the impartiality of the international 
community's post-Dayton efforts in Bosnia, taken as a whole. For a detailed 
account of the programme, see Enis DZANIC and Norman ERIK, "Retraining the 
Federation Forces in Post-Dayton Bosnia", Jane's Intelligence Review, vol. 
10(1), Jan. 1998. 
      145  According to some news reports, the split within the ranks of the 
Bosnian Serb leadership was itself engineered by the West. See: Wilkinson, 
supra, note 494; Patrick MOORE, "Political Stories from Former Yugoslavia", 
RFE/RL Newsline (End Note), vol. 1(81), 25 July 1997. 
      146  This has included crucial support for her dissolution of the Bosnian 
Serb Parliament and for her decision to hold early elections limited to the 
latter's replacement. See: "Bosnia: U.S. Wants NATO to Support Serb 
President", supra, note 494; Mike O'CONNOR, "Wiretapping Evidence Found", 
International Herald Tribune (NYT), 20 Aug. 1997, p. 5; Raymond BONNER, 
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economic assistance in return for progress in implementing 
Dayton,147 and warned her adversaries not to topple her by 
force.148
 
 SFOR has, in fact, been instrumental in preventing a coup 
by the hard-liners against Plavši_149 and in helping her to 
consolidate and extend her control over the western half of the 
Bosnian Serb Republic.150 It has also played a key role in 
 
"U.S. Push for Vote Hits Serb Defiance", International Herald Tribune 
(NYT), 17 Oct. 1997, p. 4; Chairman's Conclusions (Contact Group Meeting), 
Rome, 17 Oct. 1997 (source: <http://www.ohr.int>); Chris HEDGES, "In 
Bosnian Serb Election, the War 'Refuses to End'", International Herald 
Tribune (NYT), 24 Nov. 1997, p. 1, at p. 7. 
      147  See: Remarks at Annual Fleet Week Gala, supra, note 448; Chris HEDGES, 
"NATO Girds for a Final Push to Oust Serb Warlord", International Herald 
Tribune (NYT), 25 Aug. 1997, p. 1, at p. 6. At the end of 1997, the US 
administration appeared set to approve the first major package of financial 
assistance to areas under Plavsic's control. See R. Jeffrey SMITH, "Despite 
Critics, U.S. Expected to Send Aid to Bosnian Serbs", International Herald 
Tribune (WP), 17 Dec. 1997, p. 10. 
      148  See: Special Declaration on Bosnia and Herzegovina , supra, note 448; 
"NATO Warns against Attempt to Oust Plavsic", RFE/RL Newsline, vol. 1(69), 
9 July 1997. 
      149  Concerning developments in July-August 1997, see: Keesing's Record of 
World Events, July 1997, p. 41748; "Bosnia: NATO Boosts Security Around 
Serb President", RFE/RL News, 2 July 1997; "Foreign Support for Plavsic", 
RFE/RL Newsline, vol. 1(66), 3 July 1997; "Bosnia: U.S. Wants NATO to 
Support Serb President", supra, note 494; Hunter, supra, note 457, p. 398; 
McManus, supra, note 494. Concerning the failed attempt by hard-liners to 
mount a coup in Banja Luka in September 1997, see: OHR and SFOR Act to 
Prevent Intimidation at Banja Luka, OHR Press Release, Sarajevo, 8 Sept. 
1997 (source: OHR website: <http://www.ohr.int>); Sonia WINTER, "Bosnia: 
Holbrooke Warns Serbs against Disrupting Election", RFE/RL Feature, 10 
Sept. 1997; Bosnia Report (RFE/RL), vol. 1(7), 10 Sept. 1997; Keesing's 
Record of World Events, Sept. 1997, p. 41834. 
      150  Control of the police has been the crucial element in this. SFOR's 
intervention in Banja Luka, in August 1997, allowed Plavsic to take control 
there. See: "Pale Coup?", The Economist, 23 Aug. 1997, p. 21; "Police Chief 
Is Seized in Serb Power Struggle", International Herald Tribune (AFP, NYT), 
20 Aug. 1997, p. 5; "NATO Guards Serb Police Stations", International 
Herald Tribune (Reuters, AP), 21 Aug. 1997, p. 2; "NATO Consolidates Hold 
on Banja Luka Police Stations", RFE/RL Newsline, vol. 1(101), 22 Aug. 1997. 
Similar initiatives, undertaken by SFOR in Brcko and other Bosnian Serb 
towns at the end of August were, however, less successful. See: "Bosnia: 
Brcko Serbs Stone U.S. SFOR Troops", RFE/RL News, 28 Aug. 1997; Tracy 
WILKINSON, "In Bosnia, U.S. Creeps Deeper", Los Angeles Times, 11 Nov. 
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shutting down hard-line radio and TV broadcasts, a crucial 
weapon in the propaganda wars, and transferring the relevant 
communications facilities to Plavši_'s control.151 Although all 
of these initiatives can be justified on the basis of the 
extensive powers accorded to IFOR and SFOR, examined earlier, 
international officials have acknowledged, off the record, that 
their real objective has, in fact, been to enhance Plavši_'s 
power while diminishing that of her rivals.152
 
 It is submitted that SFOR's strong partisanship in the 
Bosnian Serb power struggle has not involved the abandonment of 
the impartiality its mission prescribes. First, the differential 
treatment at issue has occurred, not between the parties, as 
defined by Dayton, but within the ranks of one of those parties. 
Second, and most important, SFOR's favouritism among Bosnian 
Serbs has been motivated by the same fundamental concern which 
has underpinned all its activities in Bosnia ─ namely, to secure 
the implementation of the Dayton accords. This, at least, has 
been the official response to accusations of bias.153 Yet, it 
appears clear that this has, in fact, been the real reason for 
SFOR's partisanship. The latter, as previously described, has 
been just one component, albeit a key one, of a wide-ranging 
international effort clearly aimed at obtaining significant 
improvements in Bosnian Serb compliance with Dayton's civilian 
provisions by strengthening the faction perceived as more 
inclined to cooperate in this respect.154
 
1997, p. A1. 
      151  See "Media Restructuring" ("Mandate Implementation") sec., supra. 
      152  See Cody, supra, note 492. This is also reflected in many of the sources 
cited in the three preceding notes. 
      153  See: Transcript: Joint Press Conference, SFOR, LANDCENT, 12 Sept. 1997; 
NATO Press Release (97)117, supra, note 499; NATO Press Release M-NAC-D-2 
(97)149, supra, note 549, para. 5; NATO Press Release M-NAC-2 (97)155, 
supra, note 418, para. 17. 
      154  See: S/1997/804, 16 Oct. 1997, Annex, Appendix, para. 102; The Road 
Forward In Bosnia (Remarks by Samuel Berger, Assistant to the President for 
National Security Affairs), Georgetown U., Washington, D.C., 23 Sept. 1997; 
"Bosnia: Serb President Accuses Hardline Rivals of Threats", RFE/RL News, 4 
July 1997; "Bosnia: U.S. Will Continue to Support Serb President", RFE/RL 
News, 21 Aug. 1997. Note, however, that at the end of 1997 it was still 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 Of all the operations examined so far in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, only IFOR and SFOR closely approximate the model of 
peace enforcement outlined in chapter 1 on the basis of 
paragraph 44 of An Agenda for Peace and the related Foreign 
Affairs article. 
 
Enforcement Both IFOR and SFOR have had extensive 
enforcement powers, although the wide authority conferred on 
paper has been circumscribed by NATO's NAC, especially in the 
area of civil implementation. Within this, more limited, 
framework, the actual use of force has been held in reserve. 
Other forms of pressure have typically been used to secure 
compliance with the accords where IFOR or SFOR have insisted on 
this, with force employed only as a last resort. There have been 
no violent clashes between the NATO-led missions and the Bosnian 
factions of the kind seen in Somalia during UNOSOM II's pursuit 
of General Aideed. 
 
Imperfect Consent All three factions formally consented to 
the IFOR and SFOR operations, including their enforcement 
mandates, as evidenced by the factions' signature of the Dayton 
accords in Paris on 14 December 1995 and their subsequent, 
written assent to SFOR's replacement of IFOR. Yet, despite these 
formal trappings, consent, in reality, was quite imperfect. 
 
 Although representatives of the Bosnian Serbs were present 
at Dayton, the accords were negotiated without their participa-
tion. While a Bosnian Serb representative later signed the 
accords in Paris, they in fact remained opposed to key aspects 
of the agreements, including the wide authority given to IFOR to 
ensure their implementation. The Bosnian Serbs' opposition to 
                                                                
unclear whether Plavsic would, in fact, deliver improved compliance with 
Dayton. On this question, see: McManus, supra, note 494; Wilkinson, supra, 
note 494; Moore, supra, note 512. 
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Dayton was reflected in their uneven record of compliance with 
the military, and especially non-military, provisions of the 
accords, although they were not alone in this. The other two 
factions were also, not infrequently, in breach of the accords, 
prepared to cooperate only at IFOR's or SFOR's insistence. 
 
 Thus, the picture in relation to consent has been very 
mixed. Although, formally speaking, the IFOR and SFOR missions 
rest on clear consensual foundations, such consent has not 
always translated into practical cooperation. Cooperation has 
been selective, offered in respect of certain provisions of the 
Dayton accords, but not others, and contingent on IFOR's and 
SFOR's sustained efforts to nurture and, if necessary, compel 
such cooperation. 
 
Impartiality The third characteristic of peace enforcement, 
impartiality, has been a defining feature of the IFOR and SFOR 
operations, as emphasized in a wide variety of NATO and UN 
documentation. The record shows that the NATO-led missions in 
fact implemented their mandate in an even-handed manner, at 
least up to mid-1997 when the Bosnian Serbs split into moderate 
and hard-line factions. 
 
 It is submitted that the strong support given by SFOR in 
the last half of 1997 to the moderate Bosnian Serb faction, in 
concert with broader international efforts along the same lines, 
did not involve a breach of impartiality as this support was 
ultimately aimed at improving Bosnian Serb compliance with the 
Dayton accords. As understood and applied by NATO in the IFOR 
and SFOR operations, the principle of impartiality has, in fact, 
consistently rested upon such foundations. IFOR and SFOR's 
actions have invariably been based on one consideration ─ the 
parties' compliance or non-compliance with Dayton. 
6  NATIONAL MILITARY DOCTRINE 
 
 
 This chapter will be devoted to an examination of the 
ongoing efforts of certain key states to develop military 
doctrine for peace operations. As of the time of writing,1 both 
the United States and the United Kingdom are preparing revisions 
and/or expansions of recent military manuals for peace oper-
ations. French efforts to develop peace operations doctrine are 
also well advanced. Our enquiry will be limited to these three 
states for two reasons. First, their status as permanent members 
of the UN Security Council and key contributors to the UN-
sanctioned enforcement operations previously examined makes the 
US, UK, and France indispensable to any consideration of 
national military doctrine for peace operations. Second, it is 
submitted that the remarkable degree of convergence found in 
these three military doctrines, to be described in detail in the 
course of the chapter, obviates the need for a broader enquiry 
involving the extraction of general trends and tendencies from a 
larger sample. On the basis of the evidence to be presented 
here, the trend appears clear. 
 
 In the course of our study, we will seek to describe and 
distinguish the various categories of peace operation recognized 
by the three military doctrines, together with what they call 
"war". Particular attention will, of course, be paid to the 
"middle ground" of the spectrum of military operations. The 
three, by now familiar, characteristics of the use of force, 
consent and impartiality will, as it turns out, remain 
indispensable to our analysis. 
 
 
 
US MILITARY DOCTRINE 
 
 Since the end of the Cold War, the US military has devoted 
considerable attention to the development of doctrine for peace 
operations. Joint services doctrine for peace-keeping alone2 was 
                                                                
      1  This chapter was prepared in September 1997 on the basis of information 
available at that time. 
      2  Note that both US and UK military doctrines spell "peacekeeping" without 
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finalized in April 1994.3 The US Army followed this, at the end 
of 1994, with a comprehensive manual on peace operations.4 The 
joint services manual on peace-keeping is now being revised to 
cover the full range of peace operations. A draft version of 
this publication,5 together with the US Army manual, will ground 
our discussion of US military doctrine.6
 
 Current US military doctrine makes a fundamental distinc-
tion between "peace operations", a term which encompasses peace-
keeping operations and peace enforcement operations,7 and 
"war".
8
 Specifically, whereas the latter involves the pursuit of 
 
the hyphen used by the UN, as indicated in the relevant quotations and 
citations appearing below. Nevertheless, for the sake of consistency in the 
dissertation as a whole, the UN spelling will, as a rule, be used in this 
chapter for simple "peace-keeping", while the UK spelling will be retained 
for the special UK category "wider peacekeeping". 
      3  Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peacekeeping Operations, 
Joint Pub. 3-07.3, 29 April 1994 [hereinafter "JP 3-07.3 (Peacekeeping)"]. 
      4  FM 100-23, supra, note 183. 
      5  Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peace Operations (Draft), 
Joint Pub. 3-07.3, 30 Sept. 1996 [hereinafter "JP 3-07.3 (Peace 
Operations)"]. 
      6  Once finalized, the joint services manual on peace operations (ibid) will 
guide the planning and implementation of peace operations involving two or 
more of the American services (army, air force, navy, and marines). As it 
will override existing US Army doctrine, the latter will have to be revised 
to remove any discrepancies, although, at present, these appear minor. Also 
relevant to our discussion of US military doctrine for peace operations 
are: Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub. 1-02, 23 March 1994 [hereinafter "JP 1-
02"], setting out standard definitions of terms; and Joint Doctrine for 
Military Operations other than War, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub. 3-07, 
16 June 1995 [hereinafter "JP 3-07"], describing the basic tenets of 
"military operations other than war (MOOTW)", of which peace operations are 
a subset. 
      7  JP 1-02, ibid., definition of "peace operations". JP 3-07, ibid., p. III-
12. JP 3-07.3 (Peace Operations), supra, note 567, ch. I, pp. 2 and 6. 
Compare FM 100-23, supra, note 183, pp. iv and 2. 
      8  Note that "war" is not defined in JP 1-02 (ibid.), even though it is a 
key reference point in US doctrine. The latter divides all military 
operations into "war" and "military operations other than war (MOOTW)". 
Peace operations fall within the scope of MOOTW. See JP 3-07, ibid., ch. I, 
pp. 1-2. 
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military victory and the destruction of a predetermined adver-
sary, peace operations, as the name suggests, are designed to 
bring about, or at least facilitate the achievement of, peace ─ 
"the conflict, not the belligerent parties, is the enemy."9
 
 Although, in US doctrine, the "critical variables" of the 
use of force, consent, and impartiality10 serve, above all, to 
distinguish peace enforcement from peace-keeping, they also help 
to set war apart from both of these peace operations. This is 
especially true with respect to the use of force, subject to 
greater constraints in all peace operations, including peace 
enforcement.11 US military doctrine also holds that "[i]n war, 
consent is not an issue of concern for the military commander", 
whereas "[i]n peace operations, ... the level of consent 
determines fundamentals of the operation."12 In fact, for all 
practical purposes, consent is entirely absent in war, whereas, 
as we shall see, it plays at least some role in peace enforce-
ment, as well as peace-keeping. Similarly, war, as already 
noted, involves a predetermined adversary and, as such, is 
wholly partial, whereas both peace-keeping and, in almost all 
cases,
13
 peace enforcement aspire ─ to a greater (peace-keeping) 
or lesser (peace enforcement) extent ─ to impartiality. 
 
 
 
 
 Peace-keeping 
 
      9  FM 100-23, supra, note 183, p. v. And see: FM 100-23, pp. v-vi, 2, 13 and 
17; JP 3-07.3 (Peace Operations), supra, note 567, ch. I, p. 31, and ch. 
III, pp. 1, 3, 24, and 37-38. 
      10  FM 100-23, supra, note 183, p. 12. And see JP 3-07.3 (Peace Operations), 
supra, note 567, p. I-12. 
      11  See: JP 3-07.3 (Peace Operations), supra, note 567, ch. III, pp. 1, 3, 
24, 27 and 37; FM 100-23, supra, note 183, pp. v-vi and 17. Under US 
doctrine, the principle of "restraint" guides the conduct of all "military 
operations other than war (MOOTW)", including peace enforcement. See JP 3-
07, supra, note 568, p. II-4. 
      12  FM 100-23, supra, note 183, p. 13. 
      13  See note 598, infra. 
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 The US military's concept of "peacekeeping" is the same as 
that developed by the UN, introduced in the first chapter. The 
use of force is essentially limited to self-defence.14 Peace-
keeping operations are deployed and conducted with the consent 
of the principal parties to the conflict15 and are impartial.16
 
 
 
 Peace Enforcement 
 
 US military doctrine defines "peace enforcement" as: 
 
the application of military force, or the threat of its use, 
normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel 
compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or 
restore peace and order.17
 
Peace enforcement forces may be assigned the following missions: 
the enforcement of sanctions;18 the guarantee and denial of 
movement;19 the establishment and supervision of protected 
 
      14  JP 3-07.3 (Peace Operations), supra, note 567, p. I-13. In its 
description of the use of force in peace-keeping, FM 100-23 also 
incorporates the notion of extended self-defence (defence of the mandate), 
though with rather less precision than the UN. See FM 100-23, supra, note 
183, pp. 12-13 and 17. 
      15  JP 3-07.3 (Peace Operations), supra, note 567, pp. I-7 and II-3. FM 100-
23, supra, note 183, pp. 1, 4 and 12. 
      16  JP 3-07.3 (Peace Operations), supra, note 567, pp. I-7 and II-2. FM 100-
23, supra, note 183, pp. 1, 12, 13, 18 and 36. 
      17  JP 3-07.3 (Peace Operations), supra, note 567, p. I-7 (and see ch. III, 
pp. 1-3 and 38). The definitions given in JP 1-02 (supra, note 568, "peace 
enforcement") and JP 3-07 (supra, note 568, p. III-13) are virtually the 
same, while that offered in FM 100-23 (supra, note 183, p. 6) differs only 
slightly. 
      18  See: JP 3-07.3 (Peace Operations), supra, note 567, p. III-8; FM 100-23, 
supra, note 183, pp. 8-9. 
      19  See FM 100-23, supra, note 183, p. 8. Note that JP 3-07.3 (Peace 
Operations) includes this task under the broad rubric of sanctions enforce-
ment. See ibid. 
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zones;
20
 the protection of humanitarian assistance;21 the 
restoration and maintenance of order and stability;22 and the 
forcible separation of belligerents,23 including the related task 
of establishing buffer or demilitarized zones24 and other action, 
such as disarmament and demobilization, designed to maintain 
their disengagement.25
 
 Under US military doctrine, a peace enforcement operation 
may take the initiative in the use of force.26 In fact, US 
doctrine allows for the use of "overwhelming force" where 
necessary.27 Yet, in general, peace enforcers are to use only 
such force as is needed to secure compliance with the mandate.28 
US doctrine puts special emphasis on the need "to minimize 
collateral damage29 to the fullest extent possible."30 The 
principle of restraint, applicable under US military doctrine to 
 
      20  See FM 100-23, supra, note 183, pp. 9-11. While this task is not specifi-
cally mentioned in JP 3-07.3 (Peace Operations), it is at least partly 
captured by the latter's broad formulation of sanctions enforcement, which 
includes the enforcement of air, land or sea exclusion zones, such as those 
imposed in Bosnia-Herzegovina. See JP 3-07.3 (Peace Operations), ibid. 
      21  See: JP 3-07.3 (Peace Operations), supra, note 567, p. III-8; FM 100-23, 
supra, note 183, p. 8. 
      22  See: JP 3-07.3 (Peace Operations), supra, note 567, ch. III, pp. 8-9; FM 
100-23, supra, note 183, p. 7. 
      23  See: JP 3-07.3 (Peace Operations), supra, note 567, ch. III, pp. 9 and 
34-35; FM 100-23, supra, note 183, pp. 11-12. 
      24  See: JP 3-07.3 (Peace Operations), ibid; FM 100-23, ibid. 
      25  See JP 3-07.3 (Peace Operations), supra, note 567, ch. III, pp. 36-37. 
      26  JP 3-07.3 (Peace Operations), supra, note 567, p. III-3. 
      27  FM 100-23, supra, note 183, p. 17. JP 3-07.3 (Peace Operations), supra, 
note 567, p. III-3. 
      28  See: JP 3-07.3 (Peace Operations), supra, note 567, p. III-37 ("Con-
clusion"); FM 100-23, supra, note 183, p. 13. 
      29  ─ i.e., unintended death and destruction caused to civilians, civilian 
property and other non-military objects. 
      30  JP 3-07.3 (Peace Operations), supra, note 567, p. III-24. And see ch. 
III, pp. 3, 27 and 37. 
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all "military operations other than war (MOOTW)", including 
peace enforcement, is of prime importance.31
 
 The US military recognizes some role for consent in peace 
enforcement, while stressing that it cannot be relied upon.32 A 
peace enforcement force may, in fact, be deployed without the 
consent of the state on whose territory such deployment occurs.33 
Even when the cooperation of the belligerents allows the force 
to conduct itself in most circumstances "as if performing 
[peace-keeping]", it must be prepared to use force to implement 
its mandate.34 Yet, wherever possible, it is to nurture 
cooperation in order to ease the transition to a durable peace.35
 
 The US military considers impartiality in peace enforcement 
to be "desirable but not necessary".36 It is desirable since, as 
 
      31  See: JP 3-07, supra, note 568, p. II-4; JP 3-07.3 (Peace Operations), 
supra, note 567, ch. I, pp. 38-40, ch. III, pp. 3 and 24; FM 100-23, supra, 
note 183, pp. 17 and 34-35. 
      32  See: JP 3-07.3 (Peace Operations), supra, note 567, pp. I-13 and III-2; 
FM 100-23, supra, note 183, pp. 12-14. 
      33  JP 3-07.3 (Peace Operations), supra, note 567, p. III-2. 
      34  JP 3-07.3 (Peace Operations), supra, note 567, p. I-15. Note that, for 
the sake of clarity and consistency, abbreviations used in US and UK 
military manuals ("PK", "PE", etc.) are spelled out when they appear in 
quoted passages, as here. 
      35  JP 3-07.3 (Peace Operations), supra, note 567, ch. I, p. 15, ch. III, pp. 
2-3. 
      36  JP 3-07.3 (Peace Operations), supra, note 567, p. III-2. And see FM 100-
23, supra, note 183, p. 14. Note that JP 3-07.3 (Peace Operations) says, at 
one point, that "[i]n some [peace enforcement] mandates, impartiality may 
not be desired" (p. I-13). This remark is not developed elsewhere in the 
manual, however. Throughout the rest of the text, impartiality is treated 
as a desirable, though not always attainable, feature of peace enforcement. 
The meaning of the quoted passage may, arguably, be found in FM 100-23 
which asserts, at page 2, that despite their frequent designation as "peace 
enforcement" operations, the UN operations in Korea (1950-53) and 
Kuwait/Iraq (1990-91) "are clearly wars and must not be confused with 
[peace enforcement] as described herein." War, as noted earlier, is seen in 
US military doctrine as a wholly partial activity. Thus, the reference in 
JP 3-07.3 (Peace Operations) to peace enforcement mandates where 
impartiality is not desired may be to operations such as those undertaken 
in Korea and Kuwait/Iraq. 
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with consent, it helps pave the way to a lasting peace.37 
Nevertheless, "it may be extremely difficult to attain and 
maintain in an actual [peace enforcement operation], no matter 
how the [peace enforcement] force executes its mission."38 
Impartiality, in US doctrine, does not derive from the effects 
of a peace enforcement operation's actions. US military doctrine 
recognizes that "[e]ven the least intrusive [peace operation] is 
unlikely to affect all parties equally."39 The US concept of 
impartiality focuses, rather, on the way in which the force 
implements its mandate. 
 
Impartiality means that the [peace operation] force will treat all 
sides in a fair and even-handed manner, recognizing neither 
aggressor nor victim. This implies that the force will carry out 
its tasks in a way that fosters the goals of the mandate rather 
than the goals of either of the parties. During [peace 
enforcement], the force maintains impartiality by its focusing on 
the behaviour of a recalcitrant party ─ employing force because of 
what is being done, not because of who is doing it.40
 
 
 
 Distinctions 
 
 The major differences between peace-keeping and peace 
enforcement are summarized in US Army Field Manual 100-23.41 
Thus, consent is "clear" or "high" in peace-keeping, but "not 
absolute" or "low" in peace enforcement. The use of force is 
 
      37  JP 3-07.3 (Peace Operations), supra, note 567, ch. III, pp. 2 and 34. FM 
100-23, supra, note 183, p. 13. 
      38  JP 3-07.3 (Peace Operations), supra, note 567, p. I-13. And see FM 100-
23, supra, note 183, pp. 12 and 18. Although US doctrine is not entirely 
clear on this point, the sources just cited suggest the key problem is the 
perception ─ as opposed to the reality ─ of bias. 
      39  JP 3-07.3 (Peace Operations), supra, note 567, p. I-13. 
      40  JP 3-07.3 (Peace Operations), supra, note 567, p. I-13. 
      41  The following points are derived from FM 100-23, supra, note 183, pp. 12-
14. 
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limited to self-defence (including the "defence of the mandate") 
in peace-keeping, whereas in peace enforcement "force is used to 
compel or coerce." Finally, impartiality is "more easily 
maintained" or "high" in peace-keeping, while harder to maintain 
or "low" in peace enforcement. 
 
 
 
 Transitions 
 
 Although, as the preceding discussion would indicate, 
peace-keeping and peace enforcement are seen as clearly distinct 
categories in US military doctrine,42 the latter does envisage 
the possibility of transition from one to the other. A shift 
from peace enforcement to peace-keeping may occur as a 
deliberate response to a high level of cooperation from the 
warring parties.43 Yet, in such a situation, the force, though 
temporarily and provisionally operating in peace-keeping mode, 
remains prepared to use force in order to implement the mandate 
should this become necessary.44
 
 A shift from peace-keeping to peace enforcement, on the 
other hand, is a more perilous undertaking, though a serious 
deterioration in the prevailing situation (the collapse of a 
cease-fire, the withdrawal of consent, and so forth) may make it 
necessary.45 Thus, US doctrine emphasizes the need to plan in 
advance for possible transitions from peace-keeping to peace 
enforcement and vice versa.46
 
 
 
      42  And see: JP 3-07.3 (Peace Operations), supra, note 567, p. I-12; FM 100-
23, supra, note 183, p. 12. 
      43  See JP 3-07.3 (Peace Operations), supra, note 567, ch. I, pp. 8 and 15. 
Compare FM 100-23, supra, note 183, p. 12. 
      44  JP 3-07.3 (Peace Operations), supra, note 567, p. I-15. 
      45  See JP 3-07.3 (Peace Operations), supra, note 567, ch. I, pp. 8-9 and 14. 
      46  JP 3-07.3 (Peace Operations), supra, note 567, ch. I, pp. 8 and 14. 
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UK MILITARY DOCTRINE 
 
 The UK military has also been active in recent years in 
developing operational doctrine for peace operations.47 Army 
Field Manual (AFM), vol. 5, part 1 (Peacekeeping Operations), 
released in 1988, was followed, in 1995, by AFM, vol. 5, part 2 
(Wider Peacekeeping).48 Current efforts are directed towards the 
preparation of a new manual, the first version of which will 
form the basis for our analysis of UK military doctrine. Peace 
Support Operations49 constitutes both a revision of the earlier 
work, especially that concerning "wider peacekeeping", and an 
expansion to include "peace enforcement". As we will see, it 
takes a markedly different approach to its subject than Wider 
Peacekeeping. 
 
 "Wider peacekeeping" is, in fact, a subset of peace-
keeping,50 with the difference that wider peacekeeping operations 
                                                                
      47  While UK doctrine uses the term "peace support operations", for the sake 
of consistency we will continue to use "peace operations" in this section. 
Quotations will, however, reflect British terminology (and see note 596, 
infra). 
      48  Supra, note 313. 
      49  Peace Support Operations (First Draft), Army Field Manual, 1996 
[hereinafter "Peace Support Operations"]. 
      50  This is asserted in Wider Peacekeeping itself (see supra, note 313, ch. 
2, paras. 4-8 and 23). It is also reflected in the importance accorded by 
the manual to the principles of impartiality (see: ch. 2, paras. 15-16 and 
19; ch. 4, paras. 4-7 and 14) and what it calls "minimum force" (see: ch. 
2, paras. 17-20; ch. 4, paras. 8-14) in wider peacekeeping. With respect to 
the latter principle, it should be noted that Wider Peacekeeping envisages 
the use of force for the purpose of overcoming local opposition to the 
wider peacekeeping force (ch. 2, para. 18) and "in defence of mandated 
activities, for example the delivery of humanitarian aid" (ch. 4, para. 
12), as well as for strict self-defence (ch. 4, para. 12). Yet, at the same 
time, the manual specifies that "[r]eprisals and the pre-emptive (ie first 
use) of force are inappropriate to Wider Peacekeeping operations." (ch. 4, 
para. 14(b)). While Wider Peacekeeping is not as clear on this point as it 
might be, it appears that, lacking the authority to take the initiative in 
the use of force, a wider peacekeeping force would not be involved in 
enforcement. 
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are deployed in "volatile" environments where consent, though 
present to some extent, is incomplete and/or unstable.51 One of 
the main functions of a wider peacekeeping force is to build or 
restore consent through adherence to such principles as 
impartiality and "minimum force".52 Peace Support Operations 
explicitly rejects the application of traditional peace-keeping 
techniques to environments which are "volatile" in the sense 
just described, concluding rather that this is the proper domain 
of what it calls "peace enforcement".53
 
 In describing current UK military doctrine for peace 
operations, we will focus exclusively on the new draft manual. 
Although Peace Support Operations is not yet official doctrine, 
it has the advantage of being more complete than Wider 
Peacekeeping as it covers the full range of peace operations. It 
also takes account of important, recent experience in the field, 
including that of Bosnia-Herzegovina over the crucial 1995-96 
period54 ─ experience which tends to invalidate the key premises 
on which Wider Peacekeeping is founded.55
 
 Approval of Peace Support Operations in its current form 
would, in fact, involve the rejection of "wider peacekeeping" in 
 
      51  The specific scenarios envisaged appear to include a general breakdown of 
consent in situations of open warfare and/or state collapse, as well as 
instances where consent given by the principal belligerents at the 
"theatre" level is not transmitted to the local or "tactical" level. See 
Wider Peacekeeping, supra, note 313, ch. 1, paras. 5 and 24-25, ch. 2, 
paras. 9-10. 
      52  See: Wider Peacekeeping, supra, note 313, ch. 2; note 612, supra. 
      53  See Peace Support Operations, supra, note 611, ch. 1, para. 3, ch. 2, 
paras. 12-15, and ch. 3, para. 7. 
      54  Peace Support Operations (supra, note 611), written in the latter part of 
1996, acknowledges its debt to "recent experience" (ch. 1, para. 4; and see 
para. 3) and draws explicitly on UNPROFOR and IFOR experience (see, for 
example, ch. 3, paras. 4-5, and 12).  
      55  Thus, the experience of UNPROFOR in the spring-summer of 1995 showed 
quite clearly that, at least in some cases, consent could not be built up 
or restored through adherence to peace-keeping principles. See: text 
accompanying note 614, supra; chapter 4, "The Breakdown of the Safe Areas 
Regime" section. 
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favour of (1) a single category of "peace-keeping", moulded on 
the traditional lines with which we are already familiar, and 
(2) an entirely separate category of peace operation, termed 
"peace enforcement", occupying the middle ground of a spectrum 
extending from peace-keeping, at one end, to "war", at the 
other. This, then, is the framework which will underpin our 
analysis of UK military doctrine. 
 
 Like its US counterpart, UK military doctrine recognizes a 
fundamental distinction between peace operations and "war". The 
main features of the peace operations / war divide in UK 
doctrine are, in fact, remarkably similar to the US version, 
examined earlier. Thus, peace operations aim to facilitate the 
achievement of a lasting settlement among the principal 
antagonists. The goal is not military victory, as in war, but a 
durable peace.56 Moreover, both peace-keeping and peace 
enforcement are impartial in nature,57 in contrast to war which 
involves "a designated enemy".58 Other distinctions exist with 
respect to the use of force, more restrained in peace operations 
than in war,59 and consent, usually present, to some extent, in 
peace operations, including peace enforcement, but invariably 
absent in war.60
 
 
 
      56  See Peace Support Operations, supra, note 611, ch. 1, para. 1, and ch. 3, 
paras. 3-4 and 6. 
      57  As we shall see, as it concerns peace enforcement, UK doctrine is even 
more insistent on this point than the US version. 
      58  Peace Support Operations, supra, note 611, ch. 1, para. 1. And see ch. 3, 
paras. 3 and 5. 
      59  See Peace Support Operations, supra, note 611, ch. 2, para. 16, and ch. 
4, para. 1. See also the discussion of the use of force in peace enforce-
ment, infra. 
      60  "In [peace support operations], the active participation of the 
belligerent parties in the formulation and achievement of the end-state, be 
that ceasefire or peace plan, will be advantageous. As the operation moves 
towards war this trend will diminish until ultimately the terms of any 
peace plan could be imposed without consultation or agreement with the 
factions concerning conditions." Peace Support Operations, supra, note 611, 
ch. 3, para. 3. 
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 Peace-keeping 
 
 Having dispensed with "wider peacekeeping", Peace Support 
Operations' revised concept of "peacekeeping", as a single 
category, is virtually identical to that developed in UN 
practice. Thus, the use of force is, in principle, limited to 
self-defence61 and full consent and impartiality are both 
considered essential.62
 
 
 
 Peace Enforcement 
 
 Peace Support Operations defines "peace enforcement" as: 
 
Coercive operations carried out to restore or maintain peace in 
situations of chaos, or between parties who may not all consent to 
intervention and who may be engaged in combat activities, in order 
to help create the conditions for diplomatic and humanitarian 
activities to support political goals.63
 
 
 The various tasks or missions envisaged for peace enforce-
ment64 include: "peace restoration";65 the protection of 
 
      61  See Peace Support Operations, supra, note 611, ch. 1, para. 10, ch. 3, 
paras. 5 and 7, and ch. 4, para. 13. Note, however, that the draft manual 
allows peace-keepers greater scope for the use of force "in a situation of 
chaos" where "belligerent parties [are] uncoordinated and independent" (ch. 
4, para. 8) or to "contain local upset" (ch. 4, para. 11). In each case, 
the use of force would involve a loss of consent at the tactical (field 
operations) level only. 
      62  Concerning consent, see Peace Support Operations, supra, note 611, ch. 1, 
paras. 1 and 10, ch. 2, para. 12, and ch. 3, paras. 5, 7 and 12. Concerning 
impartiality, see ch. 3, paras. 5 and 7. 
      63  Peace Support Operations, supra, note 611, ch. 1, para. 1. 
      64  Generally, see Peace Support Operations, supra, note 611, ch. 3, para. 
23. 
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humanitarian operations;66 conflict containment;67 the forcible 
separation of belligerents;68 the establishment and supervision 
of protected or safe areas;69 the guarantee and denial of move-
ment;70 and the enforcement of sanctions.71
 
 Peace Support Operations stresses the coercive nature of 
peace enforcement.72 Thus, a "force deployed for [peace enforce-
ment] must be prepared to fight and to escalate if need be to 
achieve the mission."73 The use of "'overwhelming' force" is also 
envisaged where a peace enforcement operation is "challenged to 
create an immediate impact and provide credibility."74 Neverthe-
less, as with US doctrine, the use of force in peace enforcement 
is subject to restraint in the interests of "the long-term 
requirements of peace building".75 This means specifically that, 
as a rule, force is to be used only when other methods of 
persuasion have failed and only "in response to an offensive 
 
      65  See Peace Support Operations, supra, note 611, ch. 3, para. 25(a), and 
ch. 5, para. 26. 
      66  See Peace Support Operations, supra, note 611, ch. 5, para. 27. 
      67  See Peace Support Operations, supra, note 611, ch. 3, para. 25(b), and 
ch. 5, para. 28. 
      68  See Peace Support Operations, supra, note 611, ch. 3, para. 25(c), and 
ch. 5, para. 29. 
      69  See Peace Support Operations, supra, note 611, ch. 3, para. 25(d), and 
ch. 5, paras. 30-31. 
      70  See Peace Support Operations, supra, note 611, ch. 3, para. 25(e), and 
ch. 5, para. 32. 
      71  See Peace Support Operations, supra, note 611, ch. 3, para. 25(f), and 
ch. 5, para. 33. 
      72  See Peace Support Operations, supra, note 611, ch. 1, paras. 1 and 11, 
ch. 3, para. 8, and ch. 4, para. 8. 
      73  Peace Support Operations, supra, note 611, ch. 2 , para. 12. And see note 
596, supra. 
      74  Peace Support Operations, supra, note 611, ch. 4, para. 8. 
      75  Peace Support Operations, supra, note 611, ch. 1, para. 11. This point is 
also made in ch. 3, paras. 6 and 8, and ch. 4, para. 8. 
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action initiated by a belligerent party";76 further, when force 
is used, that "all positive measures [are] taken to avoid 
civilian casualties and minimise collateral damage."77 In fact, 
any use of force is to be guided by the principle of "[m]inimum 
necessary force ... defined as the measured and proportionate 
application of violence or coercion, sufficient only to achieve 
a specific objective and confined in effect to the legitimate 
target intended."78
 
 Like US doctrine, Peace Support Operations recognizes a 
role for consent in peace enforcement. While a peace enforcement 
operation can be conducted in the absence of consent, consent 
will often be present, though in the context of a "volatile" 
environment where it is incomplete and/or unstable.79 Though not 
crucial in the short-term, the promotion of consent by a peace 
enforcement operation is seen as a key determinant of long-term 
success.
80
 This need to nurture consent explains the importance 
Peace Support Operations attributes to impartiality in peace 
enforcement, as well as peace-keeping, and its emphasis on 
restraint in the use of force.81
 
In practice, [peace support operations] are likely to represent a 
continual struggle between the use of force and the need to 
promote, preserve, and sustain whatever consensual framework might 
exist.82
 
 
      76  Peace Support Operations, supra, note 611, ch. 4, para. 13. 
      77  Peace Support Operations, supra, note 611, ch. 4, para. 8. 
      78  Peace Support Operations, supra, note 611, ch. 4, para. 15. And see ch. 
3, para. 3, and ch. 4, para. 13. 
      79  See Peace Support Operations, supra, note 611, ch. 1, para. 1, ch. 2, 
paras. 12 and 15, and ch. 3, paras. 5, 8, and 12. 
      80  Peace Support Operations, supra, note 611, ch. 6, para. 2. And see ch. 3, 
paras. 8 and 26, ch. 4, para. 5, and ch. 6, sec. 2. 
      81  See Peace Support Operations, supra, note 611, ch. 3, paras. 8 and 26, 
and ch. 4, paras. 4, 8, and 17. 
      82  Peace Support Operations, supra, note 611, ch. 3, para. 26. 
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 Peace Support Operations goes somewhat further than US 
doctrine in stressing the importance of impartiality to peace 
enforcement,83 although it acknowledges that perceptions of bias 
will invariably plague even the most "scrupulously impartial" of 
operations.84 As presented in Peace Support Operations, the 
concept of impartiality appears virtually identical to its US 
counterpart. Again, the emphasis is on the "even-handed" 
implementation of the mandate: 
 
The conduct of a [peace support operations] force should always be 
impartial and even-handed, and should force have to be used 
against a particular party, it will only be because of what that 
party is doing, or not doing, as the case may be, rather than who 
they are.85
 
 
 
 Distinctions 
 
 Peace Support Operations' tripartite division of the 
"spectrum of conflict"86 into peace-keeping, peace enforcement, 
and war is neatly illustrated in chapter 3 of the draft manual:87
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                
 
      83  See Peace Support Operations, supra, note 611, ch. 3, paras. 5, 8 and 26, 
and ch. 4, paras. 4, 12, and 17-21. 
      84  Peace Support Operations, supra, note 611, ch. 4, para. 19. And see para. 
18. 
      85  Peace Support Operations, supra, note 611, ch. 4, para. 18. And see ch. 
3, para. 3, and ch. 4, para. 19. 
      86  Peace Support Operations, supra, note 611, ch. 3, para. 2. 
      87  Peace Support Operations, supra, note 611, ch. 3, para. 5. 
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Several comments on the diagram are in order. First, the consent 
divide is rather less abrupt than the vertical "CONSENT" bar 
would suggest, although the text accompanying the diagram helps 
convey a more nuanced picture. Thus, as indicated previously, 
while full consent is a feature of peace-keeping alone, consent 
also plays a role in peace enforcement, both in shaping the 
"volatile" environments to which peace enforcement operations 
will often be deployed and in defining an objective to be 
pursued. As the diagram shows, the impartiality divide, by 
contrast, is abrupt. While both peace-keeping and peace 
enforcement demand a strictly even-handed application of the 
relevant mandate, war, involving a "designated enemy", is 
entirely partial. A further distinction between war and peace 
enforcement, not shown in the diagram, but nonetheless contained 
in the text of the draft manual, is the requirement, in peace 
enforcement, for greater restraint in the use of force given its 
long-term goal of a durable peace. 
 
 
 
 Transitions 
 
 While Peace Support Operations acknowledges the dangers of 
mixing peace-keeping and peace enforcement within the context of 
a single mission,88 it appears relatively comfortable with the 
notion of a deliberate89 transition between the two types of 
 
      88  See Peace Support Operations, supra, note 611, ch. 2, para. 18. 
      89  "The significance and nature of the conceptual divisions separating 
[peace-keeping] from the resource-intensive and combat capable activities 
of [peace enforcement], and [peace enforcement] from war have been 
identified as inexact but critical divides that should only be crossed 
deliberately and after careful preparation." Peace Support Operations, 
supra, note 611, ch. 3, para. 26. And see ch. 3, paras. 9 and 13. 
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operation, especially that from peace enforcement to peace-
keeping (and back again).90 It recognizes that shifting from 
peace-keeping to peace enforcement is more difficult.91 A peace-
keeping operation rendered incapable of fulfilling its mandate 
will often have to be withdrawn from the theatre.92 Yet, a 
transition to peace enforcement, whether as a result of the 
peace-keeping force's reconfiguration or its complete 
replacement by another force, is also an option, provided that 
the new force is able to meet peace enforcement's greater 
operational demands and that other necessary preparations, 
relating, in particular, to the mission's civilian and 
humanitarian components, are made.93
 
 
 
FRENCH MILITARY DOCTRINE 
 
 As of the time of writing (September 1997), the French 
military has yet to publish its doctrine for "peace operations"94 
in final written form. Nevertheless, the Chief of Staff of the 
French armed forces issued general guidelines on the subject in 
March 1995.95 These have served as the basis for several 
subsequent studies and proposals,96 two of which will retain our 
                                                                
      90  See Peace Support Operations, supra, note 611, ch. 1, para. 10, ch. 2, 
para. 12, and ch. 3, paras. 5, 9, 10, and 12. 
      91  See Peace Support Operations, supra, note 611, ch. 3, para. 10. 
      92  See Peace Support Operations, supra, note 611, ch. 2, para. 13, and ch. 
3, para. 9. 
      93  See Peace Support Operations, supra, note 611, ch. 3, paras. 9-10. 
      94  An equivalent expression is used in French military manuals, although 
there is some variation in the particular term used ─ one finds both 
"opérations en faveur de la paix" and "opérations de paix". 
      95  Orientations pour la conception, la préparation, la planification, le 
commandement et l'emploi des forces françaises dans les opérations 
militaires fondées sur une résolution du conseil de sécurité de l'ONU, 
lettre de l'Amiral Jacques Lanxade, Chef d'État-Major des Armées, no. 
165/DEF/EMA/EMP/E.1, le 6 mars 1995 [hereinafter "lettre 165"]. 
      96  Concerning the process of formulation of French military doctrine, see 
Colonel LE NEVEN, "La Communauté doctrinale?", Objectif 21 (Revue du 
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attention in this section: France's response to the UN 
Secretary-General's Supplement to An Agenda for Peace97 and a 
comprehensive study of the employment of land forces in peace 
operations, published in November 1996 by the Centre d'Études et 
de Prospective (État-Major de l'Armée de Terre).98
 
 In contrast to its American and British counterparts, which 
recognize two types of peace operation, namely peace-keeping and 
peace enforcement, French military doctrine recognizes three: 
"maintien de la paix" (peace-keeping); "restauration de la paix" 
(peace restoration); and "imposition de la paix" (peace enforce-
ment),99 all of which are distinct from "war". 
 
 Like the American and British versions, French military 
doctrine stresses the need for greater restraint in the use of 
force in peace operations, as compared with war.100 The goal in 
peace operations is not military victory, as in war, but rather 
securing international peace and respect for international 
law.101 In certain cases, this will require forcibly bringing to 
 
Commandement de la Doctrine et de l'Entraînement), no. 2, 1er semestre, 
1996. 
      97  Supplément à l'Agenda pour la paix ─ Aide-Mémoire français, A/50/869 & 
S/1996/71, 30 janv. 1996, annexe [hereinafter "A/50/869"]. See note 1, 
supra for the reference for the Agenda Supplement. 
      98  Forces terrestres et maîtrise des crises: conception générale de l'emploi 
des forces terrestres dans les opérations extérieures en faveur de la paix, 
de la sécurité, et de l'application du droit international (document 
provisoire), État-Major de l'Armée de Terre, Centre d'Études et de Prospec-
tive, novembre 1996 [hereinafter "Forces terrestres et maîtrise des 
crises"]. 
      99  Lettre 165, supra, note 657, sec. I, 1.1. The equivalent English terms 
are taken from: A/50/869, supra, note 659, Engl. version, pp. 2-3; and 
Forces terrestres et maîtrise des crises, supra, note 660, pp. 73-74. 
      100  Forces terrestres et maîtrise des crises, supra, note 660, pp. 17 and 
49-50. 
      101  See: Livre blanc sur la défense 1994 (Paris, Éditions 10/18, 1994), pp. 
115-16 and 122; Lettre 165, supra, note 657, cover note by Admiral Jacques 
Lanxade (Chief of Staff); Forces terrestres et maîtrise des crises, supra, 
note 660, p. 17 (note also the subtitle of this publication: "Conception 
générale de l'emploi des forces terrestres dans les opérations extérieures 
en faveur de la paix, de la sécurité, et de l'application du droit interna-
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heel, but not destroying, a designated adversary.102
 
 
 
 
 "Maintien de la paix" 
 
 The French concept of peace-keeping, like its American and 
British counterparts, is faithful to the traditional model 
developed by the UN during the Cold War. Thus, the use of force 
is limited to self-defence103 and full consent104 and impartial-
ity105 are considered indispensable. 
 
 
 
 "Restauration de la paix" 
 
 In contrast to peace-keeping operations, deployed following 
the cessation of hostilities, peace restoration operations are 
sent to environments characterized by ongoing armed conflict or 
general instability.106 Peace restoration aims at ending, or at 
least moderating, these hostilities.107 Conflict moderation 
involves, in particular, the protection of threatened 
 
tional"). 
      102  Forces terrestres et maîtrise des crises, supra, note 660, p. 49. And 
see the discussion of the French concept of "peace enforcement", infra. 
      103  See: Lettre 165, supra, note 657, sec. I, 1.2.1; Forces terrestres et 
maîtrise des crises, supra, note 660, pp. 32-33. 
      104  See: Lettre 165, supra, note 657, sec. I, 1.1 (definition of peace-
keeping); Forces terrestres et maîtrise des crises, supra, note 660, pp. 25 
and 31. 
      105  See Forces terrestres et maîtrise des crises, supra, note 660, pp. 31-
32. 
      106  Lettre 165, supra, note 657, sec. I, subsecs. 1.1, 1.2.1, and 1.2.2. 
A/50/869, supra, note 659, pp. 2-3. Forces terrestres et maîtrise des 
crises, supra, note 660, p. 39. 
      107  Lettre 165, supra, note 657, sec. I, subsecs. 1.1 and 1.2.2, and sec. 
II, 2.1. A/50/869, supra, note 659, p. 2. Forces terrestres et maîtrise des 
crises, ibid. 
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populations through such missions as the organization of refugee 
returns, ensuring the free movement of humanitarian convoys, and 
establishing and maintaining safe areas and no-fly zones.108
 
 While the use of force is authorized for such purposes,109 
as with US and UK military doctrine, it must be carefully 
controlled and closely tailored to the specific objectives being 
pursued.110 As for consent, the Chief of Staff's guidelines 
simply state that a military intervention launched for purposes 
of peace restoration is not subject to the approval of the 
warring factions: 
 
L'intervention militaire pour favoriser le retour de la paix dans 
un pays déstabilisé, selon les dispositions d'ordre coercitif du 
chapitre VII, ne peut être assimilée à une simple opération de 
maintien de la paix. En effet, notamment lorsqu'il s'agit 
d'assurer la sécurité des populations, il n'est plus question de 
s'interposer sur une base consensuelle, ...111
 
Subsequent doctrinal work specifies that, while consent is 
typically present in peace restoration, it is artificial, 
incomplete, and/or unstable.112 These same sources emphasize the 
importance of strengthening the consensual basis for peace 
restoration operations through such means as negotiation and 
assistance to civilian populations.113
 
 
      108  Lettre 165, ibid. A/50/869, supra, note 659, pp. 2-3. Forces terrestres 
et maîtrise des crises, ibid. 
      109  Lettre 165, supra, note 657, sec. I, 1.2.2. A/50/869, ibid.  Forces 
terrestres et maîtrise des crises, supra, note 660, pp. 41-42. 
      110  See: A/50/869, supra, note 659, p. 3; Forces terrestres et maîtrise des 
crises, supra, note 660, pp. 18 and 42. 
      111  Lettre 165, supra, note 657, sec. I, 1.2.2. And see A/50/869, supra, 
note 659, p. 3. 
      112  See: Forces terrestres et maîtrise des crises, supra, note 660, pp. 25 
and 39-40; A/50/869, supra, note 659, p. 3. 
      113  Forces terrestres et maîtrise des crises, supra, note 660, p. 40. 
A/50/869, supra, note 659, pp. 2-3. 
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 In peace restoration, there is no designated adversary.114 A 
peace restoration operation is "impartial" though not "neu-
tral".115 As with American and British doctrine concerning "peace 
enforcement", impartiality in peace restoration means the even-
handed implementation of the mandate. The peace restoration 
force ensures that all parties comply, to the same extent, with 
the terms of the mandate, even though in practice this may prove 
more detrimental to certain parties than to others.116
 
Observatrice du statu quo dans les opérations de maintien de la 
paix, [la force de paix] est, dans le cadre des opérations de 
restauration de la paix, l'arbitre des manquements commis par les 
belligérants à l'encontre du respect du mandat, lequel constitue 
une règle supérieure de droit qui s'impose à tous et dont la force 
de paix est chargée de faire respecter les termes.117
 
 
 
 "Imposition de la paix" 
 
 In contrast to both peace-keeping and peace restoration, 
there is a "designated adversary" in "peace enforcement".118 
Peace enforcement aims, not to destroy that adversary, but 
rather to force a change of behaviour which disrupts 
international peace and/or violates international law.119 
 
      114  Lettre 165, supra, note 657, sec. I, 1.1. Forces terrestres et maîtrise 
des crises, supra, note 660, pp. 25 and 39. 
      115  Lettre 165, supra, note 657, sec. II, 2.2. A/50/869, supra, note 659, p. 
3. Forces terrestres et maîtrise des crises, supra, note 660, p. 40. Note 
that none of the sources of French military doctrine used in this chapter 
define "neutrality" or otherwise make its meaning clear. 
      116  See: A/50/869, supra, note 659, p. 3; Forces terrestres et maîtrise des 
crises, supra, note 660, pp. 39-41. 
      117  Forces terrestres et maîtrise des crises, supra, note 660, p. 39 
(emphasis in the original). 
      118  ─ "adversaire désigné". Forces terrestres et maîtrise des crises, supra, 
note 660, p. 25. And see Lettre 165, supra, note 657, sec. I, 1.1. 
      119  Forces terrestres et maîtrise des crises, supra, note 660, p. 49. Lettre 
165, supra, note 657, secs. I, 1.1 and II, 2.1. 
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Specific scenarios include: bringing an act of interstate 
aggression to a halt;120 forcing an aggressor to participate in a 
process of peaceful dispute settlement;121 and preventing a state 
from committing acts of repression or violence against part of 
its own population.122
 
 A peace enforcement force makes use of the full range of 
means normally used in full-scale combat operations.123 Neverthe-
less, the use of force must be closely tailored to the specific 
objective being pursued which, again, is not to destroy the 
target state or faction, but rather to compel it to change its 
unlawful behaviour. Escalation to extreme force levels, 
especially those involving the use of weapons of mass destruc-
tion, is to be scrupulously avoided.124
 
 There is no consent in peace enforcement.125 The target's 
opposition to the change in behaviour the international 
community demands of it is what renders the peace enforcement 
operation necessary in the first place. Finally, with respect to 
impartiality, it has already been noted that the existence of a 
designated adversary is central to the French concept of peace 
enforcement. In contrast to peace-keeping and peace restoration, 
peace enforcement is entirely partial.126
 
      120  Lettre 165, supra, note 657, sec. I, 1.2.3. Forces terrestres et 
maîtrise des crises, ibid. The example given in these documents is the 
international community's response to Iraq's invasion and annexation of 
Kuwait (1990-91). 
      121  Forces terrestres et maîtrise des crises, ibid. 
      122  Lettre 165, supra, note 657, sec. I, 1.2.3. Forces terrestres et 
maîtrise des crises, ibid. The example given in these documents is of the 
humanitarian intervention launched in favour of Iraqi Kurds following the 
end of the Gulf War in 1991. 
      123  See Forces terrestres et maîtrise des crises, supra, note 660, pp. 49-
51. 
      124  Forces terrestres et maîtrise des crises, supra, note 660, pp. 49-50. 
      125  Forces terrestres et maîtrise des crises, supra, note 660, p. 25. 
      126  See: Lettre 165, supra, note 657, sec. I, subsecs. 1.1 and 1.2.3; Forces 
terrestres et maîtrise des crises, ibid. 
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 Distinctions 
 
 The main distinctions between the various kinds of military 
operations just described may be summarized as follows.127 The 
distinction between peace enforcement and war in French military 
doctrine is a relatively fine one. In neither of these is there 
consent or impartiality. The use of force is more restrained in 
peace enforcement, as opposed to war, in that any such use must 
be harnessed quite narrowly to the specific objective being 
pursued and extreme levels of violence, especially involving the 
use of weapons of mass destruction, are to be avoided. Yet, the 
main distinction between peace enforcement and war centres on 
purpose. In peace enforcement, the aim is to bring to an end 
conduct which disrupts international peace and/or violates 
international law, not to achieve military victory as such. 
 
 The principal distinctions between the three categories of 
peace operation can be analyzed in terms of the three criteria  
of the use of force, consent, and impartiality. The use of force 
in peace-keeping is limited to self-defence. While both peace 
restoration and peace enforcement involve enforcement, this is 
subject to rules of restraint similar to those seen in respect 
of US and UK military doctrine. French doctrine considers 
consent to be full in peace-keeping, artificial, incomplete, 
and/or unstable in peace restoration, and completely absent in 
peace enforcement. Both peace-keeping and peace restoration 
require impartiality, in contrast with peace enforcement which 
is premised on the designation of an "adversary", or target 
state or faction. 
 
 
 
 Transitions 
 
 
      127  For a graphical representation of some of these distinctions, see Forces 
terrestres et maîtrise des crises, supra, note 660, p. 25. 
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 French doctrine allows for the possibility of transition 
from peace-keeping to peace operations of a coercive nature. In 
fact, it advocates equipping peace-keeping forces, not only for 
self-defence, but also for combat in case such a transition 
becomes necessary, though the doctrine also emphasizes that 
until a decision to change the nature of the operation has been 
taken, a peace-keeping force, though equipped for combat, 
remains strictly non-coercive in nature. Like its American and 
British counterparts, French military doctrine stresses that any 
transition from peace-keeping to a coercive peace operation must 
be the product of a deliberate decision in which all the risks 
inherent in such a shift are carefully weighed. The withdrawal 
of the peace-keeping force from the theatre of operations is 
always an option.128
 
 French doctrine also admits the possibility of transition 
from peace restoration to peace enforcement, notably as a result 
of a loss of impartiality in the former (designation of an 
adversary), though this should only follow a careful assessment 
of the political costs (specifically, the abandonment of certain 
of the peace restoration force's tasks) and military require-
ments (necessary force restructuring) involved.129
 
 
 
CONCLUSION130
 
 The extent to which the military doctrines of the US, UK 
and France converge in respect of peace operations is quite 
striking. Each of the three states defines peace-keeping, in 
line with the traditional UN concept, as a strictly non-coercive 
                                                                
      128  Lettre 165, supra, note 657, sec. I, 1.2.1. And see Forces terrestres et 
maîtrise des crises, supra, note 660, pp. 33-34. 
      129  A/50/869, supra, note 659, p. 3. Forces terrestres et maîtrise des 
crises, supra, note 660, p. 42. 
      130  Note that the points made in the following section are derived 
exclusively from the analysis of national military doctrine undertaken 
earlier in this chapter, together with the sources cited in that 
connection. 
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activity in which the use of force is limited to self-defence, 
and full consent and impartiality are considered essential. 
 
 At the other end of the military operations spectrum, one 
finds "war", characterized by the existence of a predetermined 
adversary (no impartiality) and a total lack of consent. Sharing 
these same characteristics, the French concept of "peace 
enforcement" also occupies this end of the spectrum. Neverthe-
less, the French version of "peace enforcement" is distinct from 
"war" in the additional constraints it faces with respect to the 
use of force and in its more limited aim of compelling a change 
of behaviour in, as opposed to destroying or disabling, the 
target state or faction. The French concept of "peace enforce-
ment" finds no equivalent in current UK doctrine and only a hint 
of an equivalent in its US counterpart;131 yet all three states 
again demonstrate a surprising degree of consensus in mapping 
out the middle ground of the military operations spectrum. 
 
 Taking, then, the American and British versions of "peace 
enforcement" together with the French concept of "peace restora-
tion", we find rough agreement as to the function of these 
operations, namely to maintain or restore peace and order in 
situations of armed conflict or general instability. The French 
military puts particular emphasis on the protection of 
threatened populations in its formulation of the middle ground 
function, yet this is perfectly consistent with the American and 
British approaches. All three states list the establishment and 
maintenance of protected zones as a potential task of these 
operations. 
 
 Convergence among the three military doctrines is particu-
larly close when it comes to describing the characteristics of 
middle ground activity. All three states agree that these 
operations are authorized to use force to implement their 
mandates, but that this enforcement authority is subject to the 
requirement of restraint, including the need to closely tailor 
any use of force to the specific objectives being pursued. 
 
 
      131  See note 598, supra. 
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 Although the situation in respect of consent is described 
in rather different terms by the three military doctrines, there 
is general agreement that it plays at least some role in middle 
ground operations. Consent, in this context, is artificial, 
incomplete, imperfect and/or unstable and thus can never be 
counted upon. Nevertheless, all three states stress the need to 
try to nurture and strengthen whatever consensual framework is 
present in the theatre of operations. 
 
 There is some discrepancy among the three doctrines 
concerning the importance of impartiality to the middle ground, 
though overall agreement in this area is nonetheless strong. 
While the UK and France see impartiality as indispensable to 
middle ground operations, the US merely considers it "desir-
able", expressing a willingness to do without it, should circum-
stances so dictate. Part of this difference appears to stem from 
the US belief, which the UK shares, that the impartiality ─ or, 
at least, perceived impartiality ─ of these operations will be 
difficult to sustain in practice. In any case, all three states 
understand impartiality to mean the even-handed implementation 
of the mandate, which means that the actions of the force are 
motivated by one concern ─ to ensure that all parties comply 
with the terms of the mandate. 
 
 Whether implicitly or explicitly, the three military 
doctrines recognize that peace-keeping and enforcement action 
must not be mixed; peace-keeping and the middle ground are seen 
as clearly distinct categories. All three doctrines admit, 
however, the possibility of transitions from one type of 
operation to the other, provided these are deliberate and 
properly prepared. 
7  A DEFINITION OF PEACE ENFORCEMENT 
 
 
 The first step in our elaboration in this chapter of an 
operational definition of peace enforcement involves a brief 
review and analysis of the case studies undertaken in chapters 
2 to 5. 
 
 The United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC) did not 
provide any real basis for the post-Cold War development and 
application of the concept of peace enforcement. The selective 
attribution of enforcement or quasi-enforcement functions to a 
force initially mandated for peace-keeping had little value as 
a long-term precedent, although the confusion between peace-
keeping and enforcement action reflected in ONUC did carry over 
into the adoption for subsequent UN peace-keeping operations of 
an extended formulation of the self-defence principle. We saw 
in both chapters 3 (UNOSOM I) and 4 (UNPROFOR) that, although 
the latter formulation has consistently figured in the mandates 
of peace-keeping operations, it has had little or no practical 
effect on peace-keeping practice, which has remained non-
coercive. 
 
 As described in chapter 1,1 the concept of peace enforce-
ment sketched out in paragraph 44 of An Agenda for Peace and 
the related Foreign Affairs article has three principal charac-
teristics. First, it involves enforcement action, i.e. the use 
of force beyond that for self-defence. Second, peace 
enforcement operations are conducted in environments of 
imperfect consent. Although the warring parties have agreed to 
the objectives the peace enforcement operation is mandated to 
secure (for example, a cease-fire), they subsequently fail, or 
can be expected to fail, to abide by these commitments. 
Finally, these operations are impartial as between the warring 
factions. Action is taken only to ensure compliance by the 
parties with their commitments. 
 
 Somalia was the setting for the first trial of the 
                                                               
      1  See first pages of "Peace Enforcement" section in that chapter, supra. 
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concept, specifically in the form of the second United Nations 
Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) which, along with the 
Implementation Force (IFOR) and Stabilization Force (SFOR) 
operations in Bosnia, constitutes the closest application of 
the chapter 1 model among the case studies. The Unified Task 
Force (UNITAF), deployed to Somalia just in advance of UNOSOM 
II, also shares the characteristics of peace enforcement 
mentioned above, except for the absence of prior consent. The 
operation was imposed on the Somali factions, though UNITAF, 
like IFOR and SFOR, worked to promote party cooperation in 
pursuing its goals. 
 
 From 1992-95, Bosnia-Herzegovina was the setting for a 
disastrous experiment in mixing peace-keeping and enforcement 
action, even, in the case of the protection of the safe areas, 
within the context of the same task. Neither the enforcement 
component of the safe areas mission nor the NATO operation to 
enforce compliance with the no-fly zone can be said to approxi-
mate the model of peace enforcement derived from the 1992 
Agenda given the lack of impartiality in the two measures as 
conceived ─ both being directed, in reality, against the 
Bosnian Serbs. The safe areas mission involved a direct denial 
of Bosnian Serb war aims, while the enforcement of the no-fly 
zone involved the elimination of the Bosnian Serb advantage in 
air power. The IFOR and SFOR operations, deployed to Bosnia to 
secure implementation of the Dayton accords, have, by contrast, 
been impartial as between the three Bosnian factions and will 
ground, in part, our analysis of the characteristics of peace 
enforcement.  
 
 ──── 
 
 Four of the operations we have studied thus far conform to 
the model of peace enforcement sketched out in chapter 1: 
UNITAF, UNOSOM II, IFOR and SFOR. In each case, we have an 
enforcement mandate, imperfect consent and impartiality. While 
our set of cases is thus limited to only two conflict zones, 
this is entirely sufficient to the task at hand ─ involving the 
elaboration of an operational definition of peace enforcement 
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on the basis of politically influential practice. In fact, the 
successes and failures of the operations in Somalia and Bosnia 
have largely determined the course of UN-sanctioned enforcement 
action in the 1990s. This evolution has involved, on the one 
hand, a marked shift away from UN-conducted enforcement action 
towards military enforcement which, though authorized by the 
UN, is conducted by regional organizations or ad hoc coalitions 
of interested states. At the same time, the 1990s has seen the 
progressive sharpening of the distinction between peace-keeping 
and peace operations of an enforcement nature. 
 
 Not coincidentally, the US, UK and France have been the 
key players in the operations reviewed in chapters 3 to 5. The 
armed forces of all three countries have taken the leading 
roles in the IFOR and SFOR operations in Bosnia. The US took 
the lead in the UNITAF and UNOSOM II (peace enforcement phase) 
operations in Somalia with strong French participation. The 
UK's involvement in Somalia was limited to a modest supporting 
role vis-à-vis UNITAF. 
 
 This emphasis in the dissertation on operations involving 
joint US-UK-French participation explains the exclusion from 
the study of Opération Turquoise and the ECOMOG enforcement 
operation, in Rwanda and Liberia respectively. Multinational 
participation in Opération Turquoise, mounted by France in June 
1994 in the late stages of the Rwandan genocide, was limited to 
Senegal and Guinea Bissau. Western industrialized countries 
held differing views on the French operation, but did not, in 
any case, participate in it, limiting its value as precedent. 
The ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) was created by the 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in August 
1990 for the purpose of taming the Liberian civil war. This was 
a West African force, comprised of contingents from various 
states in the sub-region, with Nigeria in a leading role. 
 
 Also excluded from the dissertation are the military 
operations mounted by the Russian Federation over the course of 
the 1990s in various Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) 
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countries.2 Independent of the question of relative Russian 
influence in the post-Cold War world, none of the Russian 
"peace missions" appears to have much value as broad precedent 
given, in particular, their lack of true multinational 
composition and their departure from established norms, even 
when moulded on traditional lines.3 In any case, the forces in 
Georgia (South Ossetia and Abkhazia) and Moldova (Transdnestr) 
have been peace-keeping forces ─ at least in the sense that 
they have been largely non-coercive in nature. While the fourth 
operation, undertaken in Tajikistan, has had an enforcement 
component, it has strayed rather far from the middle ground 
sketched out in the 1992 Agenda for Peace as a result, notably, 
of its lack of impartiality; the force has assisted one party, 
the Government of Tajikistan, against its armed opponents. 
 
 Also absent from the case studies is the United Nations 
Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM), though the US, UK and 
France have all provided military personnel to it. The Force 
has been mandated, since February 1993, to prevent violations 
of the demilitarized zone and of the newly demarcated border 
between Iraq and Kuwait, yet does not have enforcement powers. 
It is a peace-keeping force.4
 
 In contrast to peace-keeping, the practical and theoreti-
cal development of an enforcement option within the peace 
operations spectrum has necessarily rested with those states 
possessing the requisite political influence and military 
capability. As we saw in chapter 6, US, UK and French military 
doctrine recognize a type of peace operation with the same 
characteristics as the chapter 1 model of peace enforcement and 
the four cases conforming to the same. Practice has strongly 
 
      2  The following discussion relies on: Victor-Yves GHEBALI, L'OSCE dans 
l'Europe post-communiste, 1990-1996 (Bruxelles, Émile Bruylant, 1996), pp. 
323-28; Anthony KELLETT, "Soviet and Russian Peacekeeping 1948-1998: 
Historical Overview and Assessment", The Journal of Slavic Military 
Studies, vol. 12, no. 2, June 1999. 
      3  See: Ghebali, ibid., pp. 326-27; Kellett, ibid., pp. 13-41. 
      4  See: S/25123, 18 Jan. 1993, paras. 5, 10 and 12; SCR 806, 5 Feb. 1993. 
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influenced the development of military doctrine,5 so the close 
compatibility we find between the two is hardly surprising. 
This link between practice and doctrine, coupled with the fact 
that the US, UK and France have tended to work together in the 
peace enforcement operations under consideration, also 
explains, in large measure, why these countries have taken 
substantially the same approach in their military doctrine to 
the heretofore contentious issue of a middle ground in peace 
operations. 
 
 ──── 
 
 It is submitted that the question implicitly raised in the 
1992 Agenda and debated by scholars before and since the 
latter's publication, concerning the existence and characteris-
tics of a middle ground in peace operations, has now been 
settled. We shall call the middle ground "peace enforcement" in 
line with the 1992 Agenda and US and UK military doctrine. 
 
 The case studies and military doctrine previously examined 
reveal that peace enforcement involves, quite simply, the 
enforcement of peace. As articulated in US, UK and French 
military doctrine, the basic mission of a peace enforcement 
operation is to maintain or restore peace and order in 
situations of armed conflict or general instability. A common 
function of the four peace enforcement operations identified as 
such above was the enforcement of a cease-fire and related 
disarmament or weapons control process among belligerent 
factions. Within the context of their broad mandate to ensure 
the implementation of the Dayton accords, IFOR and SFOR have 
had the widest range of functions of any of the four peace 
enforcement operations ─ including tasks of a civilian nature 
governing freedom of movement, the return of refugees and 
displaced persons, and the arrest of indicted war crimes 
suspects ─ yet these have had the same underlying aim as their 
other peace enforcement functions, namely the restoration and 
 
      5  With respect to the UK, see chapter 6, text accompanying notes 616-17, 
supra. 
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preservation of peace. 
 
 Certain of the enforcement measures examined in chapters 
3-5, while sharing the conflict-dampening rationale of those 
described above, had a specific, humanitarian focus. One such 
measure, a component of both the UNITAF and UNOSOM II mandates 
examined in chapter 3, was the protection of relief assistance. 
Two others, studied in chapter 4, were the joint UN-NATO 
mission for the protection of the Bosnian safe areas and the 
enforcement, by NATO, of the no-fly zone over Bosnia. While, as 
previously explained, failing the test of impartiality, neither 
of the latter measures can be characterized as peace 
enforcement, one could envisage a broad range of humanitarian 
measures, including the establishment and supervision of 
protected zones or weapons exclusion zones, which would be 
impartial and thus constitute peace enforcement. 
 
 The first characteristic of peace enforcement is, as the 
name indicates, its enforcement nature. A force mandated for 
peace enforcement is authorized to use force beyond that for 
self-defence; for the purposes set out in its mandate, it may 
take the initiative in the use of force. Nevertheless, the 
exercise of these enforcement powers is subject to the require-
ment of restraint. This means, in the first instance, that 
force is to be used only as a last resort; armed confrontation 
with the belligerent factions is to be avoided wherever 
possible. Second, where force has to be used, it must be 
closely tailored to the specific objectives being pursued. 
Peace enforcers are to use only such force as is necessary to 
accomplish the task at hand, keeping civilian casualties and 
unintended property damage (so-called "collateral damage") to 
an absolute minimum. While, as explained in chapter 3,6 this 
policy also applied to UNOSOM II, some of the measures it took 
for the purpose of capturing, and even assassinating, faction 
leader Aideed seriously undermined it. None of the other peace 
enforcement operations studied earlier was involved in armed 
clashes of such scale. 
 
      6  See "UNOSOM II: The Use of Force" section, supra. 
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 The second characteristic of peace enforcement is 
imperfect consent. A peace enforcement operation will typically 
encounter some degree of consent on the part of the belligerent 
factions ─ both to the objectives whose fulfilment the 
operation is mandated to enforce and to that same enforcement 
mandate. This consent is often expressed in the form of a 
comprehensive peace agreement aimed at a final settlement of 
the particular conflict. Nevertheless, such consent is, or can 
be expected to reveal itself as being, imperfect: i.e., 
incomplete, artificial and/or unstable. 
 
 The basic problem, seen in the case of the UNOSOM II and 
I/SFOR operations, is that the formal peace agreement masks the 
underlying opposition of one or more factions to the peace 
process and/or the peace enforcers' role in it. Even though, in 
an extreme case, such as that faced by UNOSOM II, such 
opposition can give rise to open, armed rebellion against the 
peace enforcement operation, the latter typically retains the 
support of other factions and other groups within the 
particular society. Consent, though not full and continuous, as 
in peace-keeping, is never wholly absent either. 
 
 Although, as just indicated, consent in peace enforcement 
can never be counted upon, both practice and military doctrine 
stress the importance of trying to preserve and strengthen 
whatever consent is present in the theatre of operations. Thus, 
the cooperation of concerned parties in the fulfilment of 
mission objectives is solicited through a continuing process of 
dialogue and discussion designed to enhance trust, promote 
understanding of the mandate, and resolve problems arising in 
respect of mandate implementation in the simplest possible way. 
UNOSOM II, criticized by many observers for its more 
confrontational tactics, was again the exception among the four 
peace enforcement operations in this regard. Yet, it must be 
noted that the largely successful efforts of the three other 
operations to promote party cooperation invariably relied on 
the implicit, and occasionally explicit, threat of enforcement 
action. 
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 The third characteristic of peace enforcement is 
impartiality, understood as the even-handed implementation of a 
mandate which does not, in some sense, target a particular 
faction (as in the cases of no-fly zone and safe areas 
enforcement in Bosnia-Herzegovina) but is, rather, of general 
application. "Even-handed implementation" means that the force 
bases all action on the sole fact of party compliance or non-
compliance with the mandate. The peace enforcement operation 
has no prior bias against or in favour of any faction, but 
requires simply that each comply, to the same extent, with the 
terms of the mandate. 
 
 Even though a peace enforcement operation is rigorously 
even-handed in implementing a mandate of general application, 
it will often affect the prevailing balance of power among the 
factions or between the factions and other actors in the 
society, especially where it has to use force against an 
exceptionally recalcitrant party, as in the case of UNOSOM II. 
While this does not negate the actual impartiality of the 
force, it does make it difficult for it to sustain the 
perception of impartiality from the standpoint of the factions, 
especially those most affected by its actions. Both UNOSOM II's 
harsh military campaign against the USC/SNA and SFOR's efforts 
to back one group of Bosnian Serbs seen as more inclined to 
cooperate in the implementation of the Dayton accords were, it 
has been argued, impartial in the sense described above, yet 
they were not always perceived as such. 
 
 Before situating peace enforcement within the wider 
spectrum of military operations, brief mention should be made 
of the relationship between the three characteristics of peace 
enforcement. It is precisely the lack of the full and 
continuous consent found in peace-keeping which makes an 
enforcement mandate necessary in the case of the middle ground. 
Yet, to the extent that a peace enforcement operation succeeds 
in preserving and strengthening the limited consensual 
framework present in the theatre of operations, it can, for all 
practical purposes, dispense with ─ i.e., hold in reserve ─ the 
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actual use of force, though the threat of such use remains a 
powerful tool for securing party cooperation in the fulfilment 
of mission objectives. The task of preserving and strengthening 
the existing consensual framework is, in turn, assisted by a 
peace enforcement operation's continuing restraint in using 
force and by its impartiality. 
 
 ──── 
 
 The national military doctrine examined in chapter 6 
articulates, with remarkable consistency among the three states 
studied, a spectrum of military operations which stretches from 
peace-keeping, at one end, through peace enforcement, in the 
middle, to a third category of peace operations (according to 
French doctrine) and war (according to all three doctrines), at 
the other end of the spectrum. 
 
 Peace-keeping, involving the non-use of force except in 
self-defence, full consent and impartiality, occupies the non-
coercive end of this spectrum. At the other end, one finds 
enforcement operations conducted in the total absence of 
consent against a pre-determined adversary (no impartiality). 
Thus, peace enforcement, in a very real sense, occupies a 
"middle ground". Unlike peace-keeping, but like the opposite 
end of the spectrum, it involves enforcement; like peace-
keeping, but unlike the other end of the spectrum, it is 
impartial in nature. It occupies a middle ground with respect 
to consent in that peace enforcement operations are deployed in 
environments where consent is imperfect (incomplete, artificial 
and/or unstable), unlike peace-keeping where consent is 
typically full and continuous or the other end of the spectrum 
where consent is wholly absent. 
 
 While the characteristics of enforcement and impartiality 
serve as relatively sharp dividing lines between peace enforce-
ment and other kinds of military operation, that of consent may 
not ─ at least not within the operational / political framework 
of the present chapter. Consent has often been less than 
perfect or stable in peace-keeping. Examples, which are 
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numerous, include the UNPROFOR and UNTAC missions mentioned in 
chapter 1.7 Nevertheless, if the loss or lack of consent in 
peace-keeping is too great, peace-keeping becomes untenable 
and, if mission objectives are to be fulfilled, it must be 
replaced with something else ─ for example, peace enforcement. 
No sharp line distinguishes the level of consent needed for 
peace-keeping, as opposed to peace enforcement, yet the two 
regimes are distinct. The degree of consent found in any viable 
peace-keeping operation will exceed that found in peace 
enforcement. 
 
 This scheme, obviously, leaves no room for the mixing of 
peace-keeping and enforcement action, widely discredited since 
the disastrous joint UN-NATO mission for the protection of the 
Bosnian safe areas. Recent practice8 and the military doctrine 
do, however, admit the possibility of deliberate transitions 
between the different categories of peace operations enumerated 
above. 
 
 While our subject of study is, obviously, the mid-point of 
the military operations spectrum, it is worth commenting 
briefly on the characteristics of the far end, characterized by 
the prior designation of an adversary or target. In place of 
the term "imposition de la paix" ("peace enforcement"), used in 
French doctrine, we will employ the term "military sanctions" 
to refer to the third category of peace operations described in 
that doctrine. There are, in fact, important distinctions to be 
made between military sanctions and "war" which, until now, we 
have lumped together at the one end of the spectrum. 
 
 Specifically, as described in French doctrine, military 
sanctions aim, not to destroy a target state or faction, but 
rather to force a change of behaviour which disrupts interna-
tional peace and/or violates international law.9 Examples 
 
      7  See text accompanying notes 48-50, supra. 
      8  See "Conclusion: The Role of Peace Enforcement", pp. 222-23, infra. 
      9  Note that former UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali and the UN Security 
Council have both affirmed that the modification of behaviour, not 
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include bringing an act of inter-state aggression to a halt and 
preventing a state from committing acts of repression or 
violence against part of its own population. The means employed 
for such ends are limited. The use of force is closely tailored 
to the specific objectives being pursued, while escalation to 
extreme force levels, especially those involving the use of 
weapons of mass destruction, is scrupulously avoided. 
 
 As outlined in the military doctrine governing peace 
operations, examined in chapter 6, such constraints do not bind 
"war" where the aim is the achievement of military victory, 
including, where necessary, the disabling or destruction of 
one's adversary. The methods used in war also appear free of 
the requirement of restraint which controls the use of force in 
all peace operations (peace enforcement and military 
sanctions). 
 
 An interesting legal question arises with respect to the 
category of war, namely whether its goals and methods, as 
defined in contemporary military doctrine, are compatible with 
international law (jus ad bellum, jus in bello). In the age of 
the United Nations Charter, governing the recourse to force in 
international relations, and the Hague and Geneva conventions, 
governing the conduct of international and internal armed 
conflict, one would assume that the category of war is no 
longer valid, leaving military sanctions alone at the end point 
of our military operations (in fact, peace operations) 
spectrum. Yet, considering the peripheral nature of this 
question to our subject, we will leave aside the comprehensive 
examination of law and military doctrine which would be 
required to answer it definitively. We will, instead, retain 
our focus on the middle ground, complementing the definition of 
peace enforcement offered in this chapter with a determination 
of its legal basis in the next. 
 
punishment, is the purpose of economic sanctions. See: Agenda Supplement, 
supra, note 1, para. 66; S/PRST/1995/9, 22 Feb. 1995. 
8  THE LEGAL BASIS 
OF PEACE ENFORCEMENT 
 
 
 Our task in this chapter is to identify the legal basis of 
the UN Security Council's power to establish and conduct ─ or 
authorize others to establish and conduct ─ peace enforcement 
operations. Our frame of reference in the course of this enquiry 
will be the constituent instrument of the United Nations, namely 
the UN Charter.1 An Agenda for Peace (June 1992)2 was the former 
UN Secretary-General's response to the request made to him by 
the Security Council at its summit meeting of 31 January 1992: 
 
to prepare ... his analysis and recommendations on ways of 
strengthening and making more efficient within the framework and 
provisions of the Charter the capacity of the United Nations for 
preventive diplomacy, for peacemaking and for peace-keeping.3
 
As Thierry has noted, this excluded the question of Charter 
reform from consideration and meant that the proposals made by 
the Secretary-General, including that for the creation of peace-
enforcement units, were to be in conformity with the Charter.4
 
 As the definition of peace enforcement enunciated in 
chapter 7 did not stray, in its fundamentals, from that derived 
from paragraph 44 of the 1992 Agenda in chapter 1, it is entire-
ly appropriate to take the UN Charter as the framework for our 
legal analysis. While the Security Council statement quoted 
above does not predetermine the question of peace enforcement's 
compatibility with the Charter, we will see, notwithstanding the 
                                                                
      1  Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of 
Justice, San Francisco, 26 June 1945 (reprinted in UNDPI, DPI/511, 1990). 
      2  Supra, note 4. 
      3  S/23500, 31 Jan. 1992 (emphasis added). 
      4  Hubert THIERRY, "L'«Agenda pour la Paix» et la Charte des Nations Unies" 
(DANS Le développement du rôle du Conseil de Sécurité (Colloque de 
l'Académie de Droit International de la Haye, 21-23 juillet 1992), éd. par 
R.-J. Dupuy, Dordrecht, The Netherlands, Martinus Nijhoff, 1993), p. 376. 
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scepticism of some commentators,5 that the UN Charter, as it 
stands, furnishes an entirely adequate legal basis for peace 
enforcement operations. 
 
 Note that our focus will lie, exclusively, with the 
Security Council. It is no coincidence that all of the military 
enforcement operations examined in chapters 2 to 5 were estab-
lished or authorized on the basis of Security Council resol-
utions. The Council is, in fact, the only UN organ empowered to 
take enforcement action6 for the purpose of maintaining or 
restoring international peace and security, specifically within 
the framework of chapter VII of the Charter. 
 
 It was the General Assembly which established the First 
United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I, 1956-67), typically 
considered to mark the beginning of UN peace-keeping.7 Its power 
to do so under the Charter was confirmed by the International 
Court of Justice in its Certain Expenses case8 and most probably 
subsists to this day, though the Security Council has long since 
 
      5  See, for example: David RAMSBOTHAM, The Changing Nature of Intervention: 
The Role of UN Peacekeeping (Conflict Studies no. 282, London, Research 
Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, 1995), pp. 2-3. 
      6  Concerning the meaning of the word "enforcement" in the UN Charter, see: 
Michael AKEHURST, "Enforcement Action by Regional Agencies, with Special 
Reference to the Organization of American States", British Yearbook of 
International Law, vol. 42, 1967, pp. 185-88; Leland M. GOODRICH, Edvard 
HAMBRO, and Anne Patricia SIMONS, Charter of the United Nations ─ 
Commentary and Documents (New York, Columbia U. Press, 3rd rev. ed., 1969), 
pp. 365-67. The focus of our analysis is, obviously, military enforcement 
action, as will be indicated in the text where necessary. 
      7  Other UN military missions which predated UNEF I, including the United 
Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO, established in 1948) and the 
United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP, 
established in 1949), are usually put in the separate category of "observer 
missions". Concerning the "launch date" of UN peace-keeping and the 
distinction between observer missions and "peace-keeping forces", see: 
Ratner, supra, note 51, pp. 9-10; Blue Helmets, supra, note 20, pp. 8-9. 
      8  Certain Expenses of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, [1962] ICJ 
Reports 151 [hereinafter "Certain Expenses"], at pp. 163-65 and 172. And 
see Bowett, supra, note 119, pp. 288-90. 
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had a monopoly on the establishment of peace-keeping forces.9 
Nevertheless, peace-keeping, as already explained, does not 
involve enforcement action. General Assembly involvement in the 
enforcement area was effectively ruled out by the International 
Court in the same case which confirmed its powers in respect of 
peace-keeping,10 this notwithstanding the earlier Uniting for 
Peace resolution wherein the Assembly, under certain conditions, 
gave itself the power to recommend military enforcement action 
by member states.11
 
 Security Council practice is of little or no help in our 
search for the Charter basis of peace enforcement. Even during 
the Cold War, the Security Council showed a marked reluctance to 
cite specific Charter articles as the basis for its actions, 
under chapter VII of the Charter, for the maintenance or 
restoration of international peace and security.12 Although 
Security Council activity of this kind increased dramatically 
following the end of the Cold War, especially during the first 
half of the 1990s, Council practice has changed little. With 
rare exceptions,13 Security Council action under chapter VII in 
the post-Cold War period has been signalled by a simple acknowl-
edgement of that fact,14 without more ─ although there are 
 
      9  Recent General Assembly involvement in peace-keeping, broadly defined, 
has been limited to the authorization of a handful of electoral and human 
rights missions. See Ratner, supra, note 51, pp. 56 and 63. 
      10  Certain Expenses, supra, note 710, pp. 164-65 and 171. 
      11  See GAR 377 (V), 3 Nov. 1950, part A, sec. A. 
      12  Thus, the Security Council resolutions which established ONUC and defined 
its mandate (see ch. 2) do not indicate the Force's legal basis. And see: 
Goodrich, Hambro and Simons, supra, note 708, p. 303; Thomas BRUHA, 
"Security Council" (IN United Nations: Law, Policies and Practice, ed. by 
R. Wolfrum and C. Philipp, Dordrecht, The Netherlands, Martinus Nijhoff, 
1995), p. 1150. 
      13  One notable exception is Resolution 660 (2 Aug. 1990), adopted just hours 
after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, in which the Council specifies Charter 
articles 39 and 40 as the legal basis (preambular para. 3) for its demand 
for an immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi forces (para. 2). 
      14  The typical formulation is: "Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of 
the United Nations". 
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instances where not even this is on offer.15
 
 In the face of the Security Council's persistent failure to 
enunciate the legal basis of its actions under chapter VII, 
legal scholars, in certain instances, have sought to fill the 
gap. At this point in our analysis, it becomes necessary to 
distinguish between those peace enforcement operations which 
remain under UN command and control, as was the case with UNOSOM 
II, and those peace enforcement operations which, while author-
ized by the UN, are commanded by others, specifically: 
individual states acting alone or in concert with one or two 
others;16 ad hoc coalitions;17 or regional organizations such as 
NATO.18 We will first look at UN-conducted peace enforcement 
operations, leaving the subject of their UN-authorized 
counterparts for later. 
 
 
 
UN-CONDUCTED PEACE ENFORCEMENT 
 
 Unfortunately, legal doctrine is of limited help in 
determining the Charter basis of UN-conducted peace enforcement 
operations. An initial problem is that legal scholars, like 
their colleagues in other disciplines, have, to date, failed to 
identify "peace enforcement" as a distinct category of peace 
operation. If we consider legal opinion in respect of the 
broader range of UN-conducted military enforcement operations ─ 
                                                                
      15  Freudenschuss identifies two Security Council resolutions, Resolution 665 
and 773, both relating to the Iraq-Kuwait conflict, which were not 
explicitly adopted under chapter VII, but which can hardly be situated 
elsewhere in the Charter. See Helmut FREUDENSCHUSS, "Between Unilateralism 
and Collective Security: Authorizations of the Use of Force by the UN 
Security Council", European Journal of International Law, vol. 5(4), 1994, 
pp. 493-96, 501 and 523. 
      16  ─ for example, the authorization of the use of force by the United 
Kingdom for the purpose of enforcing an oil embargo against the former 
Southern Rhodesia. See SCR 221, 9 April 1966, para. 5. 
      17  ─ e.g., UNITAF. 
      18  ─ e.g., IFOR and SFOR. 
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whether or not these conform to the definition of peace enforce-
ment reached in chapter 7 ─ we encounter further problems. In 
general, legal scholars have paid scant attention to these 
operations. In the one case which they have scrutinized closely, 
namely ONUC, they do not agree among themselves ─ not only on 
the question of the operation's legal basis, but, more 
fundamentally, on the question of whether or not, at some stage, 
it involved enforcement action. 
 
 There is general agreement in the literature that ONUC, on 
the basis of the three initial Security Council resolutions 
adopted in July-August 1960, had no enforcement powers. Many 
legal scholars deny ONUC ever acquired such powers.19 This, as 
mentioned in chapter 2, was Secretary-General Hammarskjöld's 
view.20 It was also the view of the International Court of 
Justice.21 Much of this opinion turns on the belief that enforce-
ment action cannot be mounted against non-state entities, a 
point which will be addressed later in this chapter. For now, it 
is sufficient to note that this view was not universally shared, 
with several legal scholars, in the face of the authority just 
cited, leaning towards the conclusion that, in its later stages, 
ONUC did acquire enforcement powers and that these were 
necessarily based on Charter article 42 which, alone, empowers 
the Security Council to take coercive military action.22
 
 For further examples of UN-conducted military enforcement 
operations we have to turn to the post-Cold War period. While 
the Gulf War (1990-91) prompted a vigorous, yet inconclusive, 
debate among legal scholars concerning the legal basis of the 
 
      19  See: Higgins, supra, note 88, pp. 57-58; Bowett, supra, note 119, p. 176 
(also pp. 201-03 and 278-79); Simmonds, supra, note 110, p. 62. 
      20  See text accompanying notes 121-23 and 153-54, supra. See also, Abi-Saab, 
supra, note 88, pp. 103-04. 
      21  Certain Expenses, supra, note 710, pp. 166 and 177. 
      22  See: Abi-Saab, supra, note 88, pp. 104-06 and 165; Seyersted, supra, note 
110, p. 140. For the present author's opinion on the question of whether or 
not ONUC had enforcement powers, see chapter 2, especially the "Con-
clusion". 
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measures taken to force Iraq out of Kuwait, it does not form 
part of our analysis in this section since these operations were 
authorized, not conducted, by the UN. Unfortunately, since the 
Gulf War, there has been a pronounced lack of interest on the 
part of legal scholars in determining the legal basis of UN 
enforcement action, whether authorized or conducted by the 
Organization. This undoubtedly stems, at least in part, from the 
Security Council's tendency, in drafting resolutions under 
chapter VII of the Charter, to ignore the formal requirements 
and substantive distinctions embodied in that chapter and in the 
Charter generally.23
 
 Nevertheless, a few legal scholars have considered the 
question of the Charter basis of recent UN-conducted military 
enforcement operations. Bothe has concluded that UNOSOM II was 
established under article 42.24 Freudenschuss reaches the same 
conclusion in respect of both UNOSOM II and UNPROFOR,25 "[u]nless 
one requires the fulfilment of all Chapter VII-provisions 
including the conclusion of Article 43 agreements and the 
activation of the Military Staff Committee before speaking of UN 
enforcement action".26
 
 Former Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali's assertion, in An 
Agenda for Peace (1992), that his proposal for "peace-
 
      23  See: Jean COMBACAU, "Le chapitre VII de la Charte des Nations Unies: 
résurrection ou métamorphose?" (DANS Les nouveaux aspects du droit interna-
tional (colloque des 14, 15 et 16 avril 1994), sous la direction de Rafâa 
Ben Achour et Slim Laghmani, Paris, Pedone, 1994), pp. 144 and 153-54; 
Freudenschuss, supra, note 717, p. 523. 
      24  Bothe, supra, note 112, p. 590. 
      25  Freudenschuss (supra, note 717) refers specifically to the mandates 
conferred upon UNOSOM II in Resolutions 814 and 837 and upon UNPROFOR in 
Resolutions 836 and 871. It is submitted that Freudenschuss errs in respect 
of the last-named resolution which essentially involves an affirmation of 
UNPROFOR's right of self-defence and, as such, falls within the scope of 
peace-keeping. For a full discussion of this issue, see chapter 4, section 
entitled "UNPROFOR's Mandate and Chapter VII", supra. Note that SCR 871 
follows SCR 815, discussed in the latter section, in its formulation. 
      26  Freudenschuss, supra, note 717, p. 524. Note that we will examine this 
problem infra. 
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enforcement units [would] be warranted as a provisional measure 
under Article 40 of the Charter",27 has also attracted legal 
comment ─ though again fairly sparse. As in the case of ONUC, 
opinion on this issue is divergent. Legal scholars have: agreed 
with the former Secretary-General that article 40, "broadly 
interpreted", could furnish the legal basis for his "peace-
enforcement units";28 voiced scepticism that article 40 is a 
satisfactory basis, though without offering an alternative;29 and 
rejected article 40 entirely in favour of article 42.30
 
 To sum up, there is a failure in the legal doctrine to 
agree on some of the most basic questions of concern to us, 
including, as in the case of ONUC, the question as to whether 
specific operations involve enforcement action or not. Yet, the 
larger problem is arguably a failure to debate such questions at 
all ─ especially in the years following the 1990-91 Gulf War, 
when the UN became much more active in the enforcement realm. 
 
 We thus see that neither Security Council practice, nor 
legal doctrine, nor any other interpretive source offers more 
than tentative clues as to the legal basis of UN-conducted peace 
enforcement. The Security Council merely puts us within the 
framework of chapter VII of the UN Charter. Legal doctrine, 
though by nature far more specific, is, on the whole, inconclus-
ive, although those legal scholars who have studied UN-conducted 
military enforcement operations and identified these as such, 
typically look to article 42 for their legal foundation. At the 
same time, the former UN Secretary-General, with some support in 
 
      27  An Agenda for Peace, supra, note 4, para. 44. 
      28  Thierry, supra, note 706, p. 382. The original French text, just quoted 
in translation, reads "largement interprété". 
      29  Peter KOOIJMANS, "Provisional Measures of the UN Security Council" (IN 
Reflections on International Law from the Low Countries ─ In Honour of Paul 
de Waart, ed. by Erik Denters and Nico Schrijver, The Hague, Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1998), pp. 296-297. 
      30  Giorgio GAJA, "Use of Force Made or Authorized by the United Nations" (IN 
The United Nations at Age Fifty ─ A Legal Perspective, ed. by Christian 
Tomuschat, The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 1995), p. 53. 
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the legal doctrine, has asserted that the "peace-enforcement 
units", proposed in his 1992 An Agenda for Peace, would be based 
on Charter article 40. In light of these sources, it would 
appear that we are faced with a choice between articles 40 and 
42. Yet, before considering in detail the argument that one or 
other of these articles provides UN-conducted peace 
enforcement's legal basis, we will canvass the UN Charter more 
widely to see if it offers other possibilities. 
 
 
 Narrowing the Field 
 
 Halderman has argued that a primary, even sufficient, legal 
basis for the establishment and deployment of UN armed forces, 
including those of an enforcement nature, is contained in 
Charter article 1(1): 
 
The Purposes of the United Nations are: 
 
1. To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: 
to take effective collective measures for the prevention and 
removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts 
of aggression or other breaches of the peace, ...31
 
In fact, article 1(1), as formulated, is sufficiently broad in 
scope to accommodate military enforcement measures, including 
peace enforcement operations. At the same time, it appears that 
nothing in the Charter preparatory works would limit the scope 
of this provision.32 Yet, article 1(1) is not a sufficient legal 
basis for the establishment and deployment of UN armed forces. 
 
 The overriding concern of those who drafted chapter 1 of 
 
      31  See John W. HALDERMAN, "Legal Basis for United Nations Armed Forces", The 
American Journal of International Law, vol. 56(4), Oct. 1962, especially 
pp. 972-73. See also Seyersted, supra, note 110, p. 160. 
      32  See: C.F. AMERASINGHE, "The Charter Travaux Préparatoires and United 
Nations Powers to Use Armed Force", The Canadian Yearbook of International 
Law, vol. 4, 1966, pp. 83-86 and 99; Ruth B. RUSSELL, A History of the 
United Nations Charter (Washington, D.C., The Brookings Institution, 1958), 
pp. 655-57. 
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the Charter ("Purposes and Principles"), within which article 1 
resides, was to prescribe broad limits to the exercise, 
especially by the Security Council, of those powers assigned 
elsewhere in the Charter.33 That chapter 1 was not intended to 
serve ─ in fact, cannot serve ─ as a source of substantive power 
emerges clearly from the fact that it makes no mention of any UN 
organ, referring only to "the United Nations" and its "Members". 
As Bowett has suggested, if we conclude that article 1(1) 
confers certain powers on the Security Council, then it must 
follow that it confers these same powers on the UN's other 
principal organs, such as ECOSOC ─ which is clearly untenable in 
light of the attributions of competence made elsewhere in the 
Charter.34 At most, article 1(1) tells us that the UN, as a 
whole, may "take effective collective measures" for the stated 
purposes. The question of what exact powers specific UN organs 
may possess along such lines is addressed elsewhere in the 
Charter. 
 
 Having already excluded the General Assembly from our 
analysis, we necessarily turn to those Charter articles confer-
ring specific powers on the Security Council. We need not 
consider the possibility that the Council possesses "inherent", 
"implied", "general" or "residual" powers.35 These doctrines only 
 
      33  See the sources cited ibid., especially Russell, pp. 655-56. And see UN 
Charter, art. 24(2). 
      34  See Bowett, supra, note 119, p. 179. 
      35  Note that although these concepts are, in principle, distinct, they are 
sometimes confused in legal doctrine and even, arguably, in legal jurispru-
dence. Concerning "inherent capacity" or "power", see: Seyersted, supra, 
note 110, ch. IV, secs. 3-4; Hilaire MCCOUBREY and Nigel D. WHITE, The Blue 
Helmets: Legal Regulation of United Nations Military Operations (Aldershot, 
England, Dartmouth Publishing, 1996), pp. 44-45. With respect to "implied 
powers", see: Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United 
Nations, Advisory Opinion, [1949] ICJ Reports 174, at pp. 182 and 198; 
Michael BOTHE, "Les limites des pouvoirs du Conseil de Sécurité" (DANS Le 
développement du rôle du Conseil de Sécurité, supra, note 706), pp. 71 and 
74-75; McCoubrey and White, ibid., pp. 39-44. Concerning "general" or 
"residual powers", see: Hans KELSEN, The Law of the United Nations (London, 
Stevens and Sons, 1950), pp. 283-84 and 291-92; Legal Consequences for 
States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West 
Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory 
Opinion, [1971] ICJ Reports 16, at para. 110; Oscar SCHACHTER, "United 
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come into play where the Charter does not make specific 
provision for the activity under consideration, which, as we 
will see, is not the case with UN-conducted peace enforcement. 
 
 Within chapter VII of the Charter, we can eliminate from 
consideration articles 48(1) and 49. Article 48(1) basically 
"reaffirms", within the framework of chapter VII, the obligation 
of member states "to accept and carry out the decisions of the 
Security Council" under Charter article 25,36 while specifying, 
probably unnecessarily,37 that the Council may require only 
selected member states, as opposed to the entire membership, to 
carry out certain decisions.38
 
 As for article 49, whatever one thinks of the clarity of 
the text,39 its core meaning is not much in dispute ─ member 
states are to assist each other in implementing "measures 
decided upon by the Security Council", whether they are directly 
mandated with such implementation or not.40 While the practical 
significance of article 49 appears rather less certain, 
especially when considered in relation to article 43,41 the main 
points of controversy concern article 49's relationship with 
 
Nations Law in the Gulf Conflict", The American Journal of International 
Law, vol. 85(3), July 1991, p. 461; Bothe, ibid., pp. 70-71; Benedetto 
CONFORTI, The Law and Practice of the United Nations (The Hague, Kluwer Law 
International, 1996), pp. 205-06. 
      36  Pierre Michel EISEMANN, "Article 48" (DANS La Charte des Nations Unies, 
sous la direction de Jean-Pierre Cot et Alain Pellet, Paris, Economica, 2e 
éd., 1991), p. 749. The original, French text reads "réaffirme". And see 
SCR 670, 25 Sept. 1990, adopted in the context of the Persian Gulf Crisis. 
      37  Brun-Otto BRYDE, "Article 48" (IN The Charter of the United Nations, 
supra, note 112), p. 652. 
      38  See: Eisemann, supra, note 738, p. 751; Bryde, ibid., pp. 652-53. 
      39  Compare: Pierre Michel EISEMANN, "Article 49" (DANS La Charte des Nations 
Unies, supra, note 738), p. 757; Brun-Otto BRYDE, "Article 49" (IN The 
Charter of the United Nations, supra, note 112), p. 656. 
      40  Eisemann, ibid., p. 759. Bryde, ibid., pp. 656-57. 
      41  Compare: Eisemann, ibid., p. 759; Bryde, ibid., p. 657. 
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articles 25 and 50 of the Charter.42
 
 These debates need not detain us here. Neither article 49 
nor article 48(1) provide a legal basis for the establishment, 
by the Security Council, of a military force, whether mandated 
for enforcement or not, since, on any interpretation, they 
govern only the modalities of implementation of Security Council 
decisions (art. 48(1)) or measures (art. 49) taken on the basis 
of other chapter VII provisions.43 They do not provide indepen-
dent, or even supporting, authority for the taking of these 
decisions or measures.44
 
 This process of elimination leaves us with three articles, 
all situated within chapter VII, as potential legal bases for 
UN-conducted peace enforcement. 
 
 
 
Article 39 
 
   The Security Council shall determine the existence of any 
threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and 
 
      42  See: Goodrich, Hambro and Simons, supra, note 708, pp. 337-40; Eisemann, 
ibid., pp. 759-62; Bryde, ibid., pp. 656-58. 
      43  Pursuant to the interpretation of the two provisions suggested here, 
article 48(1) would only involve legally binding "decisions of the Security 
Council", such as those imposing economic sanctions under article 41, 
whereas article 49 would apply to all "measures decided upon by the 
Security Council", whether legally binding or not. The words "decided upon" 
in the latter provision would simply refer to the formal Council voting 
procedure, set out in Charter article 27. Although only article 48(1) is 
clear on this point ("decisions ... for the maintenance of international 
peace and security"), both provisions would apply solely within the 
framework of chapter VII. Note that the French text of article 49 ("mesures 
arrêtées") supports the argument that the "measures" referred to in the 
English version of that provision are different from the "decisions" 
("décisions") mentioned in article 48(1). Eisemann, however, asserts that 
they are one and the same (ibid., pp. 760-61). On the distinction between 
"binding and nonbinding decisions" and its application to article 48(1), 
see Schachter, supra, note 737, p. 463 (n. 31). 
      44  On this point, with respect to article 48(1), see: Bowett, supra, note 
119, pp. 284-85; Bryde, supra, note 739, p. 652. 
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shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken 
in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore 
international peace and security. 
 
 
 One key aspect of article 39 is procedural in nature; this 
provision, which opens chapter VII, defines the circumstances in 
which the other provisions of chapter VII apply. Before taking 
any action under this chapter, the Security Council must 
determine that the situation under consideration constitutes a 
"threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggres-
sion".45 Clearly, this requirement must also be met where the 
Security Council, exercising the substantive powers conferred 
upon it within the framework of chapter VII, decides to 
establish a peace enforcement operation. At issue here is 
whether article 39 furnishes, in whole or in part, a substantive 
basis for peace enforcement. 
 
 In addition to its procedural significance, article 39 also 
has substantive importance, deriving, specifically, from the 
following passage of the article's English text: 
 
The Security Council ... shall make recommendations, or decide 
what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 
42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.46
 
 
 
      45  Note however that, in practice, the Security Council has often failed to 
make such a determination, at least explicitly. For several recent 
examples, see Freudenschuss, supra, note 717, p. 523. Concerning the 
question of whether an "implicit determination" suffices for the purposes 
of article 39 and what, exactly, such a determination would involve, see: 
Gérard COHEN JONATHAN, "Article 39" (DANS La Charte des Nations Unies, 
supra, note 738), pp. 651 and 653-54; Jochen Abr. FROWEIN, "Article 40" (IN 
The Charter of the United Nations, supra, note 112), p. 618; Jochen Abr. 
FROWEIN, "Article 42" (IN The Charter of the United Nations, supra, note 
112), p. 631. 
      46  Note that the same passage in the French version of the text lacks the 
two commas: "Le Conseil de sécurité ... fait des recommandations ou décide 
quelles mesures seront prises conformément aux Articles 41 et 42 pour 
maintenir ou rétablir la paix et la sécurité internationales." 
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 With its two commas, this text ties the Security Council's 
power of decision to articles 41 and 42 alone, leaving it a 
general power of recommendation under chapter VII which is 
limited only by the purpose of maintaining or restoring interna-
tional peace and security. We will reserve for later the 
question of whether the Security Council's power of decision is 
really limited, within chapter VII, to articles 41 and 42, 
specifically when we consider the extent of the Security 
Council's powers under article 40. For now, we merely need to 
determine whether the Council's general, chapter VII power of 
recommendation, suggested by the English text of article 39, 
could provide a legal basis for peace enforcement. 
 
 It has been argued in the literature that the Security 
Council can set up a military force on the basis of recommenda-
tions made under article 39.47 Yet, we need not consider the 
merits of this claim as it is not relevant to the scenario 
presently under scrutiny ─ that of a UN-conducted peace enforce-
ment operation. While the establishment of a UN-conducted force 
could be accompanied by a Security Council recommendation to 
member states to contribute troops and/or equipment to it, the 
establishment of the force itself would be effected, not through 
a recommendation, but rather, as it is a UN force, through a 
decision directing the UN Secretary-General or some other UN 
body, such as the Military Staff Committee (article 47), to 
carry out the steps needed to set up and eventually deploy the 
force. To conclude therefore, article 39 does not provide a 
legal basis for UN-conducted peace enforcement. 
 
 ──── 
 
 Before embarking upon a detailed consideration of articles 
 
      47  See Bowett, supra, note 119, pp. 276-77. Note that article 39 has been 
cited by states and scholars alike as a possible legal basis of the UN-
authorized military intervention in Korea (1950-53). See: Bowett, ibid., 
pp. 32-36 and 276-77; Seyersted, supra, note 110, pp. 129-30; Goodrich, 
Hambro and Simons, supra, note 708, pp. 301 and 315; Cohen Jonathan, supra, 
note 747, pp. 662-63; Nigel D. WHITE, Keeping the Peace ─ The United 
Nations and the Maintenance of International Peace and Security 
(Manchester, Manchester U. Press, 1993), pp. 106-08. 
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40 and 42 as possible legal bases of peace enforcement, a brief 
reiteration of the latter's main features is in order. First, 
peace enforcement, whether it encompasses a more specifically 
humanitarian mission or not, always involves, as its basic aim, 
the restoration and/or preservation of peace. It has three main 
characteristics: its enforcement nature; its employment in 
environments of imperfect consent; and impartiality, understood 
as the even-handed implementation of a mandate which is of 
general application. 
 
 
 
 
 
 Article 40 
 
   In order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, the 
Security Council may, before making the recommendations or 
deciding upon the measures provided for in Article 39, call upon 
the parties concerned to comply with such provisional measures as 
it deems necessary or desirable. Such provisional measures shall 
be without prejudice to the rights, claims, or position of the 
parties concerned. The Security Council shall duly take account of 
failure to comply with such provisional measures. 
 
 
 Turning now to article 40, dealing with provisional 
measures, we find a remarkable similarity between the basic 
purpose of these measures, "to prevent an aggravation of the 
situation," and the basic ends of peace enforcement mentioned 
above, especially where one assumes that "the persistence of 
hostilities is always an aggravation in the sense of Art.40".48 
Indeed, as applied by the Security Council, provisional 
measures, like peace enforcement, have been designed to bring 
hostilities to a halt and pave the way to a lasting peace. 
 
 Typical examples of provisional measures adopted by the 
 
      48  Frowein, "Article 40", supra, note 747, p. 619. 
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Security Council include49 Security Council directives to 
belligerents to respect agreed cease-fires or otherwise cease 
hostilities,50 to withdraw their forces from the zone of con-
flict,51 and to negotiate with a view to the peaceful resolution 
of their differences.52 Provisional measures may also take the 
form of Security Council directives to other states to refrain 
from any action which could contribute to the aggravation of the 
conflict53 and, arguably, the imposition, by the Council, of 
embargoes on the delivery of weapons and military equipment to 
the belligerents.54
 
 The second-to-last sentence of article 40 articulates a 
second, key characteristic of provisional measures and another 
point of correspondence with peace enforcement: 
 
 
      49  Note that the following list is by no means exhaustive. Pursuant to the 
terms of article 40, the Security Council has virtually unlimited freedom 
to adopt whatever provisional measures "it deems necessary or desirable" to 
achieve the basic purpose already described. Goodrich, Hambro and Simons, 
supra, note 708, p. 308. Denys SIMON, "Article 40" (DANS La Charte des 
Nations Unies, supra, note 738), p. 680. For further examples of 
provisional measures and associated Security Council resolutions, see 
Simon, pp. 680-81. 
      50  See: SCR 54, S/902, 15 July 1948, paras. 2, 5 and 8; SCR 502, 3 April 
1982, para. 1; SCR 598, 20 July 1987, para. 1; SCR 713, 25 Sept. 1991, 
para. 4; SCR 733, 23 Jan. 1992, para. 4. 
      51  See: SCR 502, 3 April 1982, para. 2; SCR 598, 20 July 1987, para. 1; SCR 
660, 2 Aug. 1990, para. 2. 
      52  See: SCR 502, 3 April 1982, para. 3; SCR 598, 20 July 1987, para. 4; SCR 
660, 2 Aug. 1990, para. 3; SCR 713, 25 Sept. 1991, para. 5. Note that such 
measures may also be seen as falling under chapter VI of the UN Charter, 
relating to peaceful dispute settlement. Concerning the Security Council's 
power to recommend provisional measures under chapter VI, see Goodrich, 
Hambro and Simons, supra, note 708, pp. 278-79 and 305. 
      53  See: SCR 598, 20 July 1987, para. 5; SCR 713, 25 Sept. 1991, para. 7; SCR 
733, 23 Jan. 1992, para. 6. 
      54  See: SCR 713, 25 Sept. 1991, para. 6; SCR 733, 23 Jan. 1992, para. 5. 
Note, however, that some legal scholars have persuasively argued that arms 
embargoes actually fall under article 41 of the Charter, as opposed to 
article 40. See: Combacau, supra, note 725, pp. 152-53; Kooijmans, supra, 
note 731, pp. 295-96. 
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Such provisional measures shall be without prejudice to the 
rights, claims, or position of the parties concerned. 
 
Implicit in the "without prejudice" clause is the notion of 
impartiality. Yet, before concluding that impartiality in 
article 40 and peace enforcement are one and the same, we need 
to examine this provision in some detail. 
 
 On one interpretation, the "without prejudice" clause 
merely prevents the Security Council from taking measures which 
would affect the parties legal rights.55 Yet, as written, the 
clause goes much further than this. It refers, not only to the 
"rights ... of the parties concerned", but also their "claims, 
or position". Moreover, the text suggests that it is not simply 
the purpose of provisional measures which matters, but also 
their actual effect: "Such provisional measures shall be without 
prejudice ..." (emphasis added). As we have seen, peace enforce-
ment, though impartial in its means (even-handed implementation 
...) and ends (... of a mandate of general application), is not 
necessarily impartial in its effects. 
 
 It has been pointed out that the broader interpretation of 
the "without prejudice" clause, though faithful to the actual 
wording of the provision, would deprive article 40 of any 
practical value.56 Indeed, even the most characteristic type of 
provisional measure, namely an order for the cessation of 
hostilities, will, in practice, often prove disadvantageous to 
one or other of the parties concerned.57
 
 Strictly speaking, by its terms, article 40 demands a 
tradeoff between the realization of the purpose of provisional 
measures, "to prevent an aggravation of the situation," and the 
requirement that these measures be "without prejudice". Clearly, 
 
      55  See: Goodrich, Hambro and Simons, supra, note 708, p. 308; Frowein, 
"Article 40", supra, note 747, pp. 619-20. 
      56  Kelsen, supra, note 737, p. 743. 
      57  Simon, supra, note 751, p. 685. 
  
197
                                                               
the restoration and/or preservation of peace will almost always 
adversely affect the military and/or political "position" of one 
or more of the parties concerned.58
 
 In practice, the Security Council has not allowed diffi-
culties of this kind to hinder its action under article 40, 
rejecting, in effect, strict adherence to the "without 
prejudice" clause. As applied by the Security Council, 
provisional measures are not impartial in their effects.59 One 
could argue, further, that, in contrast to peace enforcement, 
they are not always impartial in their ends either. A good 
example of this would be those orders addressed by the Security 
Council to only one party to withdraw their troops from disputed 
territory.60 In any case, it is clear that the requirement of 
impartiality enunciated in article 40, as interpreted by the 
Security Council, is not so strict so as to preclude the 
application of article 40 to peace enforcement. 
 
 As noted previously, former UN Secretary-General Boutros-
Ghali, in outlining, in An Agenda for Peace, his proposal for 
"peace-enforcement units", indicated that these should be 
considered provisional measures, established pursuant to article 
40 of the Charter.61 Although this assertion is not explained, it 
appears to derive from the fact that the only function of the 
"peace-enforcement units" specifically mentioned in Agenda, 
paragraph 44 is the restoration and maintenance of a cease-fire, 
itself one of the most characteristic forms of provisional 
 
      58  See: Goodrich, Hambro and Simons, supra, note 708, p. 308; Simon, supra, 
note 751, p. 685. 
      59  See Simon, supra, note 751, pp. 684-85. 
      60  Examples include SCR 502, 3 April, 1982, para. 2 (ordering the withdrawal 
of Argentine forces from the Falkland / Malvinas Islands) and SCR 660, 2 
Aug. 1990, para. 2 (ordering the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait). 
Legal scholars typically see such measures as provisional measures, even 
where, as in SCR 502, article 40 is not stated as the legal basis. See: 
Simon, supra, note 751, p. 681 (n. 1); Frowein, "Article 40", supra, note 
747, p. 619. 
      61  See An Agenda for Peace, supra, note 4, para. 44, second-to-last 
sentence. 
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measure. 
 
 This notion that mechanisms set up to oversee party 
compliance with provisional measures are themselves provisional 
measures, more specifically "second degree" provisional 
measures, has been advanced in the legal doctrine.62 Peace-
keeping operations arguably fall into this category.63 In any 
case, article 40 is often cited in the legal doctrine as a 
possible, even preferred, legal basis for UN peace-keeping.64 As 
noted earlier, peace-keeping, like peace enforcement, is 
impartial. Moreover, it seems clear that peace-keeping, in 
general, has the same conflict-dampening rationale as peace 
enforcement ─ preserving, though not itself restoring, peace 
over the short-, medium- and long-term.65
 
 Nevertheless, as previously noted, the differences between 
the two types of peace operation are fundamental. The full and 
continuous consent, necessary to peace-keeping, is typically 
lacking in peace enforcement, even though some degree of consent 
to the operation exists. Underlying this difference is another ─ 
probably the key point of distinction between them. Peace 
enforcement, in contrast to peace-keeping, involves the use of 
 
      62  See Simon, supra, note 751, p. 681. 
      63  See Simon, supra, note 751, pp. 681-82. 
      64  See: Bowett, supra, note 119, p. 283; Higgins, supra, note 88, vol. IV, 
1981, p. 144; Abi-Saab, supra, note 88, p. 103 (n. 163). Support for this 
conclusion can be found in the Certain Expenses case, wherein the Interna-
tional Court of Justice states: "Articles of Chapter VII of the Charter 
speak of 'situations' as well as disputes, and it must lie within the power 
of the Security Council to police a situation even though it does not 
resort to enforcement action against a State." Supra, note 710, p. 167. 
Note that the only article in chapter VII which employs the word 
"situation" is article 40. The point is also valid for the French versions 
of the International Court's judgement (p. 167) and the UN Charter 
("situation"). For an overview of the debate concerning peace-keeping's 
legal basis, see: Ratner, supra, note 51, pp. 56-57; Eric SUY, "Peace-
keeping Operations" (IN A Handbook on International Organizations, ed. by 
R.-J. Dupuy, Dordrecht, The Netherlands, Martinus Nijhoff, 2nd ed., 1998), 
p. 544. 
      65  Concerning the somewhat different functions of "first" and "second 
generation" peace-keeping, see text accompanying note 58, supra. 
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force beyond that for self-defence. It is this characteristic 
which also tends to distinguish peace enforcement, viewed as a 
"second degree" provisional measure, from the "first degree" 
provisional measures whose implementation it is mandated to 
enforce. 
 
 While provisional measures may take the form of binding 
Security Council decisions, as well as non-binding recommenda-
tions,66 this is not enforcement. The failure of certain parties 
to comply with binding Security Council decisions under article 
40 may lead the Council to take enforcement measures for the 
purpose of securing compliance with the same, as suggested in 
the last sentence of article 40: 
 
The Security Council shall duly take account of failure to comply 
with such provisional measures.67
 
Yet, the Security Council has no basis for taking enforcement 
action under article 40 itself. 
 
 
 
 Article 42 
 
   Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for 
in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, 
it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be 
necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. 
Such action many include demonstrations, blockade, and other 
 
      66  The legal doctrine, though not unanimous, solidly backs this conclusion. 
See: Kelsen, supra, note 737, pp. 740-41; Bowett, supra, note 119, pp. 281-
82; Simon, supra, note 751, pp. 686-88; White, supra, note 749, p. 90; 
Frowein, "Article 40", supra, note 747, pp. 620-21; Jean COMBACAU et Serge 
SUR, Droit international public (Paris, Montchrestien, 3e éd., 1997), p. 
650. Note that the Security Council, since its earliest days, has assumed 
it has the power to take binding decisions under article 40. See, for 
example: SCR 54, S/902, 5 July 1948, paras. 2, 5 and 8; SCR 598, 20 July 
1987, para. 1; SCR 660, 2 Aug. 1990, para. 2. Concerning the mandatory 
intent behind the latter provision, see also SCR 678, 29 Nov. 1990, pream. 
paras. 2 and 4. 
      67  And see Simon, supra, note 751, pp. 688-89. 
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operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United 
Nations. 
 
 
 As indicated earlier, legal doctrine, to the extent it has 
dealt with the question at all, tends to look to article 42 for 
the legal basis of UN-conducted military enforcement operations. 
This is entirely logical since, under the Charter, only article 
42 confers on the Security Council explicit authority to take 
military action for the purpose of maintaining or restoring 
international peace and security. There can be little doubt that 
the "action by air, sea, or land forces" that article 42 refers 
to is coercive military action, i.e. the use of armed force 
beyond that for self-defence.68 Which is to say that article 42, 
uniquely, captures two crucial characteristics of peace enforce-
ment operations: their enforcement nature and their employment 
in environments of imperfect consent. 
 
 Nevertheless, there are two arguments which, if accepted, 
would rule out article 42 as a possible legal basis of UN-
conducted peace enforcement. The first would deny article 42 any 
applicability as a result of the failure of UN member states to 
conclude, pursuant to article 43, "special agreements" for the 
provision of armed forces and other forms of assistance to the 
Security Council when it takes action for the maintenance of 
international peace and security, while the second would limit 
article 42's applicability to interstate, as opposed to 
intrastate, conflict. 
 
 ──── 
 
 In the absence of article 43 agreements, it appears clear 
that the Security Council cannot oblige UN member states to 
supply armed forces for military enforcement action under 
article 42.69 Yet, can it be said that such action can only be 
 
      68  See UNCIO Documents, vol. 17, pp. 204-05 (Doc. WD 428 (Engl.), CO/192, 20 
Aug. 1945). 
      69  See: UNCIO Documents, vol. 11, p. 19 (Doc. 943 (Engl.), III/5, 13 June 
1945); Bowett, supra, note 119, p. 277; Seyersted, supra, note 110, pp. 
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conducted through the mechanisms sketched out in articles 43 to 
47 of the Charter? This was the prevailing view in the UN's 
early days, held by UN member states70 and many others,71 though 
both former UN Secretary-General Hammarskjöld and the Interna-
tional Court of Justice kept the question of article 42's 
potential applicability open.72 There are those who continue to 
believe that, without any article 43 agreements, the Security 
 
161-62; Goodrich, Hambro and Simons, supra, note 708, p. 316; Schachter, 
supra, note 7, p. 394; Rosalyn HIGGINS, Problems and Process: International 
Law and How We Use It (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1994), pp. 265-66; Frowein, 
"Article 42", supra, note 747, p. 633. Of course, if the Security Council 
army to be established in accordance with article 43 was fully 
internationalized, in the sense of remaining continuously under Security 
Council command and control, then there would be no need for the Council to 
direct member states to provide the forces and other forms of assistance 
agreed under article 43 for specific operations. Yet, this is only one 
possible means of organizing such a force. If the relevant forces remained 
under national command and control, except when participating in specific 
UN operations, then the Security Council would need to issue binding 
directives to those states which had concluded article 43 agreements to 
make their agreed contribution or some part thereof for the operation in 
question (thus transferring command and control over the relevant forces to 
the Security Council). In fact, the latter scenario seems to be the one 
envisaged in article 43, which refers to the provision of forces and other 
assistance to the Security Council "on its call" (para. 1). For additional 
comment concerning the type of force organization contemplated in articles 
43-47, see: Goodrich, Hambro and Simons, pp. 317-18 and 328; Kelsen, supra, 
note 737, pp. 748 and 762-68. 
      70  Western nations and their East bloc rivals shared the view that the 
failure to conclude the article 43 agreements rendered action under article 
42 impossible, although they disagreed on the broader consequences of this 
failure. While the West believed that other forms of military action 
outside the framework of article 42, such as peace-keeping, were still 
possible, the Soviet Union and its allies insisted that the Security 
Council could take no military action of any kind. See: Higgins ibid., pp. 
263-64; Seyersted, supra, note 110, pp. 129-30 and 163; Goodrich, Hambro 
and Simons, supra, note 708, p. 316. But see Frowein, "Article 42", supra, 
note 747, p. 633. 
      71  See: Kelsen, supra, note 737, pp. 756-57; Seyersted, supra, note 110, p. 
130; Schachter, supra, note 7, p. 393 (n. 13). 
      72  The point is made by Higgins, supra, note 771, pp. 264-65. See: A/3302, 6 
Nov. 1956, paras. 9-10; A/3943, 9 Oct. 1958, para. 155; Certain Expenses, 
supra, note 710, pp. 165-67. Note that the International Court rejected the 
theory of article 43 linkage, but only with respect to peace-keeping. It 
did not consider the question in relation to UN military enforcement 
operations. 
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Council cannot act on the basis of article 42.73 Nevertheless, 
since the UN's early years, the legal doctrine has swung 
decisively behind a reading of article 42 which affirms its 
autonomy from articles 43-47.74
 
 The best support for the theory of article 42/43 linkage is 
provided by article 106 of the Charter, dealing with "transi-
tional security arrangements", specifically the first words of 
the provision: 
 
Pending the coming into force of such special agreements referred 
to in Article 43 as in the opinion of the Security Council enable 
it to begin the exercise of its responsibilities under Article 42, 
... 
 
 The arguments against linkage are, however, far stronger. 
As several legal scholars have pointed out, the provisions which 
are supposed to be linked contain no language which would 
indicate this.75 In fact, "[t]he wording of Article 42 is broad, 
leaving open both the method of recruiting the Forces and the 
precise nature of their command."76 Thus, the last sentence of 
article 42, which envisages "action ... by air, sea, or land 
forces of Members of the United Nations", would appear to 
involve forces independent of those to be put at the disposal of 
 
      73  See: Burns WESTON, "Security Council Resolution 678 and Persian Gulf 
Decision Making: Precarious Legitimacy", The American Journal of 
International Law, vol. 85(3), July 1991, p. 519; An Agenda for Peace, 
supra, note 4, paras. 42-43. 
      74  Higgins argues the point forcefully. Supra, note 771, pp. 265-66. Other 
advocates of this view, include: Bowett, supra, note 119, pp. 277-78; 
Seyersted, supra, note 110, pp. 130-31, 163-64 and 169; Georges FISCHER, 
"Article 42" (DANS La Charte des Nations Unies, supra, note 738), pp. 712-
13; Frowein, "Article 42", supra, note 747, p. 633; McCoubrey and White, 
supra, note 737, pp. 12-13. 
      75  Goodrich, Hambro, and Simons, supra, note 708, pp. 630-31. Schachter, 
supra, note 7, p. 393. Thomas FRANCK, Fairness in International Law and 
Institutions (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1995), p. 300. 
      76  Bowett, supra, note 119, p. 277. And see Seyersted, supra, note 110, pp. 
130-31. 
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the Security Council pursuant to article 43.77   
 
 Nor is the theory of linkage supported in the Charter 
preparatory works.78 It is submitted, rather, that the latter 
indicate quite clearly that the Security Council's use of its 
enforcement powers under article 42 did not depend on the 
conclusion of article 43 agreements per se, but merely on the 
Council's acquisition of such capacity as would enable it to 
take enforcement action ─ whether by the means outlined in 
article 43 or through some other mechanism.79
 
 The assessment as to whether or not the Security Council 
had such capacity rested with the Council itself. It was to 
determine when its authority under article 106 terminated and 
its powers under article 42 became effective.80 In light of the 
practice described elsewhere in the dissertation ─ including, in 
particular, the UN-conducted military enforcement operations in 
the Congo (ONUC) and Somalia (UNOSOM II) ─ it seems safe to 
conclude that the Security Council has, at least implicitly, 
determined that it has the capacity to act under article 42.81
 
      77  See Frowein, "Article 42", supra, note 747, p. 633. This point will be 
developed further in the section of the chapter dealing with UN-authorized 
peace enforcement operations, infra. 
      78  See: Amerasinghe, supra, note 734, pp. 90-91 and 100; Seyersted, supra, 
note 110, pp. 130 and 131 (n. 20). 
      79  See: UNCIO Documents, vol. 12, pp. 402-03 (Doc. 704 (Engl.), III/3/36, 31 
May 1945); idem, vol. 11, pp. 187 and 189-90 (Doc. 1150 (Engl.), III/12, 22 
June 1945). 
      80  This is reflected in the first words of article 106: "... as in the 
opinion of the Security Council ...". Concerning this phrase, see: UNCIO 
Documents, vol. 12, pp. 651-52 (Doc. WD 68 (Engl.), III/3/A/2, 1 June 
1945); idem, vol. 12, pp. 419-21 (Doc. 765 (Engl.), III/3/39, 3 June 1945); 
idem, vol. 12, pp. 533-37 (Doc. 1089 (Engl.), III/3/49, 19 June 1945 and 
Doc. 1104 (Engl.), III/3/49 (1), 20 June 1945); idem, vol. 11, p. 189 (Doc. 
1150 (Engl.), III/12, 22 June 1945); Russell, supra, note 734, pp. 682-83. 
      81  It is submitted that the broad wording of article 106, specifically the 
phrase "as in the opinion of the Security Council", would allow the 
necessary Security Council determination to be implicit in the sense that 
it would follow from a series of Council decisions to take military 
enforcement action in specific cases. The assumption that the Security 
Council can take enforcement action under article 42 is, in fact, reflected 
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 ──── 
 
 A second argument which, if accepted, would largely rule 
out article 42 as the Charter basis for peace enforcement is 
that enforcement action under the Charter is to be conducted 
only against states and, as such, can have little or no 
application to internal conflicts. Probably the most important 
formulation of this position is to be found in the Certain 
Expenses case: 
 
it can be said that the operations of ONUC did not include a use 
of armed force against a State which the Security Council, under 
Article 39, determined to have committed an act of aggression or 
to have breached the peace. The armed forces which were utilized 
in the Congo were not authorized to take military action against 
any State. The operation did not involve 'preventive or 
enforcement measures' against any State under Chapter VII and 
therefore did not constitute 'action' as that term is used in 
Article 11.82
 
The phrase "preventive or enforcement measures", used by the 
Court, is in fact taken from Charter article 50 which expressly 
associates such measures with states.83 It is also claimed in the 
doctrine that the Charter preparatory works justify a narrow 
reading of enforcement action under chapter VII.84
 
 There is a strange inconsistency in the Court's line of 
 
in a wide range of UN practice, both old and new. See: Schachter, supra, 
note 7, pp. 393-94; Frowein, "Article 42", supra, note 747, pp. 633-34; 
Franck, supra, note 777, pp. 300-04. 
      82  Certain Expenses, supra, note 710, p. 177. And see p. 166. 
      83  The relevant phrase reads: "If preventive or enforcement measures against 
any state are taken by the Security Council, ...". 
      84  See Miller, supra, note 103, p. 8. The present author was unable to 
assess the merits of Oscar Schachter's claim (writing under the name "E.M. 
Miller") since the references he provides to the relevant Charter 
preparatory works ─ specifically, "12 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 334 et seq., 580-
581" ─ are incorrect. 
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argument in Certain Expenses. In advance of the passage quoted 
above, the Court determined that the limitation on the powers of 
the General Assembly contained in the last sentence of Charter 
article 11(2) applied only where the "action" in question was 
"coercive or enforcement action."85 Such action, the Court 
stated: 
 
is solely within the province of the Security Council ... [i.e.] 
that which is indicated by the title of Chapter VII of the 
Charter, namely 'Action with respect to threats to the peace, 
breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression'.86
 
In determining, 12 pages later in the judgement, that ONUC's 
military operations did not involve "action" within the meaning 
of article 11(2), the Court dropped one of the three grounds 
just cited for Security Council action under chapter VII, namely 
"threats to the peace".87 The Court, in effect, derived its 
conception of enforcement action exclusively from the two other 
grounds enumerated in article 39 ─ "breaches of the peace" and 
"acts of aggression" ─ both of which contemplate interstate 
conflict, in contrast to "threats to the peace" which, as will 
now be explained, can encompass both intra- and interstate con-
flict.88
 
 Article 39 in fine indicates that, within the framework of 
chapter VII, the Security Council acts "to maintain or restore 
international peace and security" (emphasis added).89 Arguably 
then, each of the specific grounds for Security Council action 
under chapter VII, set out in the first part of article 39, 
should be read in this light; the relevant prerequisites for 
Council action are, in effect, a threat to international peace, 
 
      85  Certain Expenses, supra, note 710, p. 164. And see pp. 165 and 171. 
      86  Certain Expenses, supra, note 710, p. 165. 
      87  See quoted passage accompanying note 784, supra. 
      88  The following argument is derived from Kelsen, supra, note 737, pp. 19 
and 731. 
      89  In the same vein, see Charter article 1(1). 
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breach of international peace, or act of international aggres-
sion. Where a breach of the peace or act of aggression is 
"international" in nature, it would have to involve at least one 
state, usually two. Yet, it seems clear that a threat to 
international peace may arise from intrastate, as well as 
interstate, conflict. In fact, nothing in the Charter limits the 
Security Council's discretion to determine that a situation of a 
purely internal nature poses a threat to international peace.90
 
 Thus, the International Court's narrow conception of 
enforcement action appears quite arbitrary, largely the result 
of it shunting aside the first ground for Security Council 
action under chapter VII ("threat to the peace"). There is, 
really, nothing in the text of the Charter which justifies a 
narrow definition of enforcement action. Article 50, which, as 
previously mentioned, also seems to have pushed the Interna-
tional Court in this direction, addresses the distinct problem 
of compensating individual states for economic hardship 
resulting from the imposition of "preventive or enforcement 
measures" ─ in particular, economic sanctions ─ on another 
state.91 Of far greater relevance to the question of enforcement 
action under the Charter are articles 39, 41 and 42; yet, these 
nowhere suggest that the Security Council cannot take enforce-
ment action against non-state entities.92
 
 Not only does a narrow interpretation of enforcement action 
jar with the plain meaning of the relevant Charter provisions, 
 
      90  Recent examples of such a determination include: SCR 794, 3 Dec. 1992, 
3rd pream. para. (Somalia); SCR 864, 15 Sept. 1993, sec. B, 4th pream. 
para. (Angola). Note that article 2(7) explicitly exempts chapter VII 
enforcement measures from its prohibition of UN intervention in the 
internal affairs of states. And see: Seyersted, supra, note 110, p. 139; 
Abi-Saab, supra, note 88, p. 104 (n. 165). Concerning the Security 
Council's broad interpretation of the notion of a threat to international 
peace, see: Higgins, supra, note 771, pp. 254-57; Jochen Abr. FROWEIN, 
"Article 39" (IN The Charter of the United Nations, supra, note 112), pp. 
609 and 611-12. 
      91  Fischer, supra, note 776, p. 713. 
      92  Abi-Saab, supra, note 88, p. 104 (n. 165). And see: Bowett, supra, note 
119, p. 278; Seyersted, supra, note 110, p. 139. 
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it is also at odds with much of the legal doctrine93 and, 
crucially, Security Council practice, both during the Cold War 
and since.94 It appears clear, then, notwithstanding claims to 
the contrary, that the Security Council can take military 
enforcement action against non-state entities on the basis of 
article 42. Which means that article 42 can indeed serve as a 
legal basis for UN-conducted peace enforcement. 
 
 
 
 Conclusion 
 
 As we have seen, both article 40 and article 42 capture key 
features of peace enforcement. Article 40 captures the conflict-
dampening ends of peace enforcement, along with the crucial 
characteristic of impartiality. Article 42 provides the indis-
pensable legal foundation for the enforcement nature of these 
operations, together with the typically flawed consensual 
environment they work within. Note that there is no overlap. 
Each article captures a different set of characteristics. Only 
when put together do they provide a complete portrait of peace 
enforcement. 
 
 Thus, the question arises as to whether both articles 40 
and 42 can supply peace enforcement's legal basis. The first 
 
      93  See: Kelsen, supra, note 737, pp. 19 and 731; Seyersted, supra, note 110, 
pp. 139-40; Abi-Saab, supra, note 88, p. 104 (n. 165). 
      94  Concerning the Cold War period, see: Fischer, supra, note 776, pp. 713-
14; Peter KOOIJMANS, "The Security Council and Non-State Entities as 
Parties to Conflicts" (IN International Law: Theory and Practice ─ Essays 
in Honour of Eric Suy, ed. by K. Wellens, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 
1998), pp. 334-35. Note that the two UN-conducted military enforcement 
operations examined earlier in the dissertation ─ in the Congo (ONUC) and 
Somalia (UNOSOM II) ─ both involved internal conflicts. Note also that the 
Security Council has imposed arms embargoes and other sanctions on non-
state entities in the context of several internal conflicts during the 
post-Cold War period, including those in Angola, Liberia, Rwanda, Somalia, 
and the former Yugoslavia. For details, see: Kooijmans, pp. 335-37; Farid 
Wahid DAHMANE, "Les mesures prises par le Conseil de Sécurité contre les 
entités non-étatiques", African Journal of International and Comparative 
Law, vol. 11(2), June 1999. And see note 792, supra. 
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sentence of article 40 suggests that the two types of measure 
are not to be combined: 
 
the Security Council may, before making the recommendations or 
deciding upon the measures provided for in Article 39, call upon 
the parties concerned to comply with such provisional measures as 
it deems necessary or desirable. [emphasis added] 
 
Yet, despite such wording, the Charter preparatory works make it 
clear that provisional measures and enforcement measures can be 
applied simultaneously.95 If these measures can be simultaneous, 
there is no reason why they cannot be combined within the 
framework of a single initiative, i.e. a peace enforcement 
operation. 
 
 Note that there is no incompatibility of a legal nature 
inherent in such a combination. Nothing in article 42 or 
elsewhere in the Charter precludes the Security Council from 
taking military enforcement action which is impartial in the 
sense previously described in relation to peace enforcement.96 At 
the same time, it is clear, both from the text of article 42 and 
the preparatory works, that while the Security Council must, at 
least implicitly, determine that economic sanctions would not be 
adequate to the task at hand, it need not actually impose such 
sanctions before taking military enforcement action under 
article 42.97
 
 Yet, while a UN-conducted peace enforcement operation would 
derive its legal basis from both articles 40 and 42 of the 
Charter, the two types of measure remain, even in this context, 
 
      95  UNCIO Documents, vol. 11, p. 19 (Doc. 943 (Engl.), III/5, 13 June 1945). 
And see Russell, supra, note 734, pp. 669-70 and 676. 
      96  See: Bowett, supra, note 119, pp. 278 and 415; Kelsen, supra, note 737, 
p. 743. 
      97  See: UNCIO Documents, vol. 18, p. 243 (Doc. WD 194 (Engl.), CO/83 (1), 5 
June 1945); idem, vol. 17, p. 74 (Doc. WD 256 (Engl.), CO/107, 10 June 
1945); idem, vol. 18, p. 244 (Doc. WD 330 (Engl.), CO/83 (2), 15 June 
1945); idem, vol. 17, p. 153 (Doc. WD 442 (Engl.), CO/206, 5 Sept. 1945); 
idem, vol. 11, p. 234 (Doc. 1170 (Engl.), III/13, 23 June 1945). 
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conceptually distinct. Pursuant to article 40, the Security 
Council, in effect, orders the parties to the conflict to comply 
with specified provisional measures. These will often, yet not 
always, take the form of a comprehensive peace settlement that 
the parties themselves will have agreed to. In any case, these 
measures will necessarily share the conflict-dampening rationale 
implicit in article 40 and intrinsic to all the peace 
enforcement missions examined earlier in the dissertation. On 
the basis of article 42, party compliance with these measures is 
to be secured, if necessary, through the use of armed force 
beyond that for self-defence; at the outset of its mission, the 
peace enforcement operation will be authorized to take military 
enforcement action for this purpose. 
 
 This way of conceptualizing the combination of articles 40 
and 42 within the framework of a single, albeit complex, 
Security Council initiative is entirely consistent with post-
Cold War Security Council practice in the enforcement realm 
generally ─ where non-compliance with a Security Council 
decision leads directly to the imposition of enforcement, 
including military enforcement, measures, often within the scope 
of a single Council resolution.98 As noted previously,99 in its 
last sentence, article 40 itself suggests such a two-step 
approach. 
 
 
 
 
UN-AUTHORIZED PEACE ENFORCEMENT100
                                                                
      98  See Combacau, supra, note 725, pp. 150-51. Note that the basis for 
enforcement action in these cases, which include resolutions adopted 
against Iraq (1990) and Libya (1992-93), is not non-compliance with the 
Security Council decision per se, but rather the Council's assessment that 
such non-compliance constitutes a threat to the peace, breach of the peace 
or act of aggression (article 39). On this point, see Kelsen, supra, note 
737, p. 294. 
      99  See text accompanying note 769, supra. 
      100  Acknowledgement: The seminar paper of a fellow student at the Graduate 
Institute of International Studies (Geneva) served as a useful introduction 
to the subject matter of this section: Sarah HEATHCOTE, "The Nature of 
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 To this point, we have been considering the specific legal 
basis of UN-conducted peace enforcement operations. In fact, 
among the four peace enforcement operations identified as such 
in chapter 7, only one, UNOSOM II, was conducted by the UN and, 
as noted earlier,101 even in this case, effective UN command and 
control was incomplete. The three other peace enforcement 
operations, while authorized and mandated by the UN Security 
Council, were under the operational control of an ad hoc 
coalition (UNITAF) or regional organization (NATO, in the case 
of IFOR and SFOR). 
 
 Military enforcement action of this kind pushed the UN-
conducted variety firmly to the sidelines during the 1990s, 
where it will likely remain for the foreseeable future as a 
result of the UN's continuing institutional and financial 
limitations102 and, above all, UN member states' deep-rooted 
reluctance to surrender sovereignty in the security realm. The 
question of the legal basis of UN-authorized peace enforcement 
is thus of considerable practical importance. 
 
 At first glance, it appears that articles 40 and 42 empower 
the Security Council, alone, to take the measures described 
therein: 
 
[Article 40:] ... the Security Council may ... call upon the 
parties concerned ... 
 
[Article 42:] Should the Security Council consider that measures 
provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to 
be inadequate, it may take such action ... [emphasis added] 
 
Forcible Measures under Article 42 of the Charter and the Legality of the 
Practice of 'Contracting Out' these Measures to Member States, Coalitions 
or Regional Arrangements" (1996). 
      101  See text accompanying notes 213-14, supra. 
      102  ─ as acknowledged by the UN itself. See: Agenda Supplement, supra, note 
1, para. 77; Le Secrétaire général souligne le rôle majeur joué par l'ONU 
dans l'émergence des nouvelles règles du droit international (Service de 
l'information de l'ONU (Genève), Communiqué de presse SG/SM/95/63/Rev.1, 22 
mars 1995), p. 6. 
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It is, therefore, far from clear that these articles can provide 
the legal basis for UN-authorized peace enforcement operations. 
In considering other possibilities suggested by Security Council 
practice and legal doctrine, we will use a broad canvas; our 
focus will be on all military enforcement action authorized by 
the UN ("permissive enforcement"), whether or not such action 
conforms to the definition of peace enforcement set out in 
chapter 7. 
 
 As previously noted, the Security Council has consistently 
refrained from indicating the specific legal basis of its 
chapter VII enforcement actions. Article 39 was mentioned by the 
UK representative in the discussions preceding the Council's 
adoption of a key resolution in the Korean Crisis (1950-53).103 
Yet, neither article 39, nor any other Charter provision, was 
mentioned in the three resolutions which formed the basis for 
the UN-sponsored military intervention in that country.104
 
 Security Council resolutions authorizing military enforce-
ment action in the post-Cold War period have typically cited 
chapter VII, in general, as the legal basis.105 On rare occa-
sions, where regional organizations have been involved in their 
implementation, chapter VIII of the Charter has also been 
mentioned in these resolutions.106
 
 The legal doctrine has tried to pin down the Charter basis 
of permissive enforcement with greater precision, yet has failed 
to reach anything remotely resembling a consensus on the matter. 
 
      103  See: Bowett, supra, note 119, p. 276; Seyersted, supra, note 110, pp. 
129-30; White, supra, note 749, p. 106. 
      104  See: SCR 82, S/1501, 25 June 1950; SCR 83, S/1511, 27 June 1950; SCR 84, 
S/1588, 7 July 1950. 
      105  See, for example: SCR 678, 29 Nov. 1990, last pream. para.; SCR 794, 3 
Dec. 1992, para. 10; SCR 929, 22 June 1994, para. 3; SCR 940, 31 July 1994, 
para. 4; SCR 1031, 15 Dec. 1995, last pream. para.; SCR 1088, 12 Dec. 1996, 
last pream. para. 
      106  See SCR 816, 31 March 1993, pream. para. 6. 
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Article 51 has frequently been cited as the legal basis of the 
Korean107 and Persian Gulf108 interventions. Yet, article 51 
presupposes a predetermined adversary and, as such, can have no 
application to peace enforcement which is necessarily impartial. 
 
 Other legal bases cited in respect of permissive 
enforcement which can be ruled out from further consideration 
include article 41,109 article 48,110 and article 106.111 While the 
relevance of the doctrine of implied powers ought not to be 
rejected at this stage, we will not need to invoke the doctrine 
of general or residual Security Council powers, whether based on 
Charter article 24(1)112 or on chapter VII as a whole,113 unless 
 
      107  See: Higgins, supra, note 771, p. 261; Frowein, supra, note 792, p. 614; 
Olivier PAYE, Sauve qui veut? (Bruxelles, Éditions Bruylant, 1996), p. 248. 
      108  See: Eugene ROSTOW, "Until What? Enforcement Action or Collective Self-
Defense?", The American Journal of International Law, vol. 85(3), July 
1991; Schachter, supra, note 737, pp. 459-61; Gaja, supra, note 732, pp. 
44-45. 
      109  Higgins has suggested that Security Council resolutions authorizing 
member states to use force for the purpose of ensuring compliance with 
mandatory economic sanctions can be based on article 41, like the sanctions 
themselves (supra, note 771, p. 258). This argument could be applied to 
peace enforcement where one holds that arms embargoes, a common feature of 
these operations, are also based on article 41. See note 756, supra. Yet, 
the argument, which basically involves an application of the doctrine of 
implied powers, must be rejected since the latter doctrine cannot lead to 
an increase of powers under the article (here, article 41) from which the 
additional powers are to be implied. I owe this point to my dissertation 
director, Professor Georges Abi-Saab. 
      110  For the arguments against the applicability of article 48, see: 
Schachter, supra, note 737, p. 463;  Bryde, supra, note 739, p. 652; 
Freudenschuss, supra, note 717, p. 525; text accompanying notes 745-46, 
supra. 
      111  Paye mentions article 106 as a possible legal basis for permissive 
enforcement, assuming the provision is not obsolete. Supra, note 809, p. 
252. In fact, as previously argued, the Security Council has at least 
implicitly determined that its authority under article 106 has terminated. 
See text accompanying notes 780-83, supra. 
      112  See Paye, supra, note 809, pp. 250-51 and 253-54. 
      113  See: Schachter, supra, note 737, pp. 459 and 461-62; Weston, supra, note 
775, p. 522; Combacau, supra, note 725, p. 157. 
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we find no specific Charter basis for UN-authorized peace 
enforcement. 
 
 In fact, two Charter provisions would appear to offer at 
least plausible legal bases for these operations. The Security 
Council's general chapter VII power of recommendation, suggested 
by the English text of article 39, has been seen by some legal 
scholars as the source of its authority in this area.114 In 
addition, article 53 specifically empowers the Council to 
"utilize ... regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement 
action under its authority."115
 
 Yet, article 53 is of limited application. Although, as 
will be explained later, the term "regional arrangement or 
agency" has been interpreted broadly, at least in the post-Cold 
War period, article 53 almost certainly does not encompass 
action taken by ad hoc coalitions, let alone that of individual 
states acting alone or in concert with one or two others. As for 
article 39, although it is of general application, it does not 
allow for any distinction between peace enforcement and other 
types of military enforcement action, such as "military sanc-
tions".116 Nor, for that matter, does article 53. 
 
 ──── 
 
 Article 42 is also cited in the legal doctrine as a legal 
basis for UN-authorized military enforcement operations.117 The 
 
      114  See: Bowett, supra, note 119, pp. 32-36 and 276-77; Goodrich, Hambro and 
Simons, supra, note 708, pp. 301 and 315; White, supra, note 749, pp. 104-
08. For an opposing view, see: Frowein, supra, note 792, pp. 614-16. 
      115  Article 53 has been identified by several commentators as a legal basis 
of NATO's involvement in Bosnia-Herzegovina, including the IFOR and SFOR 
peace enforcement operations. See: N.D. WHITE and Özlem ÜLGEN, "The 
Security Council and the Decentralised Military Option: Constitutionality 
and Function", Netherlands International Law Review, vol. XLIV, issue 3, 
1997, p. 389; James SUTTERLIN, The United Nations and the Maintenance of 
International Security (Westport, Connecticut, Praeger, 1995), p. 95. 
      116  See the end of chapter 7, supra. 
      117  See: Frowein, "Article 42", supra, note 747, p. 634; White, supra, note 
749, pp. 102-03; White and Ülgen, supra, note 817, generally (and pp. 381 
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question arises, therefore, as to whether articles 40 and 42 
could provide the legal basis for UN-authorized, as well as UN-
conducted, peace enforcement, notwithstanding the reservations 
expressed earlier in this regard. The delegation, by the 
Security Council, of military enforcement action to regional 
arrangements and agencies under article 53 would involve the 
delegation of the Council's article 42 powers.118 Yet, does the 
Council have a broader power of delegation of its article 42, 
and also article 40, powers ─ in favour of ad hoc coalitions and 
individual states, as well as regional arrangements and 
agencies? 
 
 In this regard, one should first note that the Security 
Council's powers of delegation do not stop at article 53, as 
claimed in some quarters.119 Articles 7(2), 29 and 98 of the 
Charter provide clear proof of this, although the delegation of 
Security Council powers is made in favour of "subsidiary 
organs", in the first two cases, and the UN Secretary-General in 
the last. However one defines the term "subsidiary organ",120 it 
is clear that the Security Council must retain a significant 
degree of control over the exercise of delegated powers. The 
powers enumerated in the UN Charter are given by the member 
 
and 411, more specifically); Schachter, supra, note 737, p. 462. Concerning 
Schachter's assertion that both articles 42 and 51 could serve as the legal 
basis of SCR 678 (29 Nov. 1990), authorizing military enforcement action 
against Iraq by a US-led coalition, see: Georges ABI-SAAB, commentaires 
(DANS Le chapitre VII de la Charte des Nations Unies, Paris, Pedone, 1995), 
p. 108; Frowein, p. 635. Those who have argued that article 42 cannot 
provide a legal basis for UN-authorized military enforcement operations 
include: Carl-August FLEISCHHAUER, "Inducing Compliance" (IN United Nations 
Legal Order, ed. by O. Schachter and C. Joyner, Cambridge, Cambridge U. 
Press, 1995), p. 233; Freudenschuss, supra, note 717, p. 524; and former UN 
Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali (An Agenda for Peace , supra, note 4, 
paras. 42-43). 
      118  Heathcote, supra, note 802, p. 22. And see Danesh SAROOSHI, The United 
Nations and the Development of Collective Security (Oxford, Clarendon 
Press, 1999), pp. 20 (1st limitation) and 248. 
      119  See: Bothe, supra, note 737, pp. 73-74. 
      120  For a broad interpretation of the term, see Mackinlay and Chopra, supra, 
note 4, p. 127. 
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states to specific UN organs. Delegated action must remain 
action of the organ.121 We will deal later with the question of 
the nature and degree of control that the Security Council must, 
constitutionally, retain over the military enforcement 
operations which it authorizes. At this point, it is sufficient 
to note that the Council's powers of delegation, though clearly 
admitted by the Charter, are nonetheless constrained along the 
lines just indicated. 
 
 The Security Council's delegation of its article 40 powers 
poses no particular problem. Provisional measures are, in 
principle, "without prejudice to the rights, claims, or position 
of the parties concerned" and, crucially, do not themselves 
involve the use of force. It is submitted that a Security 
Council power to delegate article 40 measures can be implied 
from article 40 itself. Adopting a narrow interpretation of the 
doctrine of implied powers, which ties the latter to specific 
enumerated powers,122 it appears reasonable to conclude that the 
power to delegate action designed to oversee party compliance 
with provisional measures123 is necessary to the effective 
exercise of the Security Council's article 40 powers, at least 
in those instances where the UN's modest institutional 
capacities for the maintenance of international peace are 
exceeded. 
 
 Yet, while the Security Council's powers of delegation 
clearly extend beyond article 53, they do not necessarily 
include a broader power of delegation of military enforcement 
action. The use of force by the Security Council pursuant to 
article 42 constitutes an exception to the prohibition of the 
use of force enunciated in Charter article 2(4), a linchpin, not 
merely of the law of the Charter, but of the international legal 
order as a whole. Yet, it is submitted that a broad power of 
 
      121  See Sarooshi, supra, note 820, pp. 20-32, 34-35, and 40-41. 
      122  See the sources cited in relation to implied powers in note 737, supra. 
      123  ─ i.e., the power to delegate the implementation of "second degree" 
provisional measures. See text accompanying note 764, supra. 
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delegation of military enforcement action can be accommodated 
within the Charter ─ more specifically within the framework of 
those Charter provisions which define the exception, in favour 
of the Security Council, to article 2(4). 
 
 Article 53 does not preclude a wider power of delegation of 
military enforcement action. Despite certain theoretical 
limitations on the notion of "regional arrangement or agency", 
enunciated in article 52(1),124 in practice, the term has been 
interpreted very broadly, at least in the post-Cold War 
period.125 There are, in other words, only modest restrictions on 
the type of entity to which the Security Council can delegate 
military enforcement action under article 53. There appears, 
then, to be no reason why such action could not also be 
delegated to ad hoc coalitions or individual member states, 
provided such entities and activities are also "consistent with 
the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations" (article 
52(1)). This will presumably be the case where the requirement 
of Security Council supervision, referred to earlier, is met.126
 
 It is submitted that article 42, as written, constitutes a 
sufficient legal basis for a broad Security Council power of 
delegation of military enforcement action, specifically in its 
second sentence: 
 
Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other 
operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United 
Nations. 
 
 
      124  See Akehurst, supra, note 708, p. 177. 
      125  See: Pierre-Marie DUPUY, "Le Maintien de la paix" (IN A Handbook on 
International Organizations, supra, note 766), pp. 599-603; An Agenda for 
Peace, supra, note 4, paras. 61-62. Note also that, in SCR 816 (31 March 
1993), the Security Council implicitly categorized NATO, which was to 
enforce the Bosnian no-fly zone pursuant to this resolution, as a "regional 
arrangement or agency" (see: pream. para. 6; op. para. 4). This was often 
disputed during the Cold War. For contrasting views on this issue, see: 
Bowett, supra, note 119, pp. 306-07; Akehurst, supra, note 708, pp. 179-80. 
      126  See Sarooshi, supra, note 820, pp. 148 and 161-62. 
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This provision has the obvious function of indicating what kinds 
of measures "action" under article 42 could include.127 It is 
submitted that it also illustrates a means of taking such action 
which is different from that mentioned in the first sentence. 
The word "it", meaning the Security Council, in the first 
sentence ─ "it may take such action ..." ─ stands in marked 
contrast to the phrase "air, sea, or land forces of Members of 
the United Nations", in the second. In the first sentence, it 
appears, the military forces are the forces of the Security 
Council, while in the second they are the forces of UN members ─ 
two different means of implementation.128
 
 In the first sentence of article 42, the forces, whether 
provided pursuant to the special agreements envisaged in article 
43 or on an ad hoc basis, as in the case of UNOSOM II, are under 
the operational control of the Security Council or some other UN 
body, such as the Military Staff Committee (article 47), 
directly controlled by it.129 In the second sentence of article 
42, operational control is delegated down to the ad hoc 
coalition or individual state or states responsible for the 
military enforcement action. Yet, we have already noted that, 
even in this second case, such enforcement action must remain 
action of the Security Council in some significant sense. It is 
time to consider the question of the nature and degree of 
control that the Security Council must, constitutionally, retain 
over the military enforcement operations which it authorizes. 
 
 Article 53, as written and applied, is not much help in 
answering this question. Even assuming it makes sense to 
distinguish those situations where the Council "utilize[s]" a 
regional arrangement or agency "for enforcement action under its 
 
      127  See Goodrich, Hambro, and Simons, supra, note 708, p. 315. 
      128  See: Fischer, supra, note 776, pp. 711 and 713; Rein MÜLLERSON and David 
SCHEFFER, "Legal Regulation of the Use of Force" (IN Beyond Confrontation, 
ed. by L.F. Damrosch, G.M. Danilenko, and R. Müllerson, Boulder, Co., 
Westview Press, 1995), p. 128. But see Frowein, "Article 42", supra, note 
747, p. 630. 
      129  See Sarooshi, supra, note 820, p. 142. 
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authority" from those where it "authoriz[es]" enforcement action 
taken at the initiative of a regional entity,130 the text of 
article 53 remains vague on the question of Security Council 
control. Focusing solely on the former scenario, the word 
"utilize", suggesting operational control, is juxtaposed with 
the phrase "under [the Council's] authority", which need not 
amount to anything more than political authority. 
 
 What practice exists with respect to article 53 is equally 
contradictory. As we have seen, UN control over NATO missions in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina has ranged from minimal, in the case of no-
fly zone enforcement and the IFOR and SFOR operations, to 
partial, in the case of safe areas protection. This is 
indicative of the fact that post-Cold War practice in respect of 
permissive enforcement, whether based on article 53 or not, has 
been quite mixed. 
 
 The UN was shunted aside at the beginning of the 1990s, 
during the Gulf War (January-February 1991)131, and again, 
towards the end of the decade, during the US-UK air strikes 
against Iraq (December 1998)132 and the NATO air campaign against 
the FRY in relation to Kosovo (March-June 1999)133 ─ although the 
latter two initiatives do not really fall within the scope of 
our study of UN-authorized operations as they had received no 
such authorization. In any case, throughout most of the 1990s, 
 
      130  See: Akehurst, supra, note 708, p. 184; Christian WALTER, "Security 
Council Control over Regional Action", Max Planck Yearbook of United 
Nations Law, vol. 1, 1997, p. 176. 
      131  See: Weston, supra, note 775, pp. 525-26; SCR 678, 29 Nov. 1990, paras. 
2 and 4. 
      132  See Jules LOBEL and Michael RATNER, "Bypassing the Security Council: 
Ambiguous Authorizations to Use Force, Cease-Fires and the Iraqi Inspection 
Regime", The American Journal of International Law, vol. 93(1), Jan. 1999. 
      133  See: Jorri DUURSMA, "Justifying NATO's Use of Force in Kosovo?", Leiden 
Journal of International Law, vol. 12(2), 1999; Bruno SIMMA, "NATO, the UN 
and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects", European Journal of International 
Law, vol. 10(1), 1999; Antonio CASSESE, "Ex iniuria ius oritur: Are We 
Moving towards International Legitimation of Forcible Humanitarian 
Countermeasures in the World Community?", European Journal of International 
Law, vol. 10(1), 1999. 
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UN-authorized military enforcement operations were, in fact, 
subject to relatively close UN supervision, with political, 
though not operational, control residing firmly with the 
Security Council.134
 
 Control of this sort is now seen by most legal scholars as 
validating the practice of permissive enforcement, the legality 
of which was contested in some quarters in the aftermath of the 
1991 Gulf War.135 Generally, the legal doctrine affirms the need 
for the states or groups of states authorized to take military 
enforcement action to be seen to act on behalf of the UN.136 More 
specifically, legal scholars emphasize the importance of regular 
UN monitoring of the operation137 and, above all, the need for a 
clear, specific and carefully delimited UN mandate.138
 
 Absent any authoritative pronouncement on the question, in 
particular from the International Court of Justice, it seems 
reasonable to conclude that the practice of permissive enforce-
ment can only be compatible with the Charter where it adheres to 
principles of this kind. At this stage in the development of 
Charter law, one cannot be any more precise. 
 
 
      134  See: White and Ülgen, supra, note 817, pp. 381, 387 and 396-412; Lobel 
and Ratner, supra, note 834, pp. 141-42; SCR 940, 31 July 1994, paras. 4-8 
and 13 (authorizing the 1994 military intervention in Haiti). Note, 
however, that these operations typically involved situations of modest 
strategic importance for the major powers. Lobel and Ratner, pp. 143-44. 
      135  See Freudenschuss, supra, note 717, p. 526. 
      136  See Mackinlay and Chopra, supra, note 4, p. 127. Note that in the 
preamble to the UN Charter, member states undertake "to ensure, by the 
acceptance of principles and the institution of methods, that armed force 
shall not be used, save in the common interest". 
      137  See: White and Ülgen, supra, note 817, pp. 387 and 410; Sarooshi, supra, 
note 820, pp. 155, 159-63, and 249-50. 
      138  See: Mackinlay and Chopra, supra, note 4, p. 127; White, supra, note 
749, pp. 103-04; Luigi CONDORELLI, "Le Statut des forces de l'ONU et le 
droit international humanitaire", Rivista di Diritto Internazionale, vol. 
78(4), 1995, p. 906; Gaja, supra, note 732, p. 46; White and Ülgen, supra, 
note 817, p. 387; Lobel and Ratner, supra, note 834, pp. 125, 127-29, and 
142-44; Sarooshi, supra, note 820, pp. 44-46, 155-59, and 249-50. 
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 ──── 
 
 Subject, then, to the above proviso, it is submitted that 
the second sentence of article 42 can serve as a legal basis for 
UN-authorized military enforcement operations. Returning to our 
principal subject of interest, UN-authorized peace enforcement 
operations would involve a delegation of the Security Council's 
powers under articles 40 and 42 on the basis of article 40 (an 
implied power) and the second sentence of article 42 ─ subject, 
once again, to the conditions relating to Security Council 
control outlined in the preceding paragraphs. Which is to say, 
simplifying only slightly, that UN-conducted and UN-authorized 
peace enforcement operations share the same legal basis ─ 
articles 40 and 42 of the Charter. 
 
 If one assumes that the preferred legal basis for peace-
keeping operations is article 40, alone,139 and that UN-conducted 
or authorized "military sanctions" ─ lacking impartiality and 
the strict conflict-dampening rationale of peace enforcement140 ─ 
would be based on article 42, alone, then peace enforcement's 
intermediate, yet distinct, position on the "peace operations 
spectrum", described in chapter 7,141 has its legal corollary. 
Combining features of both peace-keeping and military sanctions, 
peace enforcement, whether conducted or authorized by the 
Security Council, also combines their respective legal bases to 
form a unique legal entity based on both articles 40 and 42 of 
the UN Charter. 
 
      139  See text accompanying note 766, supra. 
      140  See: chapter 6, paragraph accompanying note 693, supra; end of chapter 
7, supra. 
      141  See the final pages of the chapter. Note that, for the sake of argument, 
it is assumed here that the category of "war" does indeed violate interna-
tional law, leaving military sanctions alone at the end point of our 
spectrum. 
CONCLUSION: THE ROLE 
OF PEACE ENFORCEMENT 
 
 
 In this final section of the dissertation, we turn to the 
question of peace enforcement's functional specificity in the 
context of the broader range of instruments developed by the UN 
for the maintenance of international peace and security. What is 
the role of peace enforcement in relation to peace-keeping and 
military sanctions? 
 
 In the course of the dissertation, we have identified three 
distinct types of peace operation using the three parameters of 
the use of force, consent, and impartiality. In peace-keeping, 
the use of force is limited to self-defence, whereas in both 
peace enforcement and military sanctions force may be used to 
implement the mandate, subject, in both cases, to the 
requirement of restraint. Consent is full and continuous in 
peace-keeping, imperfect (incomplete, artificial and/or 
unstable) in peace enforcement and wholly absent in the case of 
military sanctions. While both peace-keeping and peace 
enforcement are impartial, military sanctions, involving the 
prior designation of an adversary or target, are entirely 
partial. 
 
 As we saw earlier,1 the range of functions that peace 
enforcement operations perform is quite wide. These may or may 
not have a specific humanitarian focus; yet, in every case, the 
underlying aim is the restoration and/or preservation of peace. 
This basic function of peace enforcement is applicable to both 
intrastate and interstate conflict. 
 
 As indicated previously, the concept of peace enforcement 
was developed in the early 1990s in response to the UN's 
increasing involvement in internal conflict and the problems 
often encountered, in that context, by UN forces operating under 
traditional peace-keeping rules.2 The four peace enforcement 
                                                                
      1  See: chapter 6, third paragraph of the "Conclusion", supra; chapter 7, 
pp. 173-74, supra. 
      2  See: Introduction, pp. 1-2, supra; chapter 1, pp. 16-17 and 20, supra. 
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operations identified as such in chapter 7 were all deployed in 
situations of internal conflict. One of these operations, namely 
UNITAF, was basically involved in freezing a conflict in place ─ 
preserving the status quo in the temporary absence of longer-
term political solutions.3
 
 Yet, the three other peace enforcement operations (UNOSOM 
II, IFOR and SFOR) were all mandated to help implement a peace 
settlement ─ essentially facilitating the peaceful change of the 
prevailing status quo. This distinction between peace 
enforcement operations designed to preserve the status quo and 
those which are supposed to help change it, parallels the 
distinction often made, since the end of the Cold War, between 
traditional or "first generation" peace-keeping operations and 
the "second generation" variety.4 It is a distinction which can 
also be applied to interstate conflict, although there is a 
complete lack of practice to date insofar as peace enforcement 
is concerned.5
 
 In chapter 6, we saw that US, UK and French military 
doctrines all admit the possibility of transitions from one type 
of peace operation to another. There were several examples of 
such transitions during the first half of the 1990s. In Somalia, 
for example, the sequence ran from peace-keeping (UNOSOM I) to 
peace enforcement (UNITAF, UNOSOM II) and back to peace-keeping 
(UNOSOM II from October 1993). The situation in Bosnia-Herzego-
vina was rather more muddled in the sense that varying types of 
military intervention tended, up until December 1995, to 
overlap. Nevertheless, one can identify a broad shift from 
peace-keeping (UNPROFOR) to military sanctions (Operation 
 
      3  See chapter 3, "UNITAF" section, supra, especially pp. 53-55 concerning 
the latter's policy of "weapons management" as opposed to real disarmament. 
Note also that the cease-fire enforcement function of former Secretary-
General Boutros-Ghali's "peace-enforcement units" would, without more, also 
involve the preservation of the prevailing status quo. 
      4  See chapter 1, p. 19, supra. 
      5  As noted earlier, the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission 
(UNIKOM) does not have enforcement powers (text accompanying note 697, 
supra). 
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Deliberate Force) and, since December 1995, peace enforcement 
(IFOR and SFOR). 
 
 Other examples of such transitions in the context of 
intrastate conflict include Haiti and Rwanda over the 1993-95 
period. An example in the interstate realm is the transition 
from military sanctions (Operation Desert Storm) to peace-
keeping (UNIKOM)6 in the case of the Iraq-Kuwait conflict. 
Clearly, peace enforcement is typically just one component of a 
much broader series of actions designed to bring a particular 
armed conflict to an end. Its role in relation to peace-keeping 
and military sanctions cannot, however, be defined in terms of 
function. 
 
 Whether in the context of intrastate or interstate 
conflict, whether for purposes of preserving the status quo or 
peacefully changing it, peace enforcement has only one basic 
function ─ the restoration and/or preservation of peace. In 
this, it is really no different from peace-keeping and, in the 
long-term, military sanctions. 
 
 Peace enforcement finds its vocation in those conflict 
zones which lack the full and continuous consent necessary to 
peace-keeping. This makes an enforcement mandate necessary, yet 
peace enforcement is not directed, a priori, against any party 
to the conflict; it is impartial in both its means (the even-
handed implementation ...) and ends (... of a mandate of general 
application). 
 
 Peace enforcement, in other words, is defined by its 
characteristics, not its function or functions. As explained in 
chapter 8, these characteristics have legal significance. Put 
most simply, the role of peace enforcement is to fulfil what was 
probably the principal aspiration of the signatories of the UN 
Charter ─ "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of 
war".
7
 Its specificity in the context of the broader range of 
 
      6  See text accompanying note 697, supra. 
      7  UN Charter, preamble. 
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instruments developed by the UN for this same purpose derives 
from its principal characteristics of enforcement, imperfect 
consent and impartiality. 
 LIST OF ACRONYMS 
 
 
 
AFP Agence France-Presse 
 
AP The Associated Press 
 
AWSS authorized weapons storage site 
 
CIS Commonwealth of Independent States 
 
ECOMOG ECOWAS Monitoring Group 
 
ECOSOC Economic and Social Council 
 
ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States 
 
FRY Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
 
GAR General Assembly Resolution 
 
ICTY International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
 
IFOR Implementation Force 
 
IHT International Herald Tribune 
 
IPTF United Nations International Police Task Force  
 
LAT Los Angeles Times 
 
MOOTW military operations other than war 
 
NAC North Atlantic Council 
 
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
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International Peacekeeping News (U. of Bradford, UK). 
 
Keesing's Record of World Events. 
 
Los Angeles Times. 
 
Le Monde. 
 
The New York Times. 
 
Nouvelles atlantiques (Bruxelles).10
 
OHR Chronology (Office of the High Representative for 
Implementation of the Peace Agreement on Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
1997).11
 
Pursuing Balkan Peace (Open Media Research Institute).12
 
RFE/RL news, features and analyses (Radio Free Europe / Radio 
Liberty).13
 
RFE/RL Newsline (Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty).14
 
Somalia News Update (Uppsala U., Sweden). 
 
     8  See note 5, supra. 
     9  Citations to the Herald Tribune in the text indicate the news service(s) 
used for the article in question: Agence France Presse (AFP), The 
Associated Press (AP), International Herald Tribune (IHT), New York Times 
Service (NYT), Reuters, and Washington Post Service (WP). 
     10  Also published in English as Atlantic News. 
     11  Obtained through the OHR website: <http://www.ohr.int> 
     12  See note 5, supra. 
     13  Obtained through the RFE/RL website: <http://www.rferl.org> 
     14  Obtained via e-mail subscription. Also available through the RFE/RL 
website: <http://www.rferl.org/newsline/> 
